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PREFACE 
 
 
This doctoral dissertation was written at the University of Munich at the chair of 
Professor Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt from 1999 to 2004. It consists of three chapters that 
can be read independently. 
The first two chapters of this thesis are concerned with the theory of fairness. 
One of the most fundamental paradigms of economic theory until the 1990’s has been 
the so called self-interest hypothesis, according to which economic agents only care for 
their own material well-being and disregard the utility of others. This is not to say that 
all economists denied the existence of other-regarding preferences like reciprocity, envy 
or altruism.1 Rather, it was common practice not to incorporate social preferences into 
economic models despite the fact that researchers knew from their personal experiences 
that not everybody is always completely selfish. This mainly had four reasons. 
Firstly, the self-interest hypothesis is of remarkable mathematical simplicity as it 
generates utility functions that only have one argument, namely the vector of goods that 
an agent consumes. This allowed building tractable models in a unified framework. 
 Secondly, the results that these models generated were largely consistent with 
the observations that one could make in real world markets, which were at the center of 
interest for general equilibrium theorists. In related disciplines – such as public choice 
theory – the self-interest hypothesis also yielded predictions that were consistent with
                                                 
1 As one would have guessed, already Adam Smith (1759) discusses other-regarding preferences. 
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reality. In short, the simple assumptions that theorists made were useful for the purpose 
at hand. 
 Thirdly, imposing the restriction that economic agents have to be rational and 
self-interested constituted a code of conduct for economic researchers that everybody 
had to subdue to. By explicitly ruling out bounded rationality or ''strange'' preferences, 
researchers could not go the easy way and simply postulate an appropriate utility 
function in order to generate phenomena that were observed in reality. This clearly had 
the advantage of establishing some kind of discipline.  
Finally, many of the situations where people suspected that other-regarding 
preferences might play a role were regarding interaction among small numbers of 
agents. In these situations strategic considerations clearly play an important role. But 
prior to the advent of game theory, such situations could not even be appropriately 
modeled within the self-interest framework – let alone in a more complicated 
environment with interdependent utility functions. 
The first three arguments for restricting attention to self-interested preferences 
still have their merits. However, since the 1980’s a pervasive amount of empirical and 
experimental evidence has been collected which shows that social preferences play an 
important role in many situations that go far beyond the private sphere. It was shown for 
example that firms explicitly adapt their wage policies in a way that is deemed fair by 
their workers (see for instance Blinder and Choi, 1990, and Bewley, 1999). 
Furthermore, a large number of bilateral bargaining experiments made clear that 
people’s desire for a fair treatment sometimes made them incur substantial monetary 
losses in order to punish unfair (or reward fair) behavior by others (see Roth, 1995, and 
Camerer and Thaler, 1995, for surveys). This literature made clear that contrary to prior 
presumptions, other-regarding preferences were often very important in a variety of 
economic fields.2 
                                                 
2 It is not our aim to give an even rudimentary overview over this burgeoning literature at this point. See 
Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for an extensive survey. 
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As a consequence, models came up that tried to capture other-regarding motives 
in a general way. These papers can be largely divided into two categories. One strand of 
the literature models fairness as reciprocal (i.e. intention-based) behavior (Rabin, 1993, 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). The other strand of the literature builds on models 
with distributive (i.e. outcome-based) fairness (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000). Falk and Fischbacher (2000) and Charness and Rabin (2002) use 
elements of both types of fairness. Experiments that try to discriminate between these 
different views of fairness (Falk et al., 2000, Nelson, 2002, and Engelmann and Strobel, 
2004) indicate that reciprocity may be the driving force behind what is regarded as fair 
behavior. However, it has been shown that in most economic situations the predictions 
of reciprocity and distributive fairness are equivalent. Hence, concepts like Fehr and 
Schmidt’s (1999) inequity aversion, which are mathematically far more tractable than 
models of reciprocity, can be used as a proxy for reciprocity. 
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation (which is joint work with Ernst Fehr and Klaus 
M. Schmidt) we apply the model of inequity aversion to a problem that has so far only 
been analyzed within the framework of selfish agents: the hold-up problem.3 A hold-up 
problem arises when two (or more) parties engage in a common project that requires 
unverifiable investments, which are more valuable inside the relationship than outside. 
As the lack of verifiability of the investments makes it impossible to enforce an explicit 
contract on investments, agents may renegotiate any contract that is written at the 
beginning of the project. In this renegotiation agents can threaten to leave the 
relationship in order to reap greater benefits of the proceeds from the joint project. Ex 
ante, when agents have to decide on how much effort they want to invest into the 
project, investment incentives are affected by the expectation of this ex post bargaining. 
As investors fear expropriation, they tend to underinvest. 
The property rights approach (pioneered by Grossman and Hart, 1986, and Hart 
and Moore, 1990) shows that an optimal allocation of control rights over assets can 
mitigate the hold-up problem by increasing the investment incentives of those agents 
                                                 
3 See Hart (1995) for an overview over the literature on the hold-up problem. 
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whose contribution to the project is most valuable. One of the main findings of this 
literature is that joint ownership of assets is rarely optimal. The intuition for this is that 
joint ownership of an asset allows both owners to threaten blockade of the asset in the 
renegotiation. Hence both parties’ investment incentives are diluted. If a given asset has 
only one owner, then at least this one agent can not be fully blocked: as the owner of the 
asset he can use his investment with his asset. He thus has a better bargaining position 
and hence better investment incentives. 
Clearly, this view of the world extensively uses the properties of the self-interest 
model. In reality, however, joint ownership is something that can be observed in many 
different situations. We claim that one of the reasons for this is that fairness can be used 
as a contract enforcement device in joint projects.4 If there is a sufficiently large 
proportion of fair-minded agents, even selfish agents may invest because they expect to 
have fair partners. As fair partners will invest if and only if the other agents invest also, 
it may be worthwhile for an egoistic agent to contribute to the joint project. 
In order to investigate this matter we first construct a theoretical model inspired 
by Hart (1995). In this model, the self-interest hypothesis predicts that joint ownership 
is never optimal and that hence agents will not choose it as the ownership structure in 
the first place. We then show, however, that joint ownership may be the optimal form of 
ownership if there is a positive proportion of inequity averse agents.  
Thereafter we report the results of experiments that we conducted with students 
who played the game that we propose in the model. The prediction of the self-interest 
model that joint ownership generates low investments and will never be chosen turns 
out to be completely wrong. Quite to the contrary, joint ownership on average generated 
high investments in our experiments and was the predominantly chosen form of 
ownership. 
While Chapter 1 investigates an application of the theory of fairness to an 
economically interesting problem, Chapter 2 takes a closer look at the nature of fairness 
                                                 
4 In different settings this has been shown to be true in the experiments conducted by Fehr, Gächter and 
Kirchsteiger (1997) and Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2003). 
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in general. This paper presents the results of experiments that were conducted in order 
to evaluate how the social preferences of subjects are structured and how they are 
affected by different environments. We employed a series of purely distributional games 
where the subjects only had to decide on the payoff of other participants without any 
form of strategic interaction. Thus, these experiments try to shed light on the 
distributional aspects of fairness. 
First, we investigate the impact of different experimental framings on the 
subjects’ distributional decisions. We employ framings where there are real monetary 
payoffs and others where the experimental games are purely hypothetical. Also, we 
employ framings where people have to play an ultimatum game (which is essentially 
strategic) prior to the distribution games in order to set subjects in a strategic mood. Our 
results show that both types of framing have statistically and economically significant 
effects.  
Having real payoffs leads people to choose more efficient allocations on average 
– often at the cost of the poorest person in the reference group. If the decisions are 
hypothetical, subjects’ decisions reflect a much stronger concern for the poorest person. 
We argue that this change in preferences may reflect a desire to appear fair in a 
Rawlsian sense and to act fair in the sense of efficiency. 
The effect of a strategic environment is that subjects’ choices shift towards 
allocations that have most payoff for the poorest member of the reference group – at the 
expense of efficiency. Our interpretation of this phenomenon is that being dependent on 
other people’s choices in the ultimatum game makes subjects put themselves more into 
the position of others in the distributional games. As in the real world distributional 
decisions are rarely free of strategic elements, this result suggests that experiments on 
distributional fairness may generally be biased towards efficiency. 
Concerning the discrimination between models of distributional fairness, our 
experiments confirm the results of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) that distributional 
decisions are more affected by efficiency and maximin motives (as in Charness and 
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Rabin, 2002) than by inequity aversion. However, we demonstrate that more than 40 
percent of the population does not consistently decide according to any of the theories 
mentioned above. 
It should be stressed that the results of this chapter concern aspects of purely 
distributional fairness. They show that using inequity aversion as a predictive model for 
distributional games may be misleading. But of course, they do not say anything about 
the predictive power of inequity aversion in games of strategy. In fact, the theory has 
been tremendously successful in explaining the results of experiments with strategic 
content (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).5 
Chapter 3 (which is joint work with Hans Zenger) analyzes a topic that is 
unrelated to Chapters 1 and 2. In this paper we investigate the impact of asymmetric 
information on the equilibrium allocation in media markets. Media markets have long 
been of interest for economists because media products are different in character to 
standard goods.6 Arguably, the biggest difference is that media firms cater to two 
distinct groups, consumers that want to buy the media product and firms that want to 
advertise in it. Therefore, media markets are two-sided.7 This implies that media 
companies, when setting their pricing policy for one side of the market, have to take 
into account what externalities they exert on the other side of the market. For instance, 
increasing the price for advertising will lower the amount of advertising and hence 
increase consumer’s demand (if consumers dislike advertising). Chapter 3 focuses on 
one particular type of interaction between the two market sides; namely, the 
interdependence of readers’ characteristics and advertising rates, and the impact of this 
relation on the optimal pricing policy for media firms. 
Our starting point is the observation that firms that engage in advertising are 
willing to pay different advertising rates depending on the attractiveness of the people 
                                                 
5 This is one of the reasons why we have used inequity aversion for the theoretical analysis of Chapter 1, 
where the experimental game is highly strategic. As will be shown below, also in this case the predictive 
power of inequity aversion is high. 
6 Early treatments are Corden (1953) and Reddaway (1963). 
7 See Armstrong (2004) for an overview of the two-sided market literature. 
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who watch the advertisement. For example, high income consumers are more attractive 
for firms than low income consumers. This turns out to be the main reason why direct 
markets for advertising show a market-unraveling as proposed by Akerlof (1970). In 
principle, this adverse selection problem is present in media markets as well. As rich 
consumers have to view less advertising in order to generate a certain amount of 
revenue for the media firm, low income consumers have an incentive to consume 
media-products that are targeted at high income types, because they contain less 
advertising.  
In the paper, we investigate in which way media firms can mitigate this problem 
by screening consumers. The idea behind this is that media firms can distort their 
primary product (selling content) in order to alleviate the informational distortion in the 
secondary product (offering advertising). It turns out that media firms will use two 
instruments to deter low income types from consuming high type media products: (i) 
They will raise the price of the high type media product above first best levels. (ii) They 
will increase the level of quality of content of the high type bundle above first best 
levels. The intuition for those distortions is as follows. A price increase naturally hurts 
low income types more than high income types. A quality increase makes the media 
product more costly to produce. But since high types have greater wealth, they are likely 
to have a higher willingness to pay for quality improvements. Hence a quality distortion 
(which implies more advertising and a higher price of the media product) is less 
annoying for high types than for low types. 
It turns out to be crucial for the results of the paper how different the valuations 
of quality for the two types really are. A larger difference in the preference for quality 
has two effects. (i) Since the two types want to consume products of more different 
qualities, using the quality distortion is more effective, and hence the screening 
instruments are gradually exchanged. (ii) As the bundles the two types prefer get more 
differentiated, it generally becomes easier to deter low types. Hence, the necessary 
distortion to achieve incentive compatibility can be reduced. Beyond some point, the 
second effect is so strong that the first best can be achieved. 
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It will be shown that the above effects occur both in monopolistic and in 
competitive media markets. In monopolistic markets an additional interesting 
observation can be made: contrary to ordinary goods markets, the monopolist will never 
find it optimal to ration a part of the consumers. This suggests that the inefficiencies 
that a monopoly generates are less severe in media markets than in standard goods 
markets. The intuition behind this result is that using two payment instruments to 
finance the product (price and advertising) makes price discrimination of types easier 
and hence more profitable compared to the standard case. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
FAIRNESS AND THE OPTIMAL 
ALLOCATION OF OWNERSHIP RIGHTS8 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we take a fresh look at an old question: What is the optimal allocation of 
ownership rights? The modern property rights approach, pioneered by Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) argues that in a world of incomplete contracts 
the allocation of ownership rights matters because it assigns residual rights of control.9 
These control rights affect the bargaining position of the involved parties when the 
original contract is renegotiated, which in turn affects the incentives of the involved 
parties to make relationship specific investments that cannot be contracted 
                                                 
8 This chapter is joint work with Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt. 
9 The early literature, starting with Coase (1960), emphasizes that it is of crucial importance for economic 
efficiency that property rights are well defined. However, the Coase Theorem suggests that it does not 
matter for economic efficiency to whom ownership rights are allocated. In the absence of any transaction 
costs any (well defined) allocation of ownership rights implements an efficient outcome. Williamson 
(1985) points out that if the parties can write complete contingent contracts, then any ownership structure 
can be mimicked by an appropriate set of incentive contracts, so the ownership structure is irrelevant. 
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upon directly. A prominent result of this literature (see e.g. Hart, 1995) is that joint 
ownership is rarely optimal. The reason is that if both parties own an asset, then they 
can prevent each other from using the asset. Thus, joint ownership minimizes the 
threatpoint payoffs of both parties. Giving all the ownership rights to one party 
increases this party’s payoff if bargaining breaks down without reducing the other 
party’s payoff. Thus the sole owner’s investment incentives increase while the 
incentives of the non-owners are unaffected.  
The property rights approach is based on the self-interest model that assumes 
that all parties are only interested in their own material payoffs. However, we know 
from many experiments and also from systematic field evidence,10 that concerns for 
fairness and reciprocity play an important role in motivating the behavior of many 
people. Several experiments (e.g. Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997, and Fehr, Klein 
and Schmidt, 2003) point out that if only incomplete contracts can be written, then 
fairness and reciprocity may act as an enforcement device that complements (and 
sometimes substitutes for) explicit incentives that are enforced by the courts. This 
chapter addresses the question whether concerns for fairness and reciprocity affect the 
optimal allocation of ownership rights.  
In Section 1.2 we consider a very simple model based on Hart (1995). There are 
two parties, called A and B, who need a physical asset to produce some joint surplus in 
the future. The amount of this surplus is determined by some relationship specific 
investments that the parties can make. The question is who should own the asset. Joint 
ownership is never optimal if it is common knowledge that both parties are only 
interested in their own material payoffs. The self-interest model also predicts that there 
is no ownership structure that implements first best investments. However, A- or B-
ownership strongly outperform joint ownership, and the parties will always agree on the 
efficient ownership structure ex ante. This corresponds to the results of Hart and Moore 
(1990) and Hart (1995) who argue that joint ownership minimizes investment incentives 
of both parties and that giving all ownership rights to one party is second best optimal.  
                                                 
10 See Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for a recent survey on this literature. 
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In Section 1.3 we compare the prediction of the self-interest model to the 
predictions of two other approaches. The first approach assumes that it is common 
knowledge that all parties strongly care about fairness and reciprocity. Models of 
intention-based reciprocity (such as Rabin, 1993, or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 
2004) as well as models of social preferences or distributional fairness (such as Bolton 
and Ockenfels, 2000, or Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) predict that in this case, the allocation 
of ownership rights does not matter. Under any allocation of ownership rights, fairness 
and reciprocity suffice as an enforcement device to induce both parties to invest 
efficiently.  
The second approach acknowledges that people differ. Some people seem to 
care quite strongly about fairness and reciprocity while other people seem to be mainly 
self-interested. Furthermore, people often don’t know whether they interact with a fair-
minded or a self-interested opponent. Using the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity 
aversion, we show that in this case, like in Hart (1995), no ownership structure 
implements first best investments, and that the allocation of ownership rights does 
matter. However, in contrast to Hart (1995), joint ownership turns out to be the second 
best optimal ownership structure. The players anticipate this and will choose to have 
joint ownership in equilibrium.   
In Section 1.4 we put these theoretical predictions to an experimental test. In the 
experiments players first have to bargain on the allocation of ownership rights on a joint 
project. They can either have joint ownership, or one of the parties can be the sole 
owner and hire the other party as an employee. Then the two parties can make 
relationship specific investments that increase the joint surplus to be generated. Finally 
the surplus is shared according to the ex ante chosen allocation of ownership rights. We 
are interested in two questions: First, which ownership structure is (second-best) 
efficient, in the sense that it induces the most efficient investment decisions of the two 
parties? Second, do the experimental subjects understand what the most efficient 
ownership structure is and do they manage to set up this ownership structure ex ante? In 
order to address the second question we consider two different experimental designs. In 
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the Joint Ownership Design (JOD) the parties start with joint ownership but one of the 
parties can try to sell his ownership stake to the other party. In the A-Ownership Design 
(AOD), A owns the project initially, but she can give away half of her ownership rights 
to B. Thus, we can test whether the initial allocation of ownership rights affects the final 
outcome or whether the parties will always manage to set up the efficient ownership 
structure. 
In the experiments it turned out that no ownership structure can induce both 
parties to invest efficiently. Thus, concerns for fairness and reciprocity did not suffice as 
an enforcement device to achieve the first best. Furthermore, the allocation of 
ownership rights did matter. However, in contrast to the predictions of the self-interest 
model, joint ownership turned out to be second-best optimal. The large majority of the 
experimental subjects anticipated this and managed to achieve joint-ownership both in 
the Joint Ownership Design and in the A-Ownership Design. The Fehr-Schmidt (1999) 
model of inequity aversion is largely consistent with these observations. 
An alternative approach to model reciprocal behavior is to consider repeated 
games models. However, this approach is plagued by multiple equilibria. Furthermore, 
if the parties are sufficiently patient, then there is an equilibrium that sustains efficient 
investments of both parties independent of the allocation of ownership rights.11 If the 
parties are less patient, however, the allocation of ownership rights may matter. Halonen 
(2002) considers a model, where, like in Hart (1995), joint ownership maximizes hold-
up problems and is the worst ownership structure of the one-shot game. In the repeated 
game, however, this ''worst'' ownership structure may be beneficial because it provides 
the strongest possibilities to punish if one of the parties deviates from the efficient 
actions. On the other hand, with this ownership structure the gain from deviation is also 
highest. Halonen characterizes a set of parameters where the first effect dominates the 
second effect and joint ownership is optimal.  
                                                 
11 See Hart (2001) for a discussion of this approach applied to the theory of the firm.  
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There are a few theoretical models of one-shot interactions showing that joint 
ownership may sometimes be optimal. Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999) consider a set-
up where parties have to engage in two types of investments. They have to make 
relationship specific investments in their human capital but also to invest in know-how 
disclosure which increases the effectiveness of the investment of the other party. 
Rosenkranz and Schmitz show that joint ownership improves the incentives to engage 
in know-how disclosure which may turn joint ownership to be the optimal ownership 
structure. Maskin and Tirole (1999) consider a buyer-seller relationship where the seller 
can make a relationship specific investment to reduce his costs while the buyer can 
invest to increase her valuation of the good to be traded at some future date. Production 
requires the use of a physical asset. Maskin and Tirole show that joint ownership of this 
asset combined with an option to sell his or her share of the asset to the other party 
which is assigned with equal probabilities to each of the parties can implement first best 
incentives. However, this contract requires that if one party exercises the option to sell, 
the other party has to make a large payment to a third party. The idea is that exercising 
the option is advantageous if and only if the other party did not invest efficiently. 
However, because this contract relies on a side-payment to a third party off the 
equilibrium path, it is not robust against collusion. None of these papers considers the 
effects of fairness and reciprocity that may be generated by joint ownership.  
 
 
1.2 A Simple Problem of the Allocation of Ownership Rights 
 
Consider two players, called A and B, who can generate a joint surplus if they have 
access to a physical asset K .12 The gross surplus ( , )v a b  depends on the investments, a  
and b , undertaken sequentially by the two players. Investments are personally costly 
                                                 
12 The physical asset may be a plant, machinery, a building, or a ''soft'' asset such as a patent or a client 
list.  
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with investment costs given by ( )Ac a and ( )Bc b , respectively. We assume that the gross 
surplus function is differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments and concave. For 
simplicity, let us assume that the problem is symmetric in the sense that 
( ) ( ) ( )A Bc c c⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅  and that ( , ) ( , )v a b v b a
a b
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
. 
Suppose that B chooses his investment level first, and that A observes B’s 
investment before she has to invest herself. Let the first best investment levels be 
denoted by  *a  and *b ,  
 ( *, *) arg max ( , ) arg max ( , ) ( ) ( ),a b S a b v a b c a c b= = − −  
and suppose that they are uniquely defined and satisfy *a a>  and *b b> , respectively. 
Symmetry implies that a*=b*. 
The investments are assumed to be unobservable by outsiders, so that any 
investments above the minimum investment levels a  and b  cannot be contracted upon. 
However, at some initial date 0, the two parties can write a contract on the allocation of 
ownership rights on the physical asset. If one of the parties, say A, is the sole owner of 
the asset, then she has to hire B at a fixed wage T (transfer) as an employee. In this case 
monetary payoffs are given by 
 
( , ) ( )
( ).
A
B
M v a b T c a
M T c b
= − −
= −
 
If both parties jointly own the asset, then they share the gross returns of the project 
equally and payoffs are  
 
0.5 ( , ) ( )
0.5 ( , ) ( )
A
B
M v a b c a T
M v a b c b T
= − −
= − +
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where T  is again a potential transfer payment that may be necessary to achieve joint 
ownership. Note that this is a simplified version of Hart (1995) with investments in 
physical rather than in human assets.13 
The parties bargain on the allocation of ownership rights before the investments 
are taken. In our experiments we considered two different treatments: 
• In the Joint Ownership Design (JOD) both parties own the asset initially. At 
stage 0, A can either choose to stick to joint ownership or she can offer to sell 
her share of the firm to B at price T . 
• In the A-Ownership Design (AOD) player A is the single owner of the firm when 
the game starts. At stage 0, A can either choose to remain the sole owner of the 
firm and to hire B as an “employee” at a fixed wage T . Alternatively, A can 
choose to make B a ''partner'' by giving away half of the firm to him.14  
In the experiments the two parties are restricted to choose { }, 1,...,10a b∈ . The 
gross surplus function is given by ( , ) 22 ( )v a b a b= ⋅ + , while investment costs are 
( ) 12Ac a a=  and ( ) 12Bc b b= . Note that in the experiments investments are neither 
complements nor substitutes at the margin, so that optimal investment levels are 
independent of each other. 
 
 
                                                 
13 If A is the owner of the asset, she gets v(a,b), so she has full access to the returns of B’s investment b, 
even without B’s consent. If the investment was in human capital, A would not be able to realize v(a,b) 
without B’s consent, but she would have to bargain with B in order to bribe him to cooperate. With 
investments in human capital it is never optimal to have joint ownership. With investments in physical 
capital, joint ownership may be optimal. However, below we will restrict attention to the case where joint 
ownership is not optimal with investments in physical capital either.   
14 We did not use the expressions ''employee'' and ''partner'' in the actual experiments but rather the 
neutral terms ''participant A'' and ''participant B''.  
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1.3 Theoretical Predictions  
 
1.3.1 Common Knowledge of Self-interested Preferences 
 
Let us first consider the case where it is common knowledge that both parties are 
interested only in their own monetary payoffs. In this case the analysis is 
straightforward. If A owns the asset, then she is full residual claimant on the margin and 
will choose the conditionally efficient investment level *( )a b , given B’s investment b. 
B, however, gets a marginal return of zero, so he will choose the minimum investment 
level b . On the other hand, if there is joint ownership, then each party gets only half of 
the marginal return, so both parties have an incentive to underinvest.15 Thus, there is no 
ownership structure that induces both parties to invest efficiently. However, not all 
ownership structures are equally inefficient. As Grossman and Hart (1986) emphasize, 
there exists a unique second best optimal ownership structure that achieves the highest 
social surplus that can be obtained given the contractual constraint that only contracts 
on the allocation of ownership rights can be written. 
In the following we will restrict attention to the case where Grossman and Hart 
predict joint ownership to be inefficient. Suppose that 1 ( , ) '( )
2
v a b c a
a
∂
⋅ <
∂
 and 
1 ( , ) '( )
2
v a b c b
b
∂
⋅ <
∂
 for all ,a b . Then, under joint ownership, it is a dominant strategy 
for each party to choose the minimum investment level a  and b , respectively. On the 
other hand, if A (or B) owns the firm, this party is full residual claimant on the margin 
and is induced to invest efficiently, while the other party gets a constant payment and 
will choose not invest. Thus, standard contract theory based on the self-interest model 
has two implications:  
                                                 
15 Due to the sequential nature of the investments the argument is slightly more complicated than in 
Grossman and Hart (1986). See Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998, Proposition 1).  
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Proposition 1.1 If it is common knowledge that both parties are only interested in 
maximizing their own material payoff, then  
1. either A or B-ownership is efficient, while joint ownership is inefficient, and 
2. no matter what the initial allocation of ownership rights is, the parties will trade 
ownership rights ex ante so as to set up the efficient ownership structure and to 
implement the second best optimal investment decisions.  
In the set up of our experiments this implies for the 
• Joint Ownership Design: A will sell her ownership stake to B at price T=122. 
B will accept this offer and choose b=10, while A will choose the minimum 
investment level a=1. Monetary payoffs are given by 110AM =  and 
0BM = . 
• A-Ownership Design: A will keep full ownership and hire B as an employee 
at wage T=12. B will accept this offer and choose b=1, while A will invest 
efficiently and choose a=10. Monetary payoffs are again 110AM =  and 
0BM = . 
 
1.3.2 Common Knowledge of Fair and/or Reciprocal Preferences 
 
Consider now the case where the involved parties are not just concerned about their 
monetary payoffs but also care about fairness and/or reciprocity. There are several 
recent theories that try to capture these motivations. Some of the proposed models, in 
particular Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), adopt the concept of 
''psychological game theory'' that had been introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce and 
Stacchetti (1989) in order to model ''intention-based reciprocity''. In these models 
players have beliefs not just about the actions of their opponents but also about their 
intentions. They are willing to reward kind and to punish unkind intentions. While these 
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models convey many interesting insights, they are quite complicated and it is difficult to 
use them in applications. Furthermore, they are often plagued by multiple equilibria. 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) follow a different approach. 
They assume that players care only about outcomes (and not about intentions), but that 
they have ''social preferences'' in the sense that they dislike inequitable allocations. 
These models do not capture ''reciprocity'' in a strict sense, but rather ''distributional 
fairness'' or ''inequity aversion''. However, these models use standard game theoretic 
tools and it is straightforward to apply them to any game in order to derive clearcut 
predictions. Furthermore, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) 
show that their models are able to explain not just the qualitative, but also the 
quantitative results of many classes of experimental games fairly well. Finally, there are 
a few models that try to model preferences for fair outcomes and fair intentions 
simultaneously, in particular Falk and Fischbacher (2000) and Charness and Rabin 
(2002). These models are more general, because they combine social preferences and 
intention based reciprocity, but they are even less tractable for applications and again 
plagued by multiple equilibria.16  
If we assume that it is common knowledge that both players are strongly 
concerned about distributional fairness or fair intentions, then all of these models yield 
very similar predictions in the context of the simple game under consideration.  
Let us start with the case of joint ownership. Note that, at stage 2, A will always 
match B’s investment and choose a(b)=b. The reason is that if players are inequity 
averse, then by choosing a=b player A can equalize payoffs. If players are concerned 
about intentions, then a low investment level of player B can be interpreted as a hostile 
action that is punished by a low investment level of player A, while a high level of b 
will be interpreted as a kind action that is rewarded by a high level of a. Anticipating 
this, player B will choose the efficient investment level b* at stage 1, and A will 
reciprocate by choosing *a a= . Thus, joint ownership implements first best 
investments. 
                                                 
16 See Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for an extensive survey and critical discussion of this literature.  
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What about A-ownership? At stage 2, A will always invest efficiently given B’s 
investment level b, i.e., she will choose a=a*(b). Note that with A-ownership B’s 
payoff is unaffected by A’s investment level. Thus, models of intention based 
reciprocity predict that A will just maximize her own payoff which is efficient. If player 
A has social preferences and dislikes inequality, she will also choose a=a*(b). To see 
this, we have to distinguish two cases depending on the fixed wage T that B receives. 
Either T is sufficiently large so that B is better off than A. In this case A wants to reduce 
the payoff difference by maximizing her own monetary payoff which requires that she 
invests efficiently. Or T is such that A is better off than B. In this case A may want to 
reduce the payoff difference by investing *( )a a b< . However, if we assume with Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) that A prefers to get one additional Dollar for herself rather than to 
throw this Dollar away in order to reduce the inequality towards B17, she will invest 
efficiently.  
At stage 1, B’s investment b depends on the wage that A offered to him at stage 
0. If T is small, B will choose a low investment level. In a model of intension based 
reciprocity he will do so in order to punish A for her unkind offer. In a model of social 
preferences he will choose a low investment level in order to reduce the payoff 
difference between himself and A. On the other hand, if A offered a generous wage at 
date 0 that gives 1/ 2 ( *, *)T v a b= ⋅  to B, then B will choose the efficient investment 
level b*, either because he wants to reward A for her generous offer or because he 
wants to increase A’s payoff in order to reduce the inequality that is now to his 
advantage. Thus, at stage 0, a fair player A will make this generous wage offer that 
equalizes payoffs, and both parties will choose the efficient investment levels a* and b*, 
respectively.18 The analysis of B-ownership is analogous to the case of A-ownership.  
                                                 
17 I.e., 1β < . See Section 1.3.3 below. 
18 It has to be noted that this equilibrium is unique if players have social preferences, but that there are 
other equilibria if players care about the intentions of their opponents. For example, it is also an 
equilibrium that A offers a low wage because she beliefs that player B will be hostile and choose a low 
investment level. In equilibrium these beliefs are self-fulfilling.  
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Proposition 1.2 If it is common knowledge that both parties are strongly concerned 
about either distributional fairness or intention based reciprocity, then the ownership 
structure is irrelevant. Both parties will invest efficiently no matter whether there is joint, 
A-, or B-ownership.  
 
Thus, if fairness and reciprocity are common knowledge, then they induce both 
parties to invest efficiently even if investments cannot be contracted upon. Reciprocal 
fairness suffices as an enforcement device, and the allocation of ownership rights does 
not play a role.  
For the experiments this implies that in both designs the eventual ownership 
structure is indeterminate, but under any ownership structure both parties will choose 
a=b=10 and monetary payoffs are given by  100A BM M= = . 
 
1.3.3 Incomplete Information  
 
It is well known from many experiments (and everyday experience) that there are some 
people who seem to be very strongly concerned about fairness and reciprocity, while 
there are also many people who seem to behave quite selfishly. Furthermore, people 
often don’t know whether they face a fair and trustworthy opponent or whether their 
opponent is going to exploit them for his own benefit. Therefore, the most interesting 
case is the one where there is incomplete information about the preferences of the 
opponent.  
This case is considerably more difficult to analyze with models of intention 
based reciprocity. However, the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion takes 
the distribution of preferences and incomplete information explicitly into account and 
allows to analyze the game with incomplete information in a fairly straightforward 
manner. Therefore, in the following we will focus on the model of inequity aversion. 
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However, we would like to stress that we do not regard our experiments as a test of this 
particular model against other models of fairness. 
The theory of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has two main ingredients: First, the 
theory assumes that some people are not only concerned about their own material 
payoff but also care about inequity or, in our context, inequality.19 Second, the theory 
acknowledges that people differ. Some people are very much concerned about 
inequality and have a high willingness to pay in order to reduce it, while others only 
care about their own material payoff. In the two-player case the utility function of 
inequity averse (fair) players is given by 
 { } { }( ) max ,0 max ,0 ,i i i j i i i jU x x x x x xα β= − ⋅ − − ⋅ −  
{ }1, 2i∈ , i j≠ , where 1 2( , )x x x=  denotes the vector of monetary payoffs and i iβ α≤ , 
0 1iβ≤ < . In this utility function, the term weighted with iα  measures the utility loss 
that stems from inequality to i ’s disadvantage, while the term weighted with iβ  
measures the loss from advantageous inequality.  
We use a simplified version of this theory. We assume that there are 60 percent 
self-interested types ( 0i iα β= = ) and 40 percent ''fair'' types. Fair subjects exhibit 
2iα =  and 0.5 1iβ< < , i.e., they have a willingness to pay in order to achieve equality. 
If the inequality is to their disadvantage, they are prepared to engage in costly 
''punishment'' in order to reduce the payoff of their opponent. If the inequality is to their 
advantage, they are willing to spend resources in order to benefit the other player. 
Subjects with 0.5i iα β≥ > are willing to share the surplus of a contract equally and 
reject offers that give them less than 25 percent of the surplus. The evidence from many 
                                                 
19 There is no generally accepted notion of fairness, but probably all fairness definitions imply that equals 
should be treated equally. In our experiments, the subjects enter the laboratory as equals. They have no 
information about their opponents and do not know with whom they trade. Thus, in these very simple 
environments, it seems natural to define equality as the reference point for a fair payoff distribution. 
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experiments seems roughly compatible with the assumption that 40 percent of all 
subjects fall in this category. 20   
On the basis of these assumptions, the property rights game can be analyzed 
using standard game theoretic tools. The full analysis is not difficult but somewhat 
lengthy and is therefore relegated to an appendix that can be found in Section 1.7 and on 
our webpage.21 In the following, we report the main predictions for our experiments and 
give the intuition for them.22 
 
Analysis of the Joint Ownership Design 
With asymmetric information about whether the opponent is a self-interested or a fair-
minded type, the contract offer made at stage 0 may signal some information about A’s 
type. Therefore, let p denote the (endogenously determined) probability assigned by B 
to the event that he faces the self-interested type of A.  
Suppose that A chooses to stick to joint ownership at date 0. At date 2, a self-
interested type of A chooses a to maximize 
 12 22 ( ) 12 11 .
AsU a b a b a= ⋅ ⋅ + − = −  
Clearly, it is optimal to choose 1sa = . The fair-minded type of A chooses a  to 
maximize  
 { } { }11 max 11 11 ,0 max 11 11 ,0 .AfU b a a b b a b a a bα β= − − ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − − +  
Note that A will never choose a b> . If 0.5β > , the fair-minded type of A will choose 
fa b= . Thus, not surprisingly, at the second stage the self-interested type A chooses the 
minimum investment level while the fair-minded type reciprocates by choosing a b= . 
                                                 
20 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for a more extensive discussion of the experimental evidence on the 
distribution of inequity averse types. When Fehr and Schmidt calibrate their model to explain the 
quantitative evidence in the different games they use four different types, but aggregated they also have 
that 40 percent of subjects exhibit 0.5i iα β≥ > and that 60 percent exhibit 0.5 .i iα β> ≥  
21 Please visit: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/experiments/property_rights/index.htm . 
22 The analysis for general cost and benefit functions is omitted because with asymmetric information it 
would involve too many case distinctions. 
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Consider now stage 1. Anticipating A's reaction, the self-interested type of B 
chooses b  to maximize 
 
(11 ) (1 ) (11 )
(11 ) (1 ) (11 ) 11 10 11 .
Bs s fEU p a b p a b
p b p b b p b pb
= ⋅ − + − ⋅ −
= ⋅ − + − ⋅ − = + −
 
Thus, if 1011 0.91p < = , he chooses 10
sb = , if 0.91p > , he chooses 1sb = . The fair-
minded type of B, on the other hand, maximizes 
 [ ] [ ]
11 (12 12 ) (1 ) 11
11 (12 12) (1 ) 11
11 12 10 12 11 .
Bf s s fEU p a b b a p a b
p b b p b b
p p b b p bp
α
α
α α
   = ⋅ − − − + − ⋅ −   
= ⋅ − − − + − ⋅ −
= + + − −
 
Substituting 2α =  and differentiating with respect to b yields 
 10 35 .
BfdEU p
db
= −  
Thus, if 1035 0.29p < = , the fair-minded type of B chooses 10
fb = , if 0.29p > , 
he chooses 1fb = . This result is more surprising. It says that if there is uncertainty 
about A’s type, then a self-interested player B is more likely to invest than the fair-
minded type of B. The reason is that the self-interested type of B is only interested in 
his expected monetary payoff. Thus, if there is a reasonable chance that he is matched 
with a reciprocal type of A, it is worth his while to invest. A fair-minded type of B, on 
the other hand, is afraid of the increased inequality that is generated if he invests and 
meets a self-interested type of A who does not reciprocate. Therefore, the fair-minded 
type behaves more cautiously and invests only if the probability of facing a reciprocal 
type of A is very high.  
Suppose now that at date 0 A sold his ownership stake to B at price T, so B is 
the sole owner of the project and full residual claimant on profits. In this case it is a 
dominant strategy for both types of B to choose 10b =  at date 1. This is obvious for the 
self-interested type of B. The fair-minded type of B chooses b  to maximize 
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 { } { }22( ) 12 max 2 34 10 ,0 max 34 10 2 ,0BfU a b b T T a b a b Tα β= + − − − − − − + −  
which is strictly increasing in b as long as 1β < . Hence, 10fb = as well. The intuition 
is simply that with B-ownership B’s investment does not affect A’s payoff, so B cannot 
increase A’s payoff by investing less than the efficient amount. 
At stage 2, the self-interest type of A clearly chooses 1sa = . The fair-minded type of A 
chooses a  to maximize 
 { } { }12 max 34 10 2 ,0 max 2 34 10 ,0 .AfU T a a b T T a bα β= − − + − − − −  
Substituting 10b = , we get  
 
12 34 100 34 2 0
12 34 100 34 2 0.
Af if a TdU
if a Tda
α
β
− − + − ≥
= − + + − <
 
Thus,  
 
1 67
2 100 67 220
34
10 220.
f
if T
Ta if T
if T
<
−
= ≤ ≤
>
 
Note that a fair-minded type of A will invest in order to reduce the inequality between 
herself and B, but only if she sold her ownership stake at a sufficiently high price to B. 
Hence, A’s monetary payoffs under B-ownership for the self-interested and the fair-
minded type are given by 
 12AsM T= −  
 
12 67
10 1200 67 220
34
120 220,
Af
T if T
TM if T
T if T
− <
 += ≤ ≤

− >
 
while both types of B get 
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100 22 (1 )
122 67
1200 10 2948 44 67 220
34
320 198 220.
Bs Bf fM M T p p a
T if T
T p pT if T
T p if T
 = = − + + − 
− <
 + + −= ≤ ≤

− − >
 
We now turn to the analysis of the entire game. First, we can rule out the 
possibility of a separating equilibrium in which the self-interested type of A chooses 
one type of contract with probability 1 and the fair-minded type of A chooses another 
type.  
Lemma 1.1 There does not exist a separating equilibrium. 
The intuition is that the selfish type of A would always want to mimic the fair 
type: Suppose that the selfish type of A sells her ownership stake while the fair type 
chooses to stick to joint ownership. Then B would invest 10 under joint ownership 
which induces the selfish type of A to deviate and to stick to joint ownership as well. So 
suppose that the selfish type of A sticks to joint ownership while the fair-minded type 
offers to sell. In this case B would choose 1b =  if he is offered joint ownership, so the 
selfish type of A is better off by selling his ownership share, a contradiction.  
In the game under consideration here it seems very plausible that sticking to 
joint ownership will not be interpreted as a signal that player A is selfish. This is 
captured by the following condition:  
Condition 1 If A chooses to stick to joint ownership, then B’s updated belief that he faces 
the self-interested type of A does not increase. 
This condition implies that the game has a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
outcome: 
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Proposition 1.3 [Joint Ownership Design] With incomplete information about the 
players types there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome satisfying 
Condition 1. The equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which both types of A stick to 
joint ownership. 
• The self-interested type of B chooses 10sb = , while the fair-minded type of B 
chooses 1fb = . The self-interested type of A chooses 1sa =  and the fair-minded 
type of A chooses fa b=  in equilibrium. 
• Expected monetary payoffs are 69.4AsM =  for the self-interested type of A and 
64AfM =  for the fair-minded type of A, so the average monetary payoff of A is 
67.24AM = . The expected monetary payoff of the self-interested type of B is 
40.6BsM =  and of the fair-minded type of B is 10BfM = , so in expectation 
28.36BM = . 
 
Note that Proposition 1.3 differs sharply from Propositions 1.1 and 1.2. 
Proposition 1.1 assumed that it is common knowledge that all players are self-
interested. In this case no ownership structure implements first-best investments, but A- 
(or B-) ownership is strictly better than joint ownership. Proposition 1.2 assumed that all 
players are fair-minded. In this case any allocation of ownership rights implements first-
best investment decisions and the allocation of ownership rights is indeterminate. With 
incomplete information about the players types, Proposition 1.3 shows, like Proposition 
1.1, that first-best investments cannot be implemented, but that there is a second-best 
allocation of ownership rights that will obtain in equilibrium. However, this time joint 
ownership is optimal. Proposition 1.3 predicts that in equilibrium player B invests 
efficiently only if he is self-interested. If he is fair-minded, he prefers not to invest in 
order to reduce the inequality that arises if he is matched with a selfish  player A. Player 
A invests efficiently only if she is fair-minded and if she is matched with a B-player 
who invested 10b = .  
CHAPTER 1 FAIRNESS AND OWNERSHIP RIGHTS 
 
31
In the experiments we also considered a variant of the Joint Ownership Design 
called JOD’. In this treatment the game did not end when A offered to sell her share and 
B rejected this offer. Instead, the game continued with joint ownership. This improves 
B’s threatpoint utility when A chooses to make an offer. This makes it less attractive for 
A to sell her share to B. On the other hand, it is less risky for A to make an offer, 
because if her offer gets rejected, the parties are just back to joint ownership. 
Nevertheless, it is shown in the Appendix that Proposition 1.3 still applies on the 
equilibrium path, so the prediction for this control experiment is exactly the same.  
 
Analysis of the A-Ownership Design 
In this design A is the sole owner of the project initially. At date 0 she can choose 
whether to remain the sole owner and to hire B as employee at wage T , or whether to 
give away half of the project to B for free in which case there is joint ownership.  
If A goes for joint ownership, the analysis of the last subsection applies. So 
suppose that she decides to stick to A-ownership. At stage 2, a self-interested type of A 
chooses a  to maximize 
 22 ( ) 12 10 22 .AsU a b a T a b T= ⋅ + − − = + −  
Clearly, it is optimal for her to choose 10sa = . The fair-minded type of A chooses a  to 
maximize 
 { } { }10 22 max 2 10 34 ,0 max 10 34 2 ,0 .AfU a b T T a b a b Tα β= + − − − − − + −  
Given that 1β < , the fair-minded type of A also chooses 10fa = . Thus, under A-
ownership, it is a dominant strategy for both types of A to choose 10a = . 
Consider now stage 1. Anticipating A's reaction, the self-interested type of B 
clearly chooses 1b = . The fair-minded type of B maximizes  
 { } { }12 34 100 2 ,0 2 34 100,0 .BfU T b b T T bα β= − − + − − − −  
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Thus, if 67T ≤ , the fair-minded type of B chooses 1fb = . If 67T >  he chooses fb so 
as to equalize payoffs, i.e., 2 100
34
f Tb −= . This parallels the analysis of B-ownership in 
the Analysis of the Joint Ownership Design above. 
Consider now stage 0. The self-interested type of B will accept the contract 
offered by A if and only if 12T ≥ . The fair-minded type of B clearly accepts any 
contract with 67T ≥ . If 67T <  he accepts if and only if 
( )12 34 100 2 0.T b b Tα− − + − >  Noting that he chooses 1fb =  in this case and that 
2α = , this is equivalent to 56T ≥ . 
At stage 0, if the self-interested type of A offers 12T = , this will only be 
accepted by the self-interested type of B. If she offers 56T =  this will be accepted by 
both types of B, which yields a slightly higher payoff. It is easy to show that offering 
more than 56 reduces her payoff, so A will offer 56T = which is accepted by both types 
of B. The fair-minded type of A wants to equalize payoffs and offers 67T = , which is 
also accepted by both types of B. Hence, the theory of inequity aversion predicts the 
same investment levels as the self-interest theory, but it differs in the prediction of the 
wages offered to B. 
Let us now turn to the entire game. Again, if we are willing to impose a 
condition that parallels Condition 1, we get a unique equilibrium prediction. 
Condition 1’ If A offers a joint ownership contract and gives away half of the revenues 
of the firm to B, then B’s updated belief that he faces the self-interested type of A does 
not increase. 
Proposition 1.4 [A-Ownership Design] With incomplete information about the players 
types there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome satisfying Condition 
1’. The equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which both types of A offer a joint 
ownership contract which is accepted by both types of B. The equilibrium outcome is 
the same as under joint ownership described in Proposition 1.3. 
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Thus, Propositions 1.3 and 1.4 predict that the players will always end up with joint 
ownership, no matter what the initial allocation of ownership rights. Joint ownership 
does not implement first best investment decisions. However, it still outperforms A- (or 
B-) ownership. Under joint ownership both parties invest with a significant probability, 
while under A- (or B-) ownership only the owner invests while the other party does not. 
Furthermore, under A-ownership A has to hire B as an employee, and there is a 
significant probability that a fair-minded type of B will reject a wage offer that he 
perceives to be unfair. Similarly, in the joint ownership design A has to sell her 
ownership stake to B and again there is some probability that this offer is going to be 
rejected. Therefore, the model of inequity aversion predicts that joint ownership is more 
efficient. This is in contrast to the self-interest model that predicts A- (or B-) ownership 
to be more efficient. However, both models support the Coase Theorem which suggests 
that the parties will adopt the ownership structure that is most efficient independent of 
the initial allocation of ownership rights.  
 
 
1.4 Experimental Results 
 
1.4.1 Experimental Procedures 
 
The experiments were conducted at the University of Munich with undergraduate 
students of law, political science, engineering, etc. (but no students of economics or 
business administration). In total we conducted eight experimental sessions. Four 
sessions (S1–S4) implemented the Joint Ownership Design (JOD), two sessions (S5-S6) 
implemented the A-Ownership Design, and two additional sessions (S7 and S8) 
implemented a control treatment of JOD with the twist that after A’s offer was rejected 
the game did not end but continued with joint ownership (JOD’). In each session we had 
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20-24 subjects, half of them in the role of player A, the other half in the role of player 
B. The two groups were located in separate but adjacent rooms. Before the experiment 
started, all subjects had to read detailed instructions and to solve several exercises to 
make sure that all of them understood the rules of the experiment. In each session we 
had ten rounds. In each round an A-player was matched with a different B-player. Thus, 
in each experimental session we have for each subject ten contracts with ten different 
anonymous contracting partners.  
After each round the subjects had to compute their own payoff and the payoff of 
their opponent. To rule out the possibility of reputation building, the outcome of each 
round was strictly confidential, that is, each pair of players observed only what 
happened in their own relationship. They did not observe the contracts chosen by or 
offered to the other subjects in the room. Nor did they observe the past behavior of their 
current partner. Furthermore, the matching was random and anonymous. Finally, at the 
end of the session the subjects collected their total monetary payoffs privately and 
anonymously. Each session lasted for about one and a half hours. A complete set of the 
instructions for all our experiments can be found on our webpage.23  
In each session all participants received an initial endowment of DM 20.00. The 
experimental (token) payoffs were exchanged into money at the rate of 1 token = 0.06 
DM. Thus, A and B could jointly earn a maximum surplus of DM 12 (≈US $ 7.50 at the 
time of the experiment) in each of the ten rounds. The highest total income of one 
individual was DM 82.20 (≈US $52.00), an hourly wage of ≈ DM 54.80 (US $34.25). 
However, the subjects could also make substantial losses. In order to avoid the 
possibility that somebody ends up with negative earnings, a subject had to drop out of 
the experiment if his accumulated earnings fell below DM 2.00 (US $1.25), which 
never happened.  
 
 
                                                 
23 The full set of all our experimental instructions, in German and translated into English, are available at 
http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/experiments/property_rights/index.htm . As an example I 
included the instructions for the JOD (for player A) in Section 1.6. 
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1.4.2 Joint Ownership Design 
 
We have a total of 470 observations from sessions S1 – S4 in which we conducted the 
joint ownership design. The large majority of A-players (300 out of 470, 63.8%) chose 
to stick to joint ownership, while 170 (36.2%) tried to sell their ownership stake to B. 
This offer was accepted in 118 cases (69.4%) and rejected in 52 cases (30.6%). Figure 
1.1 shows that the fractions of contractual choices are fairly constant over time. 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
period
Rejected offers
B-ownership
Joint ownership
 
 
Figure 1.1: Share of joint ownership and B-ownership over time in the JOD 
 
Consider first the cases where joint ownership prevailed. At stage 1, 60% of all 
B-players (180 of 300) chose the efficient investment level 10b = . Of the remaining 
40% who chose 10b < , 41 (13.6%) went for the minimum investment level 1b = . On 
average, B-players invested 7.7, while A-players invested 6.7 on average. Figure 1.2 
shows the average investment level of player A at stage 2 given player B’s investment 
b at stage 1. Clearly, there is strong reciprocity in A’s behavior.  
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Figure 1.2: A’s average investment given b and joint ownership (JOD) 
 
A simple OLS regression with a  as the endogenous variable confirms that b has 
a strong and highly significant impact on the choice of a .24  
0.11 0.89
( 0.299) (19.862)
a b= − +
−
 
An increase of b by one unit increased a  on average by 0.89 units. Thus, if B was only 
interested in his monetary payoff, then choosing 10b =  is indeed optimal. We also 
included the ''desired investment levels'' *a  and *b  that A could mention in his 
contractual offer in the regression, but they are not statistically significant and it seems 
that the parties considered them to be ''cheap talk''.  
A closer look at the data reveals that not all A-players reciprocated. This can be 
seen from Table 1.1 which shows the distribution of investment pairs ( , )a b . Note that 
218 out of 300 (72.7%) investment choices of A are on the diagonal, i.e., given b  
player A has chosen a b= . If we exclude the 37 cases where 1a b= = , we still have 
60.3% of reciprocal investment choices of A-players. Only 9 times did an A player 
invest more than B, but there are 73 cases (24.3%) where we observe a b< , and in 85 
                                                 
24 The terms in brackets report the t values of the regression. 
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cases 1a = which is the dominant strategy of a self-interested player A. Thus, there is a 
strong minority of A-players who behave selfishly. This is confirmed by a standardized 
questionnaire that had to filled in by all participants in which 57% of all A-players 
reported that the income of player B was of no or of hardly any importance to them.  
 
               
 a / b  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Σ   
               
 1  37 5 2 3 10 7 3 4 3 11 85  
 2   3 1 1 1 1    1 8  
 3    1        1  
 4     1 2      3  
 5      4  1   3 8  
 6  1     3 3 1  3 11  
 7       1 5 1 1 1 9  
 8     1    1  2 4  
 9          6 2 8  
 10  3 1     1 1  157 163  
 Σ   41 9 4 6 17 12 13 8 10 180 300  
             
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1: Investments ( , )a b  with joint ownership contracts in JOD 
 
 
Result 1.1 Under joint ownership there is, on average, strong reciprocity of A given 
B’s investment. A-players can be separated in two types: 
• Fair types choose a b=  (roughly 70%). 
• Selfish types choose a b<  (roughly 25%). 
The majority of B-players (60%) trusted that A is going to reciprocate and chose 
10b = . 
 
In 170 out of 470 cases (36.2%) A tried to sell her ownership stake to B. B-
players rejected these offers 52 times. The average price of the accepted offers was 
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120.8. Recall that if B buys A’s ownership stake and invests 10b =  while A invests 
only 1a = , then B’s monetary payoff is 22(10 1) 12 10 122BM T T= + − ⋅ − = − . Thus, 
with a price of 120.8, B is just going to break even while all of the surplus accrues to A.  
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Figure 1.3: Evolution of price offers over time (JOD) 
 
The average price of the rejected offers was 176.9. Accepting such an offer can 
be profitable for B only if B expects A to invest considerably more than 1a = . Given 
that A sold her ownership stake, this seems unlikely. In fact, A invested 1a =  in 85 out 
of the 118 cases (72%) where she sold her ownership stake successfully to B, and her 
average investment level in these cases was just 1.9. Thus, it is not surprising that these 
high price offers got rejected.  
If A’s offer was accepted, virtually all B-players (111 out of 118) chose 10b = , 
which is a dominant strategy for self-interested and fair-minded players. A’s average 
income under joint ownership is 77.5, while it is only 67.9 if she chose to sell her 
ownership stake to B. B’s average income under joint ownership is 66.4, considerably 
more than the 12.8 that he received on average when A tried to sell him her ownership 
rights. Figure 1.4 shows that in all periods (except for period 1) both players were better 
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off with joint ownership than with B-ownership and the payoff differences are also 
considerably smaller under joint ownership.  
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Figure 1.4: Evolution of payoffs under joint ownership and B-ownership over time 
(JOD) 
 
Result 1.2 Joint ownership is the more efficient allocation of ownership rights. Both 
players receive a higher average payoff if A decides to stick to joint ownership rather 
than to sell her ownership rights to B. Thus, even a purely self-interested player A 
should opt for joint ownership.  
 
These results clearly contradict the self-interest model. The self-interest model 
predicts that none of the parties is going to invest under joint ownership, that joint 
ownership is less efficient than A-ownership, that A-ownership maximizes player A’s 
payoff, and that all A-players are going to stick to A-ownership. The results are also 
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inconsistent with models that assume that all people are strongly concerned about 
fairness and reciprocity. These models predict that the allocation of ownership rights 
does not matter, because fairness and reciprocity suffice as an enforcement device to 
induce both players to invest efficiently no matter what the ownership structure is. The 
experimental results show that if player A sells her ownership stake to B, then she is not 
going to invest anymore. Furthermore, even if A sticks to joint ownership, the first best 
is not attained. There is a significant fraction of B-players who do not choose 10b =  at 
stage 1 under joint ownership, and a strong minority of A-players who do not 
reciprocate and choose a b<  at stage 2. Nevertheless, the allocation of ownership rights 
matters because joint ownership is clearly more efficient than A-ownership. 
The theory of inequity aversion does a much better job in organizing the data. It 
predicts that no ownership structure implements the first best. It also predicts that the 
allocation of ownership rights matters, that joint ownership is more efficient than A-
ownership and that all A-players should stick to joint ownership. This is largely 
consistent with the data. However, the quantitative predictions seem to be less 
convincing. The theory predicts that under joint ownership only the self-interest B-
players (60%) will choose 10b =  while the fair-minded B-players invest 1b =  because 
they are afraid that the A-players will not reciprocate. In the experiments, the fraction of 
B-players who took the risk to invest 10 or a little bit less than 10 was somewhat  larger. 
Furthermore, it predicts that only the fair-minded A-players (40%) reciprocate to high 
investments of player B by choosing a b= . In the experiments, roughly 70% of A-
players reciprocated. Thus, it seems that players behaved ''too fairly'' in the experiment. 
However, we have to take into account that more than 30% of A-players tried to sell 
their ownership stake to B. It seems plausible that this was done mainly by self-
interested A-players. In fact, 63% of all B-players reported in the questionnaire that they 
interpreted sticking to joint ownership as a signal that A is trustworthy and will behave 
fairly. Furthermore, 64% of all A-players said that they considered joint ownership to be 
an ''invitation to cooperate''. If this is the case, then the fraction of fair-minded A-players 
in the pool of joint ownership contracts would increase. With more fair-minded A-
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players it is less risky for fair-minded B-players to invest 10b =  and we should observe 
more reciprocal behavior of the A-players. Thus, overall, the quantitative predictions of 
the theory of inequity aversion are roughly consistent with the data.  
 
1.4.3 A-Ownership Design 
 
We now turn to the results of the A-ownership design where A-players could choose 
between sticking to A-ownership or giving away for free half of the revenues of the 
project to the other player. We observed a total of 230 contractual choices in sessions 
S5 and S6.  
 
Result 1.3 The overwhelming majority of A-players chooses to make B the joint owner of 
the project. There is no significant time trend. If anything, the share of joint ownership is 
increasing over time. 
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Figure 1.5: Share of joint ownership and A-ownership over time in the AOD 
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In total joint ownership was chosen in 81.3 % of all contractual offers (187 of 230 
observations). If there is joint ownership, the investment behavior is very similar to the 
investment behavior in the JOD when A decided to stick to joint ownership. 135 out of 
187 B-players (72.2%) choose 10b = . The majority of A-players reciprocated to B’s 
investment choices. The following table shows the distribution of investment pairs 
( , )a b .  
 
                    
  a / b  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Σ    
        
  1  9 1   3 2 5 2 3 33 58   
  2       1  1   2 4   
  3         1    1   
  4      1 1   1   3   
  5       2   1  2 5   
  6        1  1   2   
  7         3  1 1 5   
  8          4 2 1 7   
  9           5 4 9   
  10        1    92 93  
 Σ   9 1 0 1 7 4 10 9 11135 187 
                          
 
  
 
 
Table 1.2: Investments ( , )a b  with joint ownership contracts in AOD 
 
On average, B invested 8.9b =  while A invested 6.5a =  as compared to 7.7b = and 
6.7a = when A decided to stick to joint ownership in the JOD. Again, investment 
choices are clearly correlated. A simple OLS regression with a  as the endogenous 
variable confirms that b has a strong and highly significant impact on the choice of a .25  
                                                 
25 Again, we included the ''desired investment levels'' a* and b* in the regression analysis, but they are 
statistically insignificant. 
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0.7 0.81
( 0.66) (6.99)
a b= − +
−
 
117 out of 187 (63%) investment choices of A are on the diagonal, i.e., given b  player 
A has chosen a b= . If we exclude the 9 cases where 1a b= = , we still have 57.8% of 
reciprocal investment choices of A-players. Only once did an A player invest more than 
B, but there are 69 cases (37%) where we observe a b< , and in 49 of them 1a = which 
is the dominant strategy of a self-interested player A. Thus, there is a strong minority of 
A-players who behave selfishly. In fact, 39% of all A-players reported in the 
questionnaire that B’s income was not important to them. Nevertheless, most players B 
seem to have anticipated reciprocal behavior: 135 out  of 187 (72%) chose 10b = , while 
only 10 (5,3%) chose an investment level of 1 or 2.  
 
Result 1.4 Under joint ownership there is, on average, strong reciprocity of A given B’s 
investment. A-players can be separated in two types: 
• Fair types choose a b=  (roughly 60%) 
• Selfish types choose a b<  (roughly 40%) 
The majority of B-players (more than 70%) trusted that A is going to reciprocate and 
chose 10b = . 
 
In 43 out of 230 cases (18,7%) A decided to stick to A-ownership and to hire B 
as an employee. B-players rejected the wage offers 5 times. The average wage offer was 
62.05. Recall that the theory of inequity aversion suggests that if A-players make a 
wage offer to B- players they should offer 56 if they are self-interested and 67 if they 
are fair-minded. With 60% self-interested players the expected wage offer is 60.4, 
which is quite close to the observation in the experiment.  Under A-ownership almost 
all B-players chose the minimum effort level (average 1.26b = ), while all A-players 
chose 10a = , which is a dominant strategy for both, self-interested and fair-minded 
types of A.  
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A’s average income under joint ownership is 91.4, while it is only 55.0 if she 
chose to stick to A-ownership. B’s average income under joint ownership is 62.9, while 
he received only 44.5 if A tried to hire him as an employee.26  
 
Result 1.5 Joint ownership is the more efficient allocation of ownership rights. Both 
players receive a higher average payoff if A decides to give away half of the project to 
player B rather than to hire B as an employee. Thus, even a purely self-interested player 
A should opt for joint ownership.  
 
Again, these results clearly contradict the predictions of the self-interest model 
and the predictions of models that assume that all people are strongly concerned about 
fairness and reciprocity. The experimental results show that if player A sticks to A-
ownership and hires B as an employee, then B is not going to invest. Furthermore, even 
if A chooses joint ownership, the first best is not attained. There is a significant fraction 
of B-players who do not choose 10b =  at stage 1 under joint ownership, and a strong 
minority of A-players who do not reciprocate and choose a b<  at stage 2. Nevertheless, 
the allocation of ownership rights matters because joint ownership is clearly more 
efficient than A-ownership. 
The theory of inequity aversion is consistent with these results. First of all, more 
than 80% of the A-players choose the predicted ownership structure. Second, roughly 
70% of B-players (as compared to the predicted 60%) chose the efficient investment 
level. If we assume that those A-players who did not opt for joint ownership are mostly 
self-interested, then the fraction of fair-minded A-players among those who offered 
joint ownership contracts is larger than 40%. Therefore, it is less risky for fair-minded 
B-players to invest and we should observe more efficient investment choices of B-
players than predicted by the model. Third, this may also explain why a larger fraction 
of A-players (roughly 60% as compared to the predicted 40%) reciprocated by choosing 
                                                 
26 Even if we only consider those cases where B accepted A’s wage offer, both parties receive a lower 
payoff than under joint ownership (A: 62.2, B: 50.4).  
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a b= . However, a significant fraction of A-players did not reciprocate. Finally, given 
the rather ''fair'' behavior of A- and B-players, it is not surprising that payoffs of both 
players are also somewhat higher than predicted by the theory.  
 
1.4.4 Control Treatment for Joint Ownership Design (JOD’) 
 
In Session S7 and S8 we conducted a control treatment of the Joint Ownership Design 
in which the parties also started from joint ownership, but this time the game did not 
end after B rejected A’s offer. Instead the game continued with joint ownership as if no 
offer had been made. We have a total of 240 observations for this treatment. Again, 
joint ownership prevailed in the majority of cases (196 of 240 observations, 81.7%). 
However, this time A-players tried to sell their ownership stake more often (in 134 out 
of 240 cases, 55.8%). It seems that making an offer was considered to be less risky by 
A-players because if the offer got rejected the parties would just get back to the status 
quo of joint ownership. In fact, the offers got rejected considerably more often (in 90 
out of 134 cases, 67.2%).  Let us consider the three different possibilities in turn: 
• If A did not make an offer, the investment behavior is very similar to the 
investment behavior in the other designs when joint ownership prevailed. B-
players invested on average 7.0b = , while A-players invested on average 
6.1a = . The reciprocal behavior of A-players is virtually identical and the OLS 
regression yields  
0.12 0.86
(0.23) (12.91)
a b= +
 
 almost the same as what we observed under joint ownership in JOD and AOD. 
• If A did make an offer that was accepted by B-players, the investment behavior 
is very similar to the corresponding case in the JOD. Almost all B-players 
invested efficiently ( 9.5b =  on average), while almost all A-players chose the 
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minimum investment level ( 1.2a =  on average). However, it is interesting to 
note that the average price of the accepted offers was much lower than the 
average accepted price in the JOD ( 88.9T =  as compared to 120.8T = ). This 
reflects the fact that B’s threat point payoff if he rejected the offer was not zero 
but to go back to the status quo of joint ownership. In fact, B’s average payoff 
after accepting A’s offer is 31.4 which is considerably higher than the 18.5 that 
he received on average when he accepted A’s offer in the original JOD.  
• Two thirds of all offers made by A-players got rejected. The average price of the 
rejected offers was 161.4, again somewhat lower than the average price of 
rejected offers in the original JOD (176.9), but still very high. After the offer was 
rejected the two players played the investment game under joint ownership. In 
these cases B invested on average only 6.3b =  while A invested only 3.9  on 
average. This is considerably less than the investment levels under joint 
ownership in JOD or AOD. A simple regression analysis shows that A-players 
reciprocated much less in these cases: 
0.27 0.57
(0.42) (6.66)
a b= +
 
Note that on average a increased by just 0.57 if B’s investment increased by one 
unit, as compared to 0.89 in the JOD and 0.81 in the AOD. Furthermore, Table 
1.3 shows that the fraction of A-players who chose 1a =  independently of the 
investment level of player B is much larger. 
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  a / b  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Σ    
        
  1  24 2 3 2 22 2 1 16 54   
  2   1 1 2   
  3   1 1   
  4   1 1   
  5   2 1 3   
  6   1 1 1 3   
  7   1 1 2   
  8   1 1 2   
  9   1 1   
  10   21 21  
 Σ   24 2 5 3 4 4 2 3 3 40 90 
                          
 
  
 
Table 1.3: Investments ( , )a b  with joint ownership after A’s offer  
was rejected in JOD’ 
 
54 out of 90 A-players (60%) chose the minimum investment level. B-players seem to 
have anticipated this behavior, and only 40 out of 90 (44.4%) opted for the efficient 
investment level 10b = . Thus, the fact that A-players tried to sell their ownership stake 
to B was interpreted by B-players as a signal that it is less likely that they face a fair-
minded A-player, and this expectation turned out to be correct.  
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1.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we analyzed the problem of the optimal allocation of ownership rights 
under three different assumptions about people’s preferences. First, the standard 
property rights approach assumes that all people are purely self-interested. In such a 
world, no ownership structure induces the parties to make efficient relationship specific 
investments. However, the allocation of ownership rights matters, because A- (or B-) 
ownership strongly outperforms joint ownership. Second, if all people are strongly 
concerned about fairness or reciprocity, then under any ownership structure reciprocal 
fairness suffices as an enforcement device to induce all parties to invest efficiently. 
Thus, the allocation of ownership rights is irrelevant. Third, the model of inequity 
aversion assumes that some people are strongly fair-minded while others are mainly 
self-interested. This model focuses on the interaction between fair-minded and self-
interested players and shows that fairness alone is not sufficient to induce first best 
investments and that the ownership structure is very important. However, in contrast to 
the property rights approach, joint ownership turns out to be second-best optimal. The 
reason is that joint ownership makes much better (but still imperfect) use of fairness as 
an implicit enforcement device.  
The experimental results are largely consistent with the model of inequity 
aversion. People clearly differ in their behavior. Joint ownership turned out to induce 
higher investment levels than A- (or B-) ownership and to generate higher payoffs for 
both parties. Furthermore, the experimental subjects seemed to understand this. They 
opted predominantly for joint ownership, independent of the initial ownership structure. 
This confirms the proposition of the Coase Theorem that the parties will always try to 
choose the efficient ownership structure ex ante.  
In a recent paper, Oliver Hart (2001) argues that (a) ''although norms are 
undoubtedly very important both inside and between firms, incorporating them into the 
theory has been very difficult and is likely to continue to be so in the near future'' and 
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(b) ''a norm-free theory of  the firm and a norm-rich theory of the firm don’t seem to 
have very different predictions''. He mainly looked at models of repeated games that try 
to capture norms or reciprocal behavior. In this chapter we have shown that the recent 
advances in modeling fairness and reciprocity in one-shot games provide powerful tools 
to incorporate norms of fair or reciprocal behavior into contract theory. This allows us 
to derive important and testable predictions on the optimal allocation of ownership 
rights, some of which differ significantly from the standard predictions of the self-
interest model. If we want to understand the incentive properties of real institutions on 
real people, concerns for fairness and reciprocity have to be taken into account.  
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1.6 Experimental Instructions 
 
As an example for the experimental instructions, this section contains the instructions 
for player A in the Joint Ownership Design (JOD). Note that the original instructions 
were written in German. 
 
 
Introductional Remarks 
 
The experiment you are participating in today is part of a research project financed by the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Its purpose is to analyze people´s economic decision 
behavior. Your income consists of an initial endowment of DM 20 that every participant gets 
for showing up, and a sum of money you can earn during the experiment, depending on your 
and your partners´ decisions. During the experiment, your income is calculated in tokens. DM 
are converted into tokens by the following rate:  
1 token = 0.06 DM. 
Your endowment of 20 DM corresponds to 333 tokens. It can be used to cover potential losses 
that can occur during the experiment. If your losses exceed 300 tokens, you have to leave the 
experiment. By appropriately taking your own decisions you can avoid losses with 
certainty! 
 
At the end of the experiment all tokens resulting from your decisions during the 
experiment will be added together, converted in DM and, in addition to the endowment, 
paid to you in cash immediately. 
 
First of all you should now carefully read these instructions. After having done so, please 
answer the control questions, which you find at the end of these instructions. After all 
participants have answered the questions correctly, the experiment, for which you need the ten 
decision sheets and the income tables, begins.   
 
Without any exception, all written information you received from us is for your private 
use only. You are not allowed to pass over any information to other participants in the 
experiment. Talking during the experiment is also not permitted. Violations of these rules 
would force us to stop the experiment. If you have any questions, please ask us. 
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General information 
 
0. The participants are split up in two types of participants, participant A and participant B. 
During the whole experiment, you are playing the role of a participant A. The 
experiment lasts for 10 periods. In every period an A-participant is matched with a B-
participant. By investing in a project, the participants can generate a total revenue TR. In 
every period, every participant has to choose an integer investment level between 1 and 10. 
The A-participant`s investment level is denoted by a, while the B-participant`s investment 
level is denoted by b. The total revenue is calculated in the following way:  
TR = 22⋅(a+b) 
Generally, the more the participants invest in the project, the higher is the total revenue. 
Every invested unit – no matter who invested this unit, A or B - increases the total revenue 
by 22 tokens. If e.g. A chooses an investment of a = 3 and B chooses b = 2, a total revenue 
of TR = 22⋅(3+2) = 22⋅(5) = 110 tokens is generated. If A´s investment is instead a = 6 
and B chooses b = 8 they generate a total revenue of TR = 22⋅(6+8) = 22⋅(14) = 308 
tokens.  
In every period each A-participant is matched with a different B-participant. This 
ensures that the same A- and B-participant are matched together only once in the 
experiment. No A-participant gets to know the identity of the matched B-participants, nor 
do the B-participants know the respective A-participant´s identity. Your decisions in one 
period are transmitted only to the B-participant matched with you in that period. No one 
else is informed about your decisions. 
 
1. Every period consists of 4 stages. At the beginning of each period both, the A- and the B-
participant hold a 50% share of the total revenue from the project. At stage 1 every A-
participant has to decide, whether he wants to keep his 50% share, or whether he wants to 
sell his 50% share to the respective B-participant. If the A-participant wants to sell his 
share, he has to make a sales offer to the B-participant. This happens by setting a price P 
for the 50% share. If the A-participant does not make a sales offer to the B-participant, both 
participants keep holding a 50% share of the TR from the project. In addition, the A-
participant has to set demanded investment levels a* and b* at the first stage, i.e. he 
announces how much he wants to invest and how much he wants the respective B-
participant to invest.  
 
2. If the A-participant did not make a sales offer at stage 1, both participants automatically 
keep their 50% shares. 
If the A-participant made a sales offer, the respective B-participant has to decide at stage 2, 
whether she wants to accept or reject the offer.  
• If B rejects the offer, this period is over for the respective A- and B-participant. Both 
participants earn nothing in that period (0 tokens). 
• If B accepts the offer, he has to pay the fixed price P to the A-participant. Thereafter, 
the B-participants holds a 100% share of the total revenue from the project.  
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After stage 2 is over, one knows, whether the A-participant still holds his 50% share, or whether 
his share was sold. If the A-participant still holds the 50% share, his income is determined by 
the total revenue TR. If on the other hand A sold his share, his income in this period is 
determined by the price P.  
 
3. At stage 3 the B-participant has to decide how much he actually wants to invest in the 
project, i.e. he has to choose his investment level b, if the relationship has not been ended 
by the rejection of a sales offer. The investment level b may be every integer between 1 and 
10, i.e. b may be higher, lower, or equal to the demanded level b*. 
 
4. At stage 4, the A-participant is informed about the B-participant´s actual investment level. 
Now, the A-participant has to decide, how much he actually wants to invest in the project, 
i.e. he has to choose his investment level a. Please note, that also those A-participants who 
sold their 50% share have to choose an investment level a. The investment level a may be 
every integer between 1 and 10, i.e. a may be higher, lower, or equal to the announced 
level a*. 
 
For every participant, investing in the project is costly, i.e. a certain cost C has to be incurred. 
Generally, a cost of 12 tokens has to be incurred per unit invested. This cost has to be 
incurred by that participant, who actually invested the certain number of units. If e.g. A 
invests a = 6, this means a cost of 6⋅12 = 72 for her. If B invests b = 8, then he has to incur a 
cost of 8⋅12 = 96.  
 
Detailed information for A-participants 
 
Please keep to the following rules and orderings: 
1. The A-participant´s decision, whether to keep his share, or to sell it at price P, happens by 
writing down the corresponding information on the decision sheet of the current period. 
After all A-participants have come to a decision and after additionally having set the 
demanded investment levels, this information is transmitted to the respective B-participants 
by the experimentators.  
2. In case of a sales offer, the B-participant first of all has to write down on the decision sheet 
whether he wants to accept or to reject the offer. If B rejects the offer, this period is over 
and both participants earn nothing in that period (0 tokens). If B accepts the offer, he has to 
choose his own actual investment level, i.e. he has to write down his investment level b on 
the corresponding decision sheet. After all B-participants have come to a decision, the 
information is transmitted to the respective A-participant (and to no one else). 
3. After that, those A-participants who kept their 50% share, or who succeeded in selling it to 
B, have to choose their actual investment levels a. This information is again transmitted to 
the respective B-participant. Thereafter, this period is over. At the beginning of the next 
period, the A-participants again have to decide, whether to keep their 50% share, or to make 
a sales offer.  
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Calculation of incomes at the end of a period 
 
Incomes of the A- and B-participants at the end of a period depend on, whether both A 
and B hold a 50% share or A has sold his share to B. Furthermore, it depends on the 
chosen investment levels. 
 
1. If both the A-participant and the B-participant happen to hold a 50% share, 
because A decided to keep his share, then both the A-participant and the B-participant 
get half of the total revenue from the project. The income of the participants results 
from their share of total revenues minus investment cost (the income of A is denoted by 
IA, and the income of B is denoted by IB): 
 
Income of A  (IA)     =      (1/2)⋅total revenue [22⋅(a+b)]  –  investment cost of A [12a] 
Income of B  (IB)     =       (1/2)⋅total revenue [22⋅(a+b)]  –  investment cost of B [12b] 
 
In order to help you calculating these figures, we provided income tables on the yellow-
coloured sheet. Therefore, on the yellow-coloured sheet you find the income tables for 
the case that A holds a 50% share. 
 
♦ In the upper part of the yellow-coloured sheet you will find the feasible incomes 
for participant A, depending on the investment levels a and b. It is important to note, 
that the income of A depends on her own investment and on B’s investment because A 
holds a 50% share. If e.g. as before, investments are a = 4 and b = 7, one learns from the 
upper table that participant A earns an income of IA = 73 (please check this out). If 
participant A were to choose a = 1 instead of a = 4, his income would rise to IA = 76  
(please check this out). 
♦ In the lower table of the yellow-coloured sheet you can find the feasible incomes 
for participant B, dependent on investment levels a and b. Again, it is important to note, 
that B’s income depends on her own investment and on A’s investment, because B holds a 
50% share. If e.g. investments are a = 4 and b = 7, one learns from the upper table that 
participant B earns an income of IB = 37 (please check this out). If participant A were to 
choose a = 1 instead of a = 4, B´s income would rise to IB = 4  (please check this out). 
 
2. If the A-participant made a sales offer that was rejected by the B-participant, both 
participants earn 0 tokens in that period. 
 
3. If the A-participant made a sales offer that was accepted by the assigned B-participant, 
the income of A, again denoted by IA, and the income of B, again denoted by IB, are 
given by: 
 
Income of A  (IA)  =      price [P]  –  investment cost of A [12a]  
Income of B  (IB)  =  total revenue [22⋅(a+b)]  –  investment cost of B [12b]  –  price [P] 
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To make also the calculation of these incomes easier for you, we have put the income 
tables on the orange-coloured sheet at your disposal. Therefore, on the orange-coloured 
sheet you find the income tables for the case that A has sold her share to B. 
♦ In the upper part of the orange-coloured sheet you will find the respective feasible 
incomes for participant A, depending on the investment level a and price P. It is 
important to note, that the income of A is completely independent of B’s investment, 
because A does not hold a share anymore. If, for example, A has sold his share for 
P = 45 (with announced investment levels a* = 4 and b* = 4) and the actual investments 
have been a = 4 and b = 7, one learns from the upper table that, at a = 4, participant A 
earns IA = P – 48 = 45 – 48 = = -3 (please check this out). If participant A were to 
choose a = 1 instead of a = 4, his income would amount to IA = P – 12 = 45 – 12 = 33 
tokens (please check this out again). 
♦ In the lower part of the orange-coloured sheet you may figure out the feasible 
incomes for participant B at different investment levels a and b and prices P. It is 
important to note, that the income of B does depend on his own investments and on the 
investment of A, because the investment of A (a) still determines the total revenue and 
therefore B’s income. In the above example, where participant B has paid P = 45 and 
where investments are a = 4 and b = 7, one learns from the lower table, that the B-
participant earns an income of 
IB = 158 – P = 158 – 45 = 113 tokens 
Were the A-participant to choose a = 1 instead of a = 4, the income of B would amount 
to 
IB = 92 – P = 92 – 45 = 47 tokens. 
 
 
Every participant knows all the details of the income calculation. So every A-participant 
can not only calculate her own income, but also the B-participant`s income. In addition, 
the B-participant is able to calculate your income.  
Please remember that you have to calculate your own income and the B-participant`s income on 
your decision sheet at the end of each period.  
If you have any questions, please ask us. 
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Control Questions 
 
Please calculate your own income and, if asked for, the income of the B-participant in tokens. 
Missing answers lead to the loss of all incomes you´ll earn during this experiment. Wrong 
answers have no consequences for you. Please write down the complete calculation, not only 
results. 
 
1. a) You have sold your share to participant B for P = 63 and have set a* = 3 und b* = 
10. Calculate the income of B under the assumption that you always choose a = 2 and B 
chooses the following investment levels: b = 1, b = 5, b = 10. 
 
Income of B if b = 1:   
Income of B if b = 5:   
Income of B if b = 10:  
 
b) Calculate your own income under the same assumptions (P = 63, a* = 3, b* = 10, 
a = 2, and the respective levels of b): 
 
Your income if b = 1:   
Your income if b = 5:   
Your income if b = 10:  
 
2. a) You have sold your share to participant B for P = 35 and have set a* = 2 and 
b* = 10. Calculate B’s income under the assumption that participant B always chooses 
b = 10 and that you actually set: a = 1, a = 5, a = 10. 
 
Income of B if a = 1:   
Income of B if a = 5:   
Income of B if a = 10:  
 
b) Calculate your own income under the same assumptions (P = 35, a* = 2, b* = 10, 
b = 10, and the respective levels of a): 
 
Your income if a = 1:   
Your income if a = 5:   
Your income if a = 10:  
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3. You have made a sales offer with P = 55 to the respective B-participant, that was 
rejected. What is your income and the income of participant B? 
 
Your income:  
Income of B:  
 
4. You kept your 50% share of the TR and set a* = 10 and b* = 10. Participant B chooses 
b = 1 and you choose a = 1. What is now your income and the income of participant B? 
 
Your income:  
Income of B:  
 
5. You kept your 50% share of the TR and set a* = 10 and b* = 10. Participant B chooses 
b = 10 and you choose a = 10. What is now your income and the income of participant 
B? 
 
Your income:  
Income of B:  
 
6. You kept your 50% share of the TR and set a* = 10 und b* = 10. Participant B chooses 
b = 7. What is your income if you choose a = 2, a = 7, a = 10.  
 
Your income if a = 2:   
Your income if a = 7:   
Your income if a = 10:  
 
7. You kept your 50% share of the TR and set a* = 10 und b* = 10. You choose an actual 
investment of a = 7. What is your income if participant B sets: b = 2, b = 7, b = 10.  
 
Your income if b = 2:   
Your income if b = 7:   
Your income if b = 10:  
 
After you answered all questions correctly, please take a look at all questions and 
results simultaneously. 
Thereafter, think carefully about your decisions in the first period. 
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1.7 Appendix 
 
In this Appendix we analyze the three different experimental designs by using the Fehr-
Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion. Throughout, we make the following 
assumptions: 
• The utility function of each player is given by  
{ } { }( , ) max ,0 max ,0 ,i i j i i j i i i jU x x x x x x xα β= − ⋅ − − ⋅ −  
• 60% of all players are self-interested with 0i iα β= = . 
• 40% of all players are fair-minded with 2iα =  and 0.5 1iβ< < . 
• There is incomplete information about the other player's type. The initial prior of 
each player is given by the distribution assumed above. 
• The gross surplus function is given by ( , ) 22 ( )v a b a b= ⋅ +  and the cost functions 
are given by ( ) 12Ac a a= and ( ) 12Bc b b= , with { }1,...,10a∈ and { }1,...,10b∈ . 
The distribution of preferences corresponds to the distribution of preferences assumed 
in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2003). The propositions of 
the chapter follow immediately from the propositions proved here. 
 
1.7.1 Analysis of the A-Ownership Design (AOD) 
 
The time structure of the ''A Ownership Design'' is as follows: 
• Stage 0a: A decides whether to remain the sole owner and to hire B as an 
employee at some wage T , or whether to make B a partner who participates in 
50% of the revenues of the firm. 
• Stage 0b: B decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If she rejects, both 
parties get a payoff of 0. If she accepts, the game moves to stage 1. 
• Stage 1: B decides on how much effort, b , to invest into the firm. 
• Stage 2: A, after she has observed b , decides on her effort level, a . 
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We impose the following condition on B's beliefs. 
 
Condition A.1 If A offers a joint ownership contract and gives away half of the 
revenues of the firm to B, then B's updated belief that he faces the self-interested type of 
A does not increase. 
 
Theorem A.1 [A-Ownership Design] 
There exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome satisfying Condition A.1. 
• The equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which both types of A offer a joint 
ownership contract which is accepted by both types of B. 
• The self-interested type of B chooses 10sb = , while the fair-minded type of B 
chooses 1fb = . The self-interested type of A chooses 1sa =  and the fair-minded 
type of A chooses fa b=  in equilibrium. 
• Expected monetary payoffs are 69.4AsM =  for the self-interested type of A and 
64AfM =  for the fair-minded type of A, so the average monetary payoff of A is 
67.24AM = . The expected monetary payoff of the self-interested type of B is 
40.6BsM =  and of the fair-minded type of B is 10BfM = , so in expectation 
28.36BM = . 
 
The proof is in several steps. First, we analyze the different types of contracts 
separately. However, because the contractual offer by A at stage 0 may be interpreted as 
a signal about her type, we have to do this for all possible beliefs p  that B may attach 
to the event that he faces the self-interested type of A. Then, we analyze the full game 
and consider all possible equilibrium candidates. 
 
A-Ownership: Suppose that A chose to stick to A-ownership and offered a ''wage'' T  
to B. At stage 2, a self-interested type of A chooses a  to maximize  
22 ( ) 12 10 22AsU a b a T a b T= ⋅ + − − = + − . 
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Clearly, it is optimal for her to choose 10sa = . The fair-minded type of A chooses a  to 
maximize 
{ } { }10 22 max 2 10 34 ,0 max 10 34 2 ,0 .AfU a b T T a b a b Tα β= + − − − − − + −  
Given that 1β < , the fair-minded type of A also chooses 10fa = . Thus, under A-
ownership, it is a dominant strategy for both types of A to choose 10a = . 
Consider now stage 1. Anticipating A's reaction, the self-interested type of B 
chooses b  to maximize 
12BsU T b= −  
which implies 1sb = . The fair-minded type of B maximizes 
{ } { }12 max 34 100 2 ,0 max 2 34 100,0BfU T b b T T bα β= − − + − − − − . 
Thus, if 67T ≤ , the fair-minded type of B chooses 1fb = . If 67T >  he chooses 
fb  so as to equalize payoffs, i.e., 2 100
34
f Tb −= . 
Consider now stage 0b. The self-interested type of B will accept the contract if 
and only if 12T ≥ . The fair-minded type of B clearly accepts any contract with 67T ≥ . 
If 67T <  he accepts if and only if 
( )12 34 100 2 0T b b Tα− − + − > . 
Noting that he chooses 1fb =  in this case and that 2α = , this is equivalent to 
12 268 56
1 4
T +≥ =
+
. 
At stage 0a, if the self-interested type of A offers 12T = , this will only be accepted by 
the self-interested type of B, so her expected payoff is ( )0.6 22 100 12 66+ − = . If she 
offers 56T = , this will be accepted by both types of B, so her payoff will also be 
22 100 56 66+ − = . Therefore A is just indifferent between offering 12T =  and offering 
56T = . Let us assume that in the case of indifference A will make an offer  that is 
accepted by both types of B. Offering more than 56 is not worth her while, because 
( ) 2 1000.6 22 100 0.4 22 100
34
TT T− + − + + − 
 
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is strictly decreasing in T . Hence, the self-interested type of A will offer 56AsT =  
which yields a monetary payoff of 66AsM =  for her. Both types of B accept and get a 
monetary payoff of 56 12 44BM = − = . The fair-minded type of A wants to equalize 
payoffs. Hence, she will offer 67T =  which yields a payoff of 
22 100 67 55AfM = + − =  to A for sure. 67 12 55BM = − =  for both types of B. 
 
This is summarized in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition A.1.1 [A-ownership] 
(a) A self-interested type of A offers 56T = , while a fair-minded type of A offers 
67T = . Both offers are accepted by both types of B. Both types of B choose 
1b = , while both types of A choose 10a = . 
(b) The monetary payoff of the self-interested type of A is 66AsM =  and of the fair-
minded type of A is 55AfM = . B's monetary payoff (for both types) is 44BM =  
if he faces the self-interested type of A and 55BM =  if he faces the fair-minded 
type of A, which gives him in expected terms ( )44 1 55BM p p= + − . 
 
Joint Ownership Contracts: Suppose now that A offered a joint ownership contract. 
At stage 2, a self-interested type of A chooses a  to maximize 
1 22 ( ) 12 11 .
2
AsU a b a b a= ⋅ ⋅ + − = −  
Thus, it is optimal to choose 1sa = . The fair-minded type of A chooses a  to maximize 
{ } { }11 max 11 11 ,0 max 11 11 ,0 .AfU b a a b b a b a a bα β= − − ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − − +  
Clearly, A will never choose a b> . If 1
12
β > , the fair-minded type of A will choose 
fa b= . 
Consider now stage 1. Anticipating A's reaction, the self-interested type of B 
chooses b  to maximize 
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(11 ) (1 ) (11 )
(11 ) (1 ) (11 ) 11 10 11 .
Bs s fEU p a b p a b
p b p b b p b pb
= ⋅ − + − ⋅ −
= ⋅ − + − ⋅ − = + −
 
Thus, if 10
11
p < , he chooses 10sb = , if 10
11
p > , he chooses 1sb = . The fair-minded 
type of B, on the other hand, maximizes 
 [ ] [ ]
11 (12 12 ) (1 ) 11
11 (12 12) (1 ) 11
11 12 10 12 11 .
Bf s s fEU p a b b a p a b
p b b p b b
p p b b p bp
α
α
α α
   = ⋅ − − − + − ⋅ −   
= ⋅ − − − + − ⋅ −
= + + − −
 
Substituting 2α =  and differentiating with respect to b yields 
 10 35 .
BfdEU p
db
= −  
Thus, if 10
35
p < , the fair-minded type of B chooses 10fb = , if 10
35
p > , he chooses 
1fb = . 
 
The next proposition summarizes the equilibrium of the continuation game with joint 
ownership: 
 
Proposition A.1.2 [Joint Ownership] 
The self-interested type of A always chooses 1sa = , while the fair-minded type of A 
chooses fa b= . Depending on B's belief about the probability that he faces a self-
interested type of A, we have to distinguish five cases. 
1. If 10350 p≤ < , both, the fair-minded and the self-interested type of B choose 
10f sb b= = . In this case the monetary payoffs are 109AsM =  for the self-
interested type of A and 100AfM =  for the fair-minded type of A. 
2. If 1035p = , the fair-minded type of B is indifferent between all levels of b  and the 
self-interested type of B chooses 10sb = . 
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3. If 10 1035 11p< < , the fair-minded type of B chooses 1
fb =  and the self-interested 
type of B chooses 10sb = . In this case the monetary payoffs of A are 69.4AsM =  
for the self-interested type of A and 64AfM =  for the fair-minded type of A. 
4. If 1011p = , the fair-minded type of B chooses 1
fb =  and the self-interested type of 
B is indifferent between all levels of b . 
5. If 1011 1p< ≤ , the fair-minded type of B chooses 1
fb =  and the self-interested 
type of B chooses 1sb = . In this case the monetary payoffs are 10AsM =  for the 
self-interested type of A and 10AfM =  for the fair-minded type of A. 
 
We now turn to the analysis of the entire game. 
 
Lemma A.1 There does not exist a separating equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Suppose there is a separating equilibrium in which the self-interested type of A 
chooses A-ownership and the fair-minded type of A chooses joint ownership. In such an 
equilibrium the self-interested type of A would get a payoff of 66. However, if she 
offers a joint ownership contract, B believes that he faces a fair-minded type of A with 
probability one. Therefore, by Proposition A.1.2, both types of B choose 10b = , and the 
self-interested type of A could get a monetary payoff 109. Hence, the self-interested 
type of A has an incentive to deviate, a contradiction. 
Similarly, suppose that there is a separating equilibrium in which the self-
interested type of A chooses joint ownership while the fair-minded type of A chooses 
A-ownership. In this case B believes that he faces the self-interested type of A with 
probability one if he is offered joint ownership, so both types of B will choose 1b =  and 
the self-interested type of A gets a payoff of 10. If she deviates and sticks to A-
ownership, she can guarantee herself a payoff of 66. Hence, she has an incentive to 
deviate, a contradiction.        Q.E.D. 
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Lemma A.2 There does not exist a pooling equilibrium satisfying Condition A.1 in 
which both types of A stick to A-ownership. 
 
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that both types of A stick to A-ownership in equilibrium. 
In this case the fair-minded type of A will get a payoff of 55. If she deviates and offers 
joint ownership, B's belief that he faces a self-interested type of A cannot increase (by 
Condition A.1), so 0.6p ≤ . Hence, the fair-minded type of A will get a payoff of at 
least 64 from joint ownership, which induces her to deviate, a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A.3 There does not exist a semi-separating equilibrium satisfying Condition 
A.1 in which the self-interested type of A chooses one type of ownership with probability 
one and the fair-minded type of A chooses this type of ownership with a probability 
smaller than one. 
 
Proof: Suppose the self-interested type of A chooses A-ownership with probability one, 
while the fair-minded type of A chooses A-ownership with probability q  and joint 
ownership with probability 1 q− , 0 1q< < . If B is offered joint ownership, he 
concludes that he faces the fair-minded type of A with probability one and chooses 
10b =  which induces the self-interested type of A to deviate. 
Now suppose that the self-interested type of A chooses joint ownership with 
probability one, while the fair-minded type of A chooses A-ownership with probability 
0q >  and joint ownership with probability 1 q− . Then, by Bayes' rule, if B is offered 
joint ownership, he must conclude that the probability that he faces the self-interested 
type of A is larger than 0.6, a contradiction to Condition A.1.   Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A.4 There does not exist a semi-separating equilibrium satisfying Condition 
A.1 in which the fair-minded type of A chooses one type of ownership with probability 
one and the self-interested type of A chooses this type of ownership with a probability 
smaller than one. 
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Proof: Suppose the fair-minded type of A chooses A-ownership with probability one, 
while the self-interested type of A chooses A-ownership with probability q  and joint 
ownership with probability 1 q− , 0 1q< < . If B is offered joint ownership, he 
concludes that he faces the self-interested type of A with probability one, so the self-
interested type of A would get a payoff of 10, less than the 66 that she could guarantee 
herself from offering a wage contract, a contradiction to the assumption that the self-
interested type of A is indifferent between A- and joint ownership. 
Suppose finally that the fair-minded type of A chooses joint ownership with 
probability one, while the self-interested type of A chooses A-ownership with 
probability 0q >  and joint ownership with probability 1 q− . If B observes joint 
ownership, the updated probability that he faces the self-interested type of A is smaller 
than 0.6. Hence, by Proposition A.1.2, the self-interested type of A gets a payoff from 
joint ownership that is at least 69.4, while she only gets 66 from sticking to A-
ownership, a contradiction to the assumption that she is indifferent between the two 
ownership structures.         Q.E.D. 
Hence, the only remaining equilibrium candidate satisfying Condition A.1 is the 
pooling equilibrium described in Theorem A.1. It remains to check that this is indeed an 
equilibrium. 
Suppose that in equilibrium both types of A choose joint ownership with 
probability one. Thus, if joint ownership is offered, B still believes that he faces the 
self-interested type of A with probability 0.6p = . Hence, by Proposition A.1.2, the self-
interested type of A gets an expected monetary payoff of 69.4AsM = . The fair-minded 
type of A chooses fa b= , so that there is no inequality and her utility equals her 
monetary payoff of 64AfM = . If A deviates and chooses to stick to A-ownership, then, 
independent of B's updated belief about A's type, the self-interested type of A gets a 
payoff of 66 and the fair-minded type of A gets a payoff of 55 (see Proposition A.1.1). 
Hence, neither of them has an incentive to deviate. This completes the proof of Theorem 
A.1. 
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1.7.2 Analysis of the Joint Ownership Design (JOD) 
 
Consider the following sequence of events: 
• Stage 0a: A may either offer to sell her share of the firm to B at a fixed price T  
or to stick with joint ownership where each party gets 50% of the revenues. 
• Stage 0b: If A offered to sell her share, B has to decide whether to accept or to 
reject the offer. If he accepts, we have B-ownership and A gets a fixed payment 
T . If he rejects, the game ends and both players get a payoff of 0. 
• Stage 1: B chooses b . 
• Stage 2: A chooses a . 
 
We impose the following condition which corresponds to Condition A.1: 
 
Condition A.2 If A chooses to stick to joint ownership, then B's updated belief that he 
faces the self-interested type of A does not increase. 
 
Theorem A.2 [Joint Ownership Design] 
There exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome satisfying Condition A.2. 
• The equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which both types of A stick to joint 
ownership. 
• The self-interested type of B chooses 10sb = , while the fair-minded type of B 
chooses 1fb = . The self-interested type of A chooses 1sa =  and the fair-minded 
type of A chooses fa b=  in equilibrium. 
• Expected monetary payoffs are 69.4AsM =  for the self-interested type of A and 
64AfM =  for the fair-minded type of A, so the average monetary payoff of A is 
67.24AM = . The expected monetary payoff of the self-interested type of B is 
40.6BsM =  and of the fair-minded type of B is 10BfM = , which gives on 
average 28.36BM =  for player B. 
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To prove the theorem consider first a continuation game with joint ownership. Let p  
denote the probability assigned by B to the event that A is self-interested. Note that, as 
in Section 1.6.1, p  is determined endogenously because B may learn something about 
A's type when he observes that A did not sell her share. In fact, the analysis is exactly 
the same as the analysis of the joint ownership game in Section 1.6.1, and Proposition 
A.1.2 applies. 
Consider now the continuation game after B accepted to buy A's share of the 
firm at price T . Note that the analysis here is slightly different from the analysis of ''A-
ownership'' in the first section, because now B (who moves first in the investment 
game) is full residual claimant on the margin. However, as will become transparent in a 
moment, this is not going to affect the results. 
 At stage 1 it is a dominant strategy for both types of B to choose 10b = , no 
matter what A does at stage 2. If B is self-interested, then his payoff is given by 
( )22 12 22 10BsU a b b T a b T= + − − = + −  
so it is clearly optimal to choose 10sb = . If B is fair-minded, then he chooses b  to 
maximize 
 { } { }22( ) 12 max 2 34 10 ,0 max 34 10 2 ,0BfU a b b T T a b a b Tα β= + − − − − − − + −  
which is strictly increasing in b as long as 1β < . Hence, 10fb = as well. 
At stage 2, the self-interested type of A always chooses 1sa = . The fair-minded 
type of A chooses a  to maximize 
 { } { }12 max 34 10 2 ,0 max 2 34 10 ,0 .AfU T a a b T T a bα β= − − + − − − −  
Substituting 10b = , we get  
 
12 34 100 34 2 0
12 34 100 34 2 0.
Af
f
if a TdU
if a Tda
α
β
− − + − ≥
= − + + − <
 
Thus, we get 
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1 67
2 100 67 220
34
10 220.
f
if T
Ta if T
if T
<
 −= ≤ ≤

>
 
Hence, monetary payoffs under B-ownership are given by 
12AsM T= − , 
12 67
10 1200 67 220
34
120 220
Af
T if T
TM if T
T if T
− <
 += ≤ ≤

− >
 
100 22 (1 )
122 67
1200 10 2948 44 67 220
34
320 198 220.
Bs Bf fM M T p p a
T if T
T p pT if T
T p if T
 = = − + + − 
− <
 + + −= ≤ ≤

− − >
 
 
We now turn to the analysis of the entire game. 
 
Lemma A.5 There does not exist a separating equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Suppose there is a separating equilibrium in which the self-interested type of A 
offers to sell at price T  and the fair-minded type of A chooses to stick to joint 
ownership. If A sticks to joint ownership, B knows for sure that he faces the fair-minded 
type of A, so 0p = , and B will choose 10b = . Hence, if the self-interested type of A 
mimics the fair-minded type and chooses to stick to joint ownership as well, she would 
get a payoff of 109 (see Proposition A.1.2). On the other hand, if A offers to sell at price 
T , B knows that she faces the self-interested type with probability 1. If B rejects the 
offer, both players get a monetary payoff of 0. Therefore, the self-interested type of B 
accepts T  if and only if 
122 0 122T T− ≥ ⇔ ≤ . 
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The fair-minded type of B accepts T  if and only if  
[ ]122 12 122 0T T Tα− − − − + ≥ . 
Substituting 2α = , the fair-minded type of B accepts T  if and only if  
78T ≤ . 
Thus, A is just indifferent whether to offer a price 78T =  which is accepted by both 
types of B and yields a monetary payoff of ( )78 78 12 66AsM T = = − = or to offer 
122T =  which is accepted only by the self-interested agent and yields an expected 
monetary payoff of ( ) ( )122 0.6 122 12 0.4 0 66AsM T = = − + ⋅ = . However, 66 is strictly 
smaller than 109 which she could get by mimicking the fair-minded type, a 
contradiction. 
Similarly, suppose that there is a separating equilibrium in which the self-
interested type of A chooses to stick to joint ownership while the fair-minded type of A 
offers to sell at price T . In this case B infers from not getting an offer T  that he faces 
the self-interested type of A with probability 1, so the outcome of the joint ownership 
game yields a payoff of 10 for each party. On the other hand, we have just seen that the 
self-interested type of A could guarantee himself a payoff of 66 by offering to sell her 
share to B at price 78T =  which would be accepted by both types of B, even if this 
offer revealed that A is self-interested. Hence, the self-interested type of A has an 
incentive to deviate, a contradiction.       Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A.6 There does not exist a pooling equilibrium satisfying Condition A.2 in 
which both types of A offer to sell their share of the firm. 
 
Proof: Suppose now that both types of A offer to sell their share in equilibrium. Note 
first, that it cannot be the case that the self-interested type of A tries to sell at a different 
price than the fair-minded type of A. In this case the self-interested type of A would get 
a payoff of at most 66. If she deviates and sticks to joint ownership, Condition A.2 
implies that B's updated probability that he faces the self-interested type of A cannot go 
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up. Therefore, by Proposition A.1.2, the self-interested type of A would get an expected 
payoff of 69.4, which induces her to deviate. 
Hence, selling their share can only be an equilibrium if both types of A sell at 
the same price T . It turns out that the highest price at which the fair-minded type of B 
is willing to buy is 86.1T = , while the highest price at which the self-interested type of 
B is willing to buy is 181.02T = . Suppose both types of A offer to sell at 86T = . In 
this case both types of B accept and choose 10b = . The self-interested type of A 
chooses 1sa =  and gets 74AsM = . The fair-minded type of A chooses 
2 100 2.1
34
f Ta −= =  (which equalizes payoffs) and gets 85 24 62AfM = − = . However, 
if the fair-minded type would deviate and stick to joint ownership, then B's belief that 
he faces the self-interested type cannot be larger than 0.6 (by Condition A.2), so the 
fair-minded type of player A would get a payoff of 64, which is strictly larger than 62, a 
contradiction. Finally, suppose that both types of A offer 181T = . This would only be 
accepted by the self-interested type of B. The fair-minded type of B would reject and 
force payoffs of 0 for both parties. If A's offer was accepted, a fair-minded A would 
choose 2 181 100 7.7
34
fa ⋅ −= =  and get 181 7.7 12 88.6− ⋅ = . Hence, her expected payoff 
would be 0.6 88.6 0.4 0 53.16AfM = ⋅ + ⋅ =  which is strictly less than what she would get 
if she sticks to joint ownership at stage 0, a contradiction.    Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A.7 There does not exist a semi-separating equilibrium satisfying Condition 
A.2 in which the self-interested type of A chooses one contract with probability one and 
the fair-minded type of A chooses this contract with a probability smaller than one. 
 
Proof: Suppose the self-interested type of A chooses to sell her share with probability 
one, while the fair-minded type of A chooses to sell with probability q  and to stick to 
joint ownership with probability 1 q− , 0 1q< < . If B is offered the joint ownership 
CHAPTER 1 FAIRNESS AND OWNERSHIP RIGHTS 
 
70
contract, he concludes that he faces the fair-minded type of A with probability one and 
chooses 10b =  which induces the self-interested type of A to deviate. 
Suppose that the self-interested type of A chooses to stick to joint ownership 
with probability one, while the fair-minded type of A chooses to sell with probability q  
and to stick to joint ownership contract with probability 1 q− . Thus, by Bayes' rule, if A 
sticks to joint ownership, B must conclude that the probability that she faces the self-
interested type of A must be larger than 0.6, a contradiction to Condition A.2.  Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A.8 There does not exist a semi-separating equilibrium satisfying Condition 
A.2 in which the fair-minded type of A chooses one contract with probability one and 
the self-interested type of A chooses this contract with a probability smaller than one. 
 
Proof: Suppose the fair-minded type of A chooses to sell with probability one, while the 
self-interested type chooses to sell with probability q  and to stick to joint ownership 
with probability 1 q− , 0 1q< < . If A sticks to joint ownership, B concludes that she 
faces the self-interested type of A with probability one, so the self-interested type of A 
would get a payoff of 10, less than the 66 that she could guarantee herself from offering 
to sell her share at price 78T = , a contradiction to the assumption that the self-
interested type of A is indifferent between selling and sticking to joint ownership. 
Suppose that the fair-minded type of A chooses to stick to joint ownership with 
probability one, while the self-interested type of A offers to sell with probability q  and 
to stick to joint ownership with probability 1 q− . If A sticks to joint ownership, the 
updated probability that B faces the self-interested type of A is smaller than 0.6. Hence, 
by Proposition A.1.2, the self-interested type of A gets a payoff from a joint ownership 
contract that is at least 69.4, while she only gets 66 from offering to sell her share, a 
contradiction to the assumption that she is indifferent between her two options. Q.E.D. 
Hence, the only remaining equilibrium candidate satisfying Condition A.2 is the 
pooling equilibrium described in Theorem A.2. It remains to check that this is indeed an 
equilibrium. 
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Suppose that in equilibrium both types of A choose to stick to joint ownership 
with probability one. Thus, if A sticks to joint ownership B continues to believes that he 
faces the self-interested type of A with probability 0.6p = . Hence, by Proposition 
A.1.2, the self-interested type of A will get an expected monetary payoff of 
69.4AsM = . The fair-minded type of A will choose fa b= , so there is no inequality 
and her utility equals her monetary payoff of 64AfM = . 
Now suppose that as soon as B observes a deviation from equilibrium, i.e. A 
makes a sales offer at stage 0, B's up-dated belief that he faces a self-interested type of 
A is equal to one. Given this out of equilibrium belief, no type of A has an incentive to 
deviate from the equilibrium. The self-interested type of A would - in case of a 
deviation - offer 78T = , which is accepted by both types of B and yields a payoff of 66. 
66 however is less than 69.4, what he gets in equilibrium. The fair-minded type of A 
would - in case of a deviation - also offer 78T = , which is accepted by both types of B 
and yields a payoff strictly between 57.2 and 58, depending on β . This however is less 
than 64, what he gets in equilibrium. Hence, neither of the two types has an incentive to 
deviate. This completes the proof of Theorem A.2. 
 
1.7.3 Analysis of the Control Treatment of the Joint Ownership Design (JOD') 
 
The time structure of this game is as follows: 
• Stage 0a: A may either offer to sell her share of the firm to B at a fixed price T  
or to stick with joint ownership where each party gets 50% of the revenues. 
• Stage 0b: If A offered to sell her share, B has to decide whether to accept or to 
reject the offer. If he accepts, we have B-ownership and A gets a fixed payment 
T . If he rejects, or if A did not offer to sell her share of the firm, we have joint 
ownership. 
• Stage 1: B chooses b . 
• Stage 2: A chooses a . 
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Theorem A.3 [Joint Ownership Design] 
There exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome satisfying Condition A.2. 
• The equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which both types of A stick to joint 
ownership. 
• The self-interested type of B chooses 10sb = , while the fair-minded type of B 
chooses 1fb = . The self-interested type of A chooses 1sa =  and the fair-minded 
type of A chooses fa b=  in equilibrium. 
• Expected monetary payoffs are 69.4AsM =  for the self-interested type of A and 
64AfM =  for the fair-minded type of A, so the average monetary payoff of A is 
67.24AM = . The expected monetary payoff of the self-interested type of B is 
40.6BsM =  and of the fair-minded type of B is 10BfM = , which gives on 
average 28.36BM =  for player B. 
 
To prove the theorem consider first a continuation game with joint ownership. Let p  
denote the probability assigned by B to the event that A is self-interested. Note that, as 
in Section 1.6.1, p  may differ depending on whether this continuation game was 
reached after B rejected an offer by A or whether it was reached because A chose to 
have joint ownership. In fact, the analysis is exactly the same as the analysis of the joint 
ownership game in Section 1.6.1, and Proposition A.1.2 applies. 
Consider now the continuation game after B accepted to buy A's share of the 
firm at price T . Note that the analysis here is slightly different from the analysis of ''A-
ownership'' in the previous section 1.6.1, because now B (who moves first in the 
investment game) is full residual claimant on the margin. Furthermore, if B rejects the 
offer, the game does not end with payoffs of zero for both players as was the case in 
section 1.6.2, but we are rather back to joint ownership. However, as will become 
transparent in a moment, this is not going to affect the results. 
At stage 1 it is a dominant strategy for both types of B to choose 10b = , no 
matter what A does at stage 2. If B is self-interested, then his payoff is given by 
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( )22 12 22 10BsU a b b T a b T= + − − = + −  
so it is clearly optimal to choose 10sb = . If B is fair-minded, then he chooses b  to 
maximize 
 { } { }22( ) 12 max 2 34 10 ,0 max 34 10 2 ,0BfU a b b T T a b a b Tα β= + − − − − − − + −  
which is strictly increasing in b as long as 1β < . Hence, 10fb = as well. 
At stage 2, the self-interested type of A always chooses 1sa = . The fair-minded 
type of A chooses a  to maximize 
 { } { }12 max 34 10 2 ,0 max 2 34 10 ,0 .AfU T a a b T T a bα β= − − + − − − −  
Substituting 10b = , we get  
 
12 34 100 34 2 0
12 34 100 34 2 0.
Af
f
if a TdU
if a Tda
α
β
− − + − ≥
= − + + − <
 
Thus, we get 
 
1 67
2 100 67 220
34
10 220.
f
if T
Ta if T
if T
<
 −= ≤ ≤

>
 
Hence, monetary payoffs under B-ownership are given by 
12AsM T= − , 
12 67
10 1200 67 220
34
120 220
Af
T if T
TM if T
T if T
− <
 += ≤ ≤

− >
 
100 22 (1 )
122 67
1200 10 2948 44 67 220
34
320 198 220.
Bs Bf fM M T p p a
T if T
T p pT if T
T p if T
 = = − + + − 
− <
 + + −= ≤ ≤

− − >
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We now turn to the analysis of the entire game. 
 
Lemma A.9 There does not exist a separating equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Suppose there is a separating equilibrium in which the self-interested type of A 
offers to sell at price T  and the fair-minded type of A chooses to stick to joint 
ownership. If A sticks to joint ownership, B knows for sure that he faces the fair-minded 
type of A, so 0p = , and B will choose 10b = . Hence, if the self-interested type of A 
mimics the fair-minded type and chooses to stick to joint ownership as well, she would 
get a payoff of 109 (see Proposition A.1.2). On the other hand, if A offers to sell at price 
T , B knows that she faces the self-interested type with probability 1. If B rejects the 
offer, we are in a continuation game with joint ownership and 1p = , so (by Proposition 
A.1.2) both players get a monetary payoff of 10. Therefore, the self-interested type of B 
accepts T  if and only if 
122 10 112T T− ≥ ⇔ ≤ . 
The fair-minded type of B accepts T  if and only if  
[ ]122 12 122 10T T Tα− − − − + ≥ . 
Substituting 2α = , the fair-minded type of B accepts T  if and only if  
76T ≤ . 
Thus, A is indifferent between offering a price 76T =  which is accepted by both types 
of B and yields a monetary payoff of ( )76 76 12 64AsM T = = − = or to offer 112T =  
which is accepted only by the self-interested agent and yields an expected monetary 
payoff of ( ) ( )112 0.6 112 12 0.4 10 64AsM T = = − + ⋅ = . However, any of these payoffs is 
strictly smaller than 109 which she could get by mimicking the fair-minded type, a 
contradiction. 
Similarly, suppose that there is a separating equilibrium in which the self-
interested type of A chooses to stick to joint ownership while the fair-minded type of A 
offers to sell at price T . In this case B infers from not getting an offer T  that he faces 
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the self-interested type of A with probability 1, so the outcome of the joint ownership 
game yields a payoff of 10 for each party. On the other hand, we have just seen that the 
self-interested type of A could guarantee himself a payoff of 64 by offering to sell her 
share to B at price 76T =  which would be accepted by both types of B, even if this 
offer revealed that A is self-interested. Hence, the self-interested type of A has an 
incentive to deviate, a contradiction.       Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A.10 There does not exist a pooling equilibrium satisfying Condition A.2 in 
which both types of A offer to sell their share of the firm. 
 
Proof: Suppose now that both types of A offer to sell their share in equilibrium. It 
cannot be the case that the self-interested type of A tries to sell at a different price than 
the fair-minded type of A. In this case the self-interested type of A would get a payoff 
of 64 by offering 76T = . If she deviates and sticks to joint ownership, Condition A.2 
implies that B's updated probability that he faces the self-interested type of A cannot go 
up. Therefore, by Proposition A.1.2, the self-interested type of A would get an expected 
payoff of 69.4, which induces her to deviate. 
Hence, selling their share can only be an equilibrium if both types of A sell at 
the same price T . It turns out that the highest price at which the fair-minded type of B 
is willing to buy is 82.6T = , while the highest price at which the self-interested type of 
B is willing to buy is 160.3T = . Suppose both types of A offer to sell at 82T = . In this 
case both types of B accept and choose 10b = . The self-interested type of A chooses 
1sa =  and gets 70AsM = . The fair-minded type of A chooses 2 100 1.88
34
f Ta −= =  
(which equalizes payoffs) and gets 82 12 1.88 59.44AfM = − ⋅ = . However, if the fair-
minded type would deviate and stick to joint ownership, then B's belief that he faces the 
self-interested type cannot be larger than 0.6 (by Condition A.2), so the fair-minded 
type of player A would get a payoff of 64, which is strictly larger than 59.44, a 
contradiction. Finally, suppose that both types of A offer 160T = . This would only be 
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accepted by the self-interested type of B. The fair-minded type of B would reject and 
then choose 1fb =  in the continuation game with joint ownership. Hence, in this 
continuation game, the fair-minded type of A would get 10. If her offer was accepted, 
she would choose 2 160 100 6.4
34
fa ⋅ −= =  and get 160 6.4 12 83.2− ⋅ = . Hence, her 
expected payoff would be 0.6 83.2 0.4 10 53.92AfM = ⋅ + ⋅ =  which is strictly less than 
what she would get if she sticks to joint ownership at stage 0, a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A.11 There does not exist a semi-separating equilibrium satisfying Condition 
A.2 in which the self-interested type of A chooses one contract with probability one and 
the fair-minded type of A chooses this contract with a probability smaller than one. 
 
Proof: Suppose the self-interested type of A chooses to sell her share with probability 
one, while the fair-minded type of A chooses to sell with probability q  and to stick to 
joint ownership with probability 1 q− , 0 1q< < . If B is offered the joint ownership 
contract, he concludes that he faces the fair-minded type of A with probability one and 
chooses 10b =  which induces the self-interested type of A to deviate. 
Suppose that the self-interested type of A chooses to stick to joint ownership 
with probability one, while the fair-minded type of A chooses to sell with probability q  
and to stick to joint ownership contract with probability 1 q− . Thus, by Bayes' rule, if A 
sticks to joint ownership, B must conclude that the probability that she faces the self-
interested type of A must be larger than 0.6, a contradiction to Condition A.2. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A.12 There does not exist a semi-separating equilibrium satisfying Condition 
A.2 in which the fair-minded type of A chooses one contract with probability one and 
the self-interested type of A chooses this contract with a probability smaller than one. 
 
Proof: Suppose the fair-minded type of A chooses to sell with probability one, while the 
self-interested type chooses to sell with probability q  and to stick to joint ownership 
CHAPTER 1 FAIRNESS AND OWNERSHIP RIGHTS 
 
77
with probability 1 q− , 0 1q< < . If A sticks to joint ownership, B concludes that she 
faces the self-interested type of A with probability one, so the self-interested type of A 
would get a payoff of 10, less than the 64 that she could guarantee herself from offering 
to sell her share at price 76T = , a contradiction to the assumption that the self-
interested type of A is indifferent between selling and sticking to joint ownership. 
Suppose that the fair-minded type of A chooses to stick to joint ownership with 
probability one, while the self-interested type of A offers to sell with probability q  and 
to stick to joint ownership with probability 1 q− . If A sticks to joint ownership, the 
updated probability that B faces the self-interested type of A is smaller than 0.6. Hence, 
by Proposition A.1.2, the self-interested type of A gets a payoff from a joint ownership 
contract that is at least 69.4, while she only gets 64 from offering to sell her share, a 
contradiction to the assumption that she is indifferent between her two options. Q.E.D. 
Hence, the only remaining equilibrium candidate satisfying Condition A.2 is the 
pooling equilibrium described in Theorem A.3. It remains to check that this is indeed an 
equilibrium. 
Suppose that in equilibrium both types of A choose to stick to joint ownership 
with probability one. Thus, if A sticks to joint ownership B continues to believes that he 
faces the self-interested type of A with probability 0.6p = . Hence, by Proposition 
A.1.2, the self-interested type of A will get an expected monetary payoff of 
69.4AsM = . The fair-minded type of A will choose fa b= , so there is no inequality 
and her utility equals her monetary payoff of 64AfM = . 
Now suppose that as soon as B observes a deviation from equilibrium, i.e. A 
makes a sales offer at stage 0, B's up-dated belief that he faces a self-interested type of 
A is equal to one. Given this out-of-equilibrium belief, no type of A has an incentive to 
deviate from the equilibrium. 
The self-interested type of A would - in case of a deviation - offer 76T = , which 
is accepted by both types of B and yields a payoff of 64. 64 however is less than 69.4, 
what he gets in equilibrium. The fair-minded type of A would - in case of a deviation - 
also offer 76T = , which is accepted by both types of B and yields a payoff strictly 
CHAPTER 1 FAIRNESS AND OWNERSHIP RIGHTS 
 
78
between 57 and 57.5, depending on β . This however is less than 64, what he gets in 
equilibrium. Hence, neither type of A has an incentive to deviate. This completes the 
proof of Theorem A.3. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS, 
EFFICIENCY, AND THE EFFECT OF A 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Theories of social preferences have attracted a lot of attention recently. These theories 
provide a framework to account for the growing experimental evidence of the 
importance of fairness motives in human behavior. Among the most significant 
contributions are models based on reciprocity (Rabin, 1993, and Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004), as well as models of inequity aversion which are based on 
distributional concerns (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, henceforth FS, and Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000). Falk and Fischbacher (2000) and Charness and Rabin (2002, 
henceforth CR) provide a combination of reciprocal and distributional preferences. 
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Some researchers have taken those theories back to the experimental laboratories in 
order to test which of them reflect human behavior more accurately. Among those are 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004, henceforth ES), Falk et al. (2000) and Nelson (2002). 
One testable dimension along which the above mentioned theories differ is their 
treatment of distributional fairness.27 In order to separate purely distributional concerns 
from reciprocity (i.e. intention-based fairness), ES construct experiments in which 
subjects have to decide between different allocations without any strategic interaction. 
They decide on how much money other players will get, with their own payoffs being 
fixed. This allows ES to take a direct look at distributional concerns. They find that, 
among the models of inequity aversion, FS does significantly better than Bolton and 
Ockenfels. Particularly, agents seem to suffer from disutility when their payoff differs 
from individual payoffs of members of their reference group (rather than from payoff-
difference to the average payoff of the reference group). Overall, however, a 
combination of concerns for efficiency and maximin preferences (as modeled by 
Charness and Rabin in an intention-free context) outperforms inequity aversion in their 
experimental games. 
This chapter tries to take a closer look at the workings of distributional fairness, 
using the results of experiments that we conducted at the University of Munich in 2003. 
In our experiments we employ three purely distributional games in the spirit of ES. We 
want to analyze how different experimental framings alter revealed preference for 
efficiency, equity and maximin. The chapter’s purpose is threefold. 
Firstly, we want to analyze how distributional fairness changes when there is 
real money at stake compared to a situation where payoffs are hypothetical. This is 
interesting because it investigates the question whether there is a difference between the 
way people theorize about fairness and the way they act when their doing actually has 
consequences. Furthermore, it sheds light on the controversy between economists and 
                                                 
27 Distributional fairness describes how people evaluate the distributional outcome of an allocation (say, 
the amount of money that each individual in a society has). Reciprocal fairness describes how people 
evaluate the intentions that lead to actions that determine an allocation. Both types of fairness-
considerations can induce people to sacrifice own payoffs: in the former case to achieve a fairer 
distribution, in the latter case to react in a fair way to the suspected intentions. 
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psychologists whether hypothetical experiments are acceptable devices in order to 
evaluate human behavior. 
Secondly, we investigate a possible bias that abstract distribution experiments 
may have: in reality, even if purely distributional decisions without any strategic 
component were conceivable, they certainly would be preceded and followed by 
decisions that have strategic content as (arguably) most decisions in life are of that kind. 
In order to analyze whether putting subjects in a strategic environment alters the way 
they decide in distributional games, we let them play an otherwise unrelated strategic 
game, the ultimatum game, prior to the distribution games. 
Our findings are that if real monetary payoffs are at stake, the efficient allocation 
was chosen significantly more often than the allocation that is best for maximin 
preferences. Our interpretation is that some people like to appear concerned about the 
poorest individual, but actually have a different view about what constitutes a fair 
allocation. Those people may decide for the maximin allocation if their doing has no 
material consequences, but may be tempted to go for more efficient allocations when 
this is not the case. 
If subjects were put in a strategic environment, they played efficient allocations 
significantly less often, while they played maximin allocations significantly more often. 
That is, creating a ''strategic mood'' altered behavior insofar as concerns for the poorest 
increased. This implies that preferences for maximin may be stronger in reality than 
suggested by previous experimental studies. 
Thirdly, we analyze the consistency of the decisions of each subject across 
different distribution games. The question here is whether there are patterns of play that 
make it possible to sort players into homogeneous groups. We find that 31.2% of the 
participants chose the efficient allocation in all games they played. 24.6% of the 
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participants chose the maximin allocation in all games. Only 4.5% consistently went for 
the allocation that is most attractive for inequity averse players.28  
This suggests that the theory of CR most accurately predicts people’s 
preferences in pure distribution games. Along the lines of their paper one could argue 
that, if we do not take concerns for reciprocity into account, people have utility 
functions that are a weighted average of an efficiency term and a maximin term. Indeed, 
55.8% of the subjects have a very strong preference for either efficiency or maximin. 
The rest could be interpreted as having intermediate preferences, where either maximin 
or efficiency may dominate, depending on the game at hand. It turns out, however, that 
this is not correct. We included a decision where efficiency and maximin call for the 
same choice by the participants. Contrary to the above claim, only 44.6% actually chose 
this allocation. This suggests that this interpretation of the intermediate group is not 
valid. Hence, we have a puzzle insofar as none of the leading theories of fairness is 
capable of explaining a substantive amount of choices by participants. 
As a byproduct our experimental data confirm the previously established 
observation that males behave more efficiently than females. Female participants on the 
other hand act more in line with maximin preferences. This holds for distributional as 
well as for strategic fairness. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In the next section we will introduce the 
experimental set-up. Section 2.3 presents the experimental results concerning the 
treatment effects. Section 2.4 then takes a look at the consistency of decisions within the 
distribution games. The last section concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 This failure of inequity aversion to account for the experimental results in purely distributional settings 
not only shows up at this instance but also at various other points in this chapter. E.g. the change in 
allocations caused by different framing effects was always driven by efficiency and maximin preferences, 
but never by inequity aversion. 
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2.2 Experimental Set-up 
 
The experiments reported in this chapter were conducted in January 2003 at the 
University of Munich with first year undergraduate students of economics and business 
administration. We did not recruit participants in advance. Instead, we visited several 
first year undergraduate economics classes at the beginning of class and asked for 
voluntary participation directly after class. As all students in the classes took part, there 
is no bias towards fairness among the participating subjects. Including an introductory 
speech and the explanation of the experimental instructions each session took about 15 
to 25 minutes, depending on the treatment. 
We conducted four different treatments that are explained in detail below. There 
were altogether 509 participants, at least 100 subjects per treatment. Each participant 
had to indicate his or her major subject of study and sex. We had 256 (51%) male and 
246 (49%) female participants.29 129 students took part in treatment 1 (T1), 109 in 
treatment 2 (T2), 101 subjects participated in treatment 3 (T3) and lastly 170 
participants took part in treatment 4 (T4). 
The experiments consist of three distribution games that are identical in each 
treatment. But the setting and frame in which these games are played is varied. In some 
treatments participants played for money (while in other treatments no money could be 
earned)30 and in some treatments an ultimatum game had to be played on a first stage. 
In treatment T1 only three distribution games were played and participants were 
not paid off with money. In the second treatment, T2, again only the distribution games 
were played, but here some randomly drawn participants were paid off with money. The 
third and fourth treatment (T3 and T4) consist of an ultimatum game that was played at 
                                                 
29 See Appendix A.2.1 for a detailed overview of the number of male and female participants in each 
treatment. 
30 Note that this is a crucial difference to the experiments by Engelmann and Strobel (2004), who paid off 
all participants. 
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stage one, followed again by the distribution games. In T3 no monetary payoffs were 
made, while in T4, some participants were really paid off. 
We now describe in detail the distribution games, the ultimatum game (for T3 
and T4) and also the payoff method we used in the real payoff treatments T2 and T4.  
In all distribution games participants hypothetically form groups of three people. 
In each distribution game, all participants take the role of a decision maker. The 
decision maker has to select one of three different allocations. Allocations determine 
payoffs. By choosing allocation A, B or C the decision maker determines how much 
money the other two group members get. The decision maker takes the role of Person 2, 
who gets the same payoff in all three allocations. He can therefore never influence his 
own payoff with his decision. 
Allocations differ with respect to the sum of payoffs and the distribution of 
payoffs between the three persons. We call allocations that maximize the sum of payoffs 
to the group efficient. Concerning the distribution of payoffs, we can distinguish 
between allocations that are fair in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt’s inequity aversion 
and those that are fair in the sense of maximizing the lowest payoff, i.e. the poorest 
person´s payoff (maximin motive). We indicated the sum of payoffs and also the 
average payoffs of persons 1 and 3 as additional information and computational help on 
the decision sheets. A series of control experiments conducted at the University of 
Munich in summer 2002 show that this information has no significant influence on 
subjects’ choices. In particular, there is no bias towards more efficient choices.31  
The three distribution games are structured similarly, but they differ concerning 
the absolute levels and the distribution of payoffs. 
Table 2.1 shows the first game. It was invented by Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004) and is called the taxation game. Person 2, the decider, gets an intermediate 
payoff in all three allocations A, B and C. The most efficient allocation (A) that 
                                                 
31 Some results and a number of chi-squared tests that confirm this observation are listed in Appendix 
A.2.2. 
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maximizes the sum of payoffs is also the most unequal distribution. By choosing 
allocation B or C the decider can redistribute payoffs from the rich person to the poor 
person and thereby increase the equality of payoffs. Note that redistribution happens at 
the cost of efficiency as the rich person’s payoff decreases by more than the poor 
person´s payoff is increased. Payoffs are most equal in allocation C. Therefore 
allocation C goes in line with Fehr-Schmidt preferences (FS) of inequity aversion. 
Allocation C also coincides with maximin preferences (MM), as the poorest person´s 
payoff (5) is maximal here. FS preferences coincide with MM preferences and 
contradict efficiency (E) in the taxation game.  
 
 Game 1   
Allocation A B C 
Person 1 21 17 13 
Person 2 9 9 9 
Person 3 3 4 5 
Total 33 30 27 
Average 1,3 12 10.5 9 
Efficient A   
FS   C 
Maximin   C 
 
Table 2.1: Taxation game.  
 
The second distribution game, shown in Table 2.2, is the so called poor game. 
The decision maker, person 2, gets the lowest payoff in the group. As always, the 
decision maker’s payoff is held constant across all allocations within the game. Since 
she is the poorest person in this game, the poor game is neutral for maximin 
preferences. As in game 1, the least unequal allocation (C) coincides with FS 
preferences and contradicts efficiency. 
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  Game  2    
Allocation A B C 
Person 1 14 11 8 
Person 2 4 4 4 
Person 3 5 6 7 
Total 23 21 19 
Average 1,3 9.5 8.5 7.5 
Efficient A   
FS   C 
Maximin A B or C 
 
Table 2.2: Poor game. 
 
Table 2.3 shows the last distribution game, game 3. It is the so called rich game. Person 
2, the decision maker, gets the highest payoff of all group members. In this game, the 
most efficient allocation (A) is also the least unequal allocation. Here efficiency and 
inequity aversion predict the same allocation, which contradicts maximin motives 
(allocation C). 
 
  Game 3     
Allocation A B C 
Person 1 11 8 5 
Person 2 12 12 12 
Person 3 2 3 4 
Total 25 23 21 
Average 1,3 6.5 5.5 4.5 
Efficient A   
FS A   
Maximin   C 
  
Table 2.3: Rich game. 
 
The sequence of the distribution games is the same in all treatments. We are aware of 
the fact that the sequence of games might influence the decisions and that therefore 
decisions should not be regarded as independent. We conducted a number of control 
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treatments where we changed the sequence of the distribution games.32 These 
experiments show that the sequence of distribution games does not change the results 
significantly.  
In order to create a strategic context in T3 and T4, we chose to let the subjects 
play the ultimatum game before they took their decisions in the distribution games.33 
Although the ultimatum game is highly strategic, it has a simple and therefore easy to 
understand structure. It is well documented from numerous experiments how subjects 
behave in ultimatum games.34 In the ultimatum game we used a variation of the strategy 
method. Every participant was told that she was in the role of the proposer. In that role 
she had to decide how to divide an amount of € 10 between her and an anonymous 
responder. Thereafter every participant hypothetically had to take the role of the 
responder. In that role she had to announce a minimal acceptable offer, below which she 
would reject.35 We made clear to the participants that in case of a rejection of the 
proposal, i.e. in case of a proposed share below the minimal acceptable offer, the 
hypothetical contract between the partners would fail and that both partners would get a 
payoff of zero in that case. This of course was of practical relevance only in treatments 
with real monetary payments. A full set of experimental instructions can be found in 
Appendix A.2.10. 
In all sessions, after the participants quietly and anonymously had taken their 
decisions, they folded the decision sheets and put them into a box. For T1 and T3 the 
experiment was over after all subjects had handed in their decision sheets. In T2 and T4 
some participants were randomly drawn and paid off afterwards. We organized the 
following payoff procedure: For every decision game that was played in a treatment, we 
                                                 
32 We conducted three different variations of T1 (no ultimatum game and no payments). First the 
sequence of games was ''Taxation-, Poor-, Rich Game'' as in the original treatment T1 (T1org). Then we 
changed the sequence to ''Poor-, Rich-, Taxation Game'' (T1var1) and finally we chose the sequence 
''Rich-, Poor-, Taxation Game'' (T1var2). The results of these control treatments are reported in Appendix 
A.2.3. 
33 The ultimatum game was invented by Güth et al. (1982). 
34 For an overview see e.g. Camerer and Thaler (1995) and Roth (1995). 
35 Note that with the original strategy method, responders have to specify a full strategy for all possible 
proposals of their partner. A further difference here is that each subject had to take both roles (proposer 
and responder) in the game. 
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drew the respective number of involved persons. Remember that T2 consists of three 
games while T4 consists of four games, the ultimatum game and three distribution 
games, i.e. for T2 we drew 9 participants (three persons for three games) while for T4 
we drew 11 participants (two for the ultimatum game and three for the each of the three 
distribution games). The sequence of draws was important, as it assigned the role of the 
drawn participants. In the ultimatum game, real payoffs could only be achieved if 
proposed and accepted offers were compatible, i.e. if the proposer offered at least what 
the responder announced as just acceptable. In the distribution games, the first drawn 
subject was assigned the role of person 1 in game 1, the second was person 2 in game 1 
etc. The participant who was assigned the role of person 2 in the respective game 
determined by his decision the actual payoffs for persons 1 and 3 in the game.36 After 
payoffs had been determined we put the money in sealed envelopes that only had the 
subject´s ID-number on them. We mixed up the sequence of numbers and then called 
the participants via their ID-numbers. This method generated the highest possible 
degree of anonymity. Not even the drawn subjects themselves knew which role in 
which game they had played37 and only the receiver of the envelope got to know the 
amount of money she earned.  
We are aware of the fact that this design creates what is called ''role uncertainty''. 
The own payoff is never influenced by the own decision (as person 2’s payoff is the 
same in all three allocations). But it is well possible that one is being drawn as person 1 
or 3, i.e. somebody else determines the own payoff. So at the moment of choosing an 
allocation, there is uncertainty about the role that one will be assigned later. This feature 
was also a reason for using the strategy method in the ultimatum game. Thereby, we 
created a situation in which participants were unaware of their role in the strategic game 
as well.  
One could conjecture that role uncertainty creates a bias towards the efficient or 
the maximin allocation. However, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) show in a number of 
                                                 
36 The decisions taken by persons 1 and 3 were irrelevant. 
37 Only for a rejected offer in the ultimatum game they would have known this with certainty, as the 
payoff would be zero only in that case. However, this case never occured. 
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experiments with and without role uncertainty that this feature does not influence 
subjects´ choices significantly. 
Another important feature of our experiments has to be mentioned. The 
participants in our experiments were students of business administration and economics 
exclusively. Students of these subjects are known to be more concerned about efficiency 
than other students. We therefore conducted control treatments of T2 and T4 with 
students of other subjects.38 We thereby tested whether the effect of the strategic context 
also holds with a different subject pool. Our control treatments strongly confirm the 
efficiency bias of business and economics students. But they also show that the effect of 
a strategic context persists.39 
 
 
2.3 Treatment Effects 
 
In the following section we present the experimental results in detail. We will analyze 
how behavior changes, if the environment in which the distribution games are played is 
varied. In particular, we investigate the effect of real payments and the effect of the 
ultimatum game on the outcome in the distribution games. By comparing the decisions 
in the distribution games across the four different treatments we can analyze if and how 
decisions change when the framing of the experiment is changed. 
 
                                                 
38 The results of these control treatments are reported in Appendix A.2.4. 
39 See Fehr and Schmidt (2004) for more details on the subject pool effect. 
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2.3.1 Effect of Monetary Payoffs  
 
In order to see whether real payoffs have any effect on subjects’ behavior in the 
distribution games we have to compare the results in T1 to the results in T2 (both 
treatments without ultimatum game but in T2 people are really paid off) and the results 
in T3 to those of T4 (both treatments with ultimatum game, but only in T4 participants 
are really paid off). This allows not only to check for the existence of a treatment effect 
but also for the direction and the consistency of the changes.40 
We detect the following significant and consistent change in behavior: If people 
are really paid off, the efficient allocation is chosen more often while the maximin 
allocation is chosen less often in all three distribution games, both comparing T1 to T2 
and T3 to T4. This means that we observe a consistent effect of real payments 
concerning the efficient and the maximin allocation. This does not hold true for the 
Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion allocation. Concerning FS, the change depends on 
whether the FS allocation coincides with the efficient or with the maximin allocation. 
For an overview of absolute and relative choices and the changes across the 
different treatments see Table 2.4 below. 
                                                 
40 Of course we are not the first who think about the effects of monetary incentives in experiments. The 
discussion was started by Smith (1962). By now it is well established to use monetary incentives in 
experiments, although the evidence on the effects is mixed. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) for instance 
show that in experiments with easy tasks, paying money does not affect experimental results. 
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  Game 1 (Tax)   Game 2 (Poor)   Game 3 (Rich)   
Allocation A B C A B C A B C 
Person 1 21 17 13 14 11 8 11 8 5 
Person 2 9 9 9 4 4 4 12 12 12 
Person 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 2 3 4 
Total 33 30 27 23 21 19 25 23 21 
Average 1,3 12 10.5 9 9.5 8.5 7.5 6.5 5.5 4.5 
Efficient A    A   A    
FS   C   C A    
Maximin   C A B or C     C 
T1               
choices (abs.) 47 23 59 52 24 53 53 24 52 
choices (%) 36.4 17.9 45.7 40.3 18.6 41.1 41.1 18.6 40.3 
T2             
choices (abs.) 72 12 25 63 16 30 70 14 25 
choices (%) 66.1 11.0 22.9 57.8 14.7 27.5 64.2 12.8 22.9 
T3             
choices (abs.) 37 8 56 39 11 51 43 17 41 
choices (%) 36.6 8.0 55.4 38.6 10.9 50.5 42.6 16.8 40.6 
T4             
choices (abs.) 69 28 73 73 36 61 72 40 58 
choices (%) 40.6 16.5 42.9 42.9 21.2 35.9 42.4 23.5 34.1 
  
 Table 2.4: The effect of real payments. 
 
To begin with, consider game 1, the taxation game. In T1, the majority of people 
(45.7%) chose allocation C that corresponds to maximin preferences as well as to FS 
preferences. A significant fraction of people (36.4%) also chose the efficient allocation 
A. Now compare these results to the decisions taken in T2 that exactly equals T1 with 
the only difference of having the chance to earn real money. Here an overwhelming 
majority of people (66.1%) chose the efficient allocation A, while only 22.9% of 
participants chose the MM and FS allocation C. The percentage of choices for the 
efficient allocation nearly doubled from 36.4% to 66.1%, while the percentage of 
choices for the MM allocation sharply decreased. The same effects can be observed 
when we look at the decisions taken in game 1 in the treatments with ultimatum game. 
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Compare T3 (without payment) to T4 (with payment). In T3 a clear majority of 
participants (55.4%) chose the maximin allocation C and 36.6% chose the efficient 
allocation A. In the real payoff treatment T4 the fraction of the maximin allocation C 
decreases to 42.9% while again the efficient allocation is chosen more often now (we 
observe an increase from 36.6% to 40.6%). 
In order to get a first confirmation of the significance of these effects we 
conducted a number of simple chi-squared tests (and additionally Fisher’s exact test). 
We thereby test whether the differences in the fractions with which the allocations A, B 
and C were chosen in the respective treatments are significant.41 For T1 versus T2 we 
get χ2 = 20.94, p > .000 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .000) where p is the respective level of 
significance. For T3 versus T4 we get χ2 = 5.82, p > .054 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .058). 
Thus, indeed the differences between the treatments are highly significant.  
Now take a look at game 2, the so called poor game, that is neutral for maximin 
preferences. Again we observe that in treatments with real money payments (T2 and T4) 
the efficient allocation A was chosen more often than in the treatments without real 
payoffs (T1 and T3 respectively). Compare T1 to T2. In T1 (T3) the efficient allocation 
is chosen by 40.3% (38.6%) of the participants while in T2 (T4), with real payments, it 
is chosen by a fraction of 57.8% (42.9%). Allocation C, which is the least unequal 
allocation and therefore coincides with FS preferences of inequity aversion, goes in line 
with maximin preferences but contradicts efficiency. Consequently, allocation C gets 
less important in treatments with real payoffs. In T1 (T3) 41.1% (50.5%) of the 
participants chose C while in T2 (T4), this fraction decreases to 27.5% (35.9%).42 
Lastly, consider distribution game 3. The efficient allocation A is also the least 
unequal allocation and therefore coincides with FS preferences. Hence, in this game the 
                                                 
41 More precisely we test the hypothesis that the distribution of choices in T1 and T2 (say) is generated by 
subsets of subjects from the same statistical population. 
42 Again a simple chi-squared test and Fisher’s exact test show that the differences in the fractions 
between T1 and T2, and also between T3 and T4 are significant. For T1 versus T2 it yields χ2 = 7.40, p > 
.025 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .025). For T3 versus T4 we get χ2 = 7.43, p > .024 (Fisher’s exact test: p > 
.025). 
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maximin allocation C contradicts the FS allocation. For the comparison of T1 to T2 the 
results just carry over from the first two distribution games. The efficient allocation gets 
chosen more often in the real payoff treatment (41.1% in T1 and 64.2% in T2) while the 
maximin allocation is less important in the real payoff treatment (40.3% in T1 but only 
22.9% in T2). The FS allocation coincides with efficiency in this game and gets chosen 
more often with real payoffs. Concerning the effect of real money in these treatments 
with ultimatum game, again the maximin allocation gets less important with real 
payoffs (40.6% of participants chose C in T3, while only a 34.1% fraction chose it in 
T4). Concerning the efficient allocation there is nearly no effect here. 42.6% of subjects 
chose the efficient allocation A in the treatment without payoff (T3) and a 42.4% 
fraction (so this time slightly less) chose it in T4. But as can be concluded from the chi-
squared test, this difference is far from being statistically significant.43  
Consider now the change in the importance of the FS allocations in all three 
games. We observe that this change depends on whether the FS allocation coincides 
with the maximin allocation (as is the case in games 1 and 2) or with the efficient 
allocation (as in game 3). If FS coincides with maximin, it gets less important with real 
payoffs, while if it coincides with the efficient allocation, it is chosen more often with 
real payments. In other words the change in importance of FS preferences is not 
consistent. 
                                                 
43 For T3 versus T4 we get χ2 = 2.08, p > .354 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .354), i.e. the difference is indeed 
not significant, while for T1 versus T2 we get χ2 = 12.86, p > .002 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .001), i.e. the 
differences here are highly significant. 
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The following result summarizes our observations. 
 
Result 2.1 There is a significant and consistent effect of the existence of real monetary 
payments in the purely distributional games. Real payoffs increase the fraction of 
choices of the efficient allocations and decrease the fraction of choices of the maximin 
allocations. The fraction of choices of the Fehr-Schmidt allocations changes 
inconsistently, as it depends on whether the FS allocations coincide with maximin 
allocations or with efficient allocations. 
 
From this we conclude that as soon as real money is at stake, efficiency, i.e. the 
sum of payoffs, becomes a more important motive for people´s behavior in a purely 
distributional context. Their concern for the poorest (maximin preferences) on the other 
hand becomes less important with real money. For an interpretation of these results see 
Section 2.3.3 below. 
 
2.3.2 Effect of a Strategic Environment  
 
Next we want to analyze the effect that a more strategic environment has on the 
subjects’ behavior. In order to create a strategic context we extended the experimental 
set-up. Before the participants played the distribution games (game 1 to game 3) they 
were asked to play the ultimatum game. As described above, for practical reasons and 
for consistency concerning role uncertainty in all games we used the strategy method 
here.44  
In order to detect a possible treatment effect we have to compare the results in 
T1 to the results in T3 (both treatments without real payments but T3 with the 
                                                 
44 First, each participant had to propose what share of an amount of € 10 she wanted to propose to an 
anonymous partner. Thereafter she took the role of a responder and had to announce a minimal acceptable 
offer. 
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ultimatum game at the beginning) and the results in T2 to those in T4 (both with real 
payments and again T4 in the strategic context). This comparison will also allow to 
check for the direction and the consistency of possible changes. 
Although the distribution games are exactly the same as before, i.e. they are not 
at all strategic, it turns out that decisions in the distribution games change if they are to 
be taken in a strategic context. We detect the following change in behavior: If 
participants felt in a more strategic ''mood'', the maximin allocations (in all three 
distribution games) were chosen more often, while the efficient allocations were chosen 
less often. Concerning the FS allocation the change, as before, depends on whether the 
FS allocations coincide with the efficient or the maximin allocations. 
By comparing the respective treatments we detect an important feature. The 
effect of the ultimatum game on decisions in the distribution games is much stronger in 
the treatments with real money payoffs (T2 versus T4) than in the treatments without 
real payments. But as is shown in a series of probit estimates discussed below, the effect 
of the strategic context is significant across all treatments (not only T2 and T4). Probit 
estimates for the treatments without real payments (T1 and T3) alone show that the 
effect still goes in the same direction (i.e. the ultimatum game increases the probability 
of the maximin allocations being chosen and it decreases the probability of the efficient 
allocations being chosen, apart from the third distribution game). However, the effect is 
not significant.45 
For an overview over the absolute and relative choices and the changes across 
the different treatments see Table 2.5 below.  
                                                 
45See Appendix A.2.5 for two examples of those probit estimates. 
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  Game 1 (Tax)   Game 2 (Poor)   Game 3 (Rich)   
Allocation A B C A B C A B C 
Person 1 21 17 13 14 11 8 11 8 5 
Person 2 9 9 9 4 4 4 12 12 12 
Person 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 2 3 4 
Total 33 30 27 23 21 19 25 23 21 
Average 1,3 12 10.5 9 9.5 8.5 7.5 6.5 5.5 4.5 
Efficient A    A    A   
FS    C    C A   
Maximin    C A B or C     C 
T1                   
choices (abs.) 47 23 59 52 24 53 53 24 52 
choices (%) 36.4 17.9 45.7 40.3 18.6 41.1 41.1 18.6 40.3 
T3              
choices (abs.) 37 8 56 39 11 51 43 17 41 
choices (%) 36.6 8.0 55.4 38.6 10.9 50.5 42.6 16.8 40.6 
T2              
choices (abs.) 72 12 25 63 16 30 70 14 25 
choices (%) 66.1 11.0 22.9 57.8 14.7 27.5 64.2 12.8 22.9 
T4              
choices (abs.) 69 28 73 73 36 61 72 40 58 
choices (%) 40.6 16.5 42.9 42.9 21.2 35.9 42.4 23.5 34.1 
  
 Table 2.5: The effect of a strategic context (ultimatum game). 
 
Consider game 1 and focus first on the comparison of treatments with real money 
payoffs (T2 versus T4). While in the treatment without strategic context an 
overwhelming majority of participants chose the efficient allocation A (66.1% of 
participants), this fraction decreases to only 40.6% in T4, the treatment with ultimatum 
game. Correspondingly, in T2 only a small fraction of people (22.9%) chose the 
maximin allocation (that coincides with the FS allocation), while in T4 42.9% of 
choices were for the maximin allocation.46  
                                                 
46 In order to check the significance of the observed changes we again look at the results of a chi-squared 
and of an exact Fisher test: χ2 = 17.47, and p > .000 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .000 ), i.e. the effects are 
highly significant here. 
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Concerning the maximin allocation the effect exactly carries over to the 
comparison of T1 to T3. In T1 45.7% of participants chose the maximin allocation C 
while in T3, this fraction increased to 55.4%. As FS coincides with maximin here, its 
fraction also increased. For the efficient allocation there is only a very small effect, that 
goes in the contrary direction. In T1 36.4% of participants chose the efficient allocation. 
In the ultimatum game treatment T3 a slightly higher fraction, namely 36.6% of the 
subjects chose the efficient allocation. Concerning magnitude and significance, this 
effect is negligible: χ2 = 5.20, p > .074 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .071 ). Summing up the 
significant effects for game 1 we found that the ultimatum game decreased the fraction 
of efficient choices and increased the fraction of maximin choices. As the FS allocation 
coincides with the maximin allocation here, the fraction of choices of the FS allocation 
also increased with the ultimatum game. 
Now let us consider game 2. For the treatments without real payments (T1 
versus T3) as well as for the treatments with real payoffs (T2 versus T4) we observe the 
following effects: introducing the ultimatum game decreased the efficient choices and 
increased the FS choices. Remember that the poor game is neutral for maximin 
preferences, i.e. FS coincides with maximin and contradicts efficiency. In T2 a fraction 
of 57.8% participants chose the efficient allocation A. With the ultimatum game in T4 
this fraction decreased to 42.9%. The FS allocation was chosen by 27.5% of the people 
in T2. In T4 this figure increased to 35.9%.47 Comparing T1 to T3 the effects are 
similar. In T1 40.3% of the choices were for the efficient allocation. This fraction 
decreased to 38.6% in T3. The FS allocation was chosen by 41.1% of the participants in 
T1 and by 50.5% in the ultimatum game treatment T3.48  
Finally consider game 3. Concerning the comparison of real payment treatments 
T2 to T4, the effects are large and highly significant. In T2 64.2% of the participants 
chose the efficient allocation A, while only 42.2% chose that allocation in the ultimatum 
                                                 
47 The effects are significant: χ2 = 5.93, p > .051 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .054 ). 
48 The direction of the effects is well in line with the rest of our results, although the effects are not 
statistically significant: χ2 = 3.37, p > .186 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .184 ). 
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game treatment T4. In game 3 the efficient allocation is in line with FS preferences of 
inequity aversion, i.e. the FS allocation also got chosen less in the strategic context. The 
maximin allocation C that is in contrast to FS, was chosen by only 22.9% of the people 
in T2. But this fraction rose to 34.1% in T4 with the ultimatum game.49 Comparing the 
treatments without real payments there is hardly any effect to be detected. In T1 41.1% 
of the subjects chose the efficient allocation. This fraction increased to 42.6% in T3, 
contrary to what we observed in the other games and treatments. Concerning the 
maximin allocation, 40.3% chose it in T1 and a slightly higher fraction (40.6%) chose it 
in T3, but those effects are far from being significant.50  
The following result summarizes our observations. 
 
Result 2.2 There is a significant and consistent effect of a strategic environment on the 
decisions taken in the purely distributional games. In a strategic context, the efficient 
allocations are chosen less often and the maximin allocations are chosen more often. 
The fraction of choices of the Fehr-Schmidt allocations changes inconsistently, as it 
depends on whether the FS allocations coincide with maximin allocations or with 
efficient allocations.  
 
In addition to the simple statistical tests reported above, we conducted a number 
of probit estimates in order to check the significance of the treatment effects of real 
money payoff and the ultimatum game. These probit estimates use the micro data we 
have collected across all treatments. They show that the probability of an efficient 
allocation being chosen is higher if there are real payoffs and it is lower in the presence 
of the ultimatum game. On the other hand the probit estimates show that the probability 
of a maximin allocation being chosen is lower if there are real payoffs and it is higher in 
the presence of the ultimatum game. As all subjects had to indicate their sex on the 
                                                 
49 These differences are highly significant: χ2  = 12.95, p > .002 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .002 ). 
50 χ2 = 0.1311, p > .937 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .953). 
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decision sheets we can additionally check for the effect of the decision maker´s gender 
on the choice taken in the distribution games. We find that the probability of an efficient 
allocation being chosen is higher, if the decider is male, while the probability of a 
maximin allocation being chosen is lower if the decider is male.  
Table 2.6 reports the results of a probit estimation that estimates how the 
probability of allocation A1 (A1 denotes the efficient allocation A in distribution game 
1) being chosen depends on the decision maker being male, the presence of the 
ultimatum game and the presence of real monetary payoffs.51 
 
 Explanatory Variables 
 Constant Male UG Payoff 
A1 -.358*** 
(.115) 
.331*** 
(.115) 
-.379*** 
(.117) 
.444*** 
(.117) 
 
 Table 2.6: Probit estimation of treatment effects for A1. 
 
All coefficients are highly significant here. The coefficient of the dummy 
variable ''male'' is positive, i.e. the probability of the efficient allocation A1 being 
chosen rises if the decision maker is male. The coefficient of the dummy variable 
''ultimatum game'' (UG) is negative, i.e. the probability of A1 being chosen falls if there 
is an ultimatum game. Lastly the coefficient of the dummy variable ''payoff'' is positive, 
i.e. the probability of A1 being chosen falls if there is real money at stake. These results 
carry over to the probit estimates for the other efficient allocations, A2 (allocation A in 
game 2) and A3 (allocation A in game 3) that can be found in Appendix A.2.6.  
Next consider the probit estimation for the maximin allocation C1, i.e. allocation 
C in distribution game 1 that is reported in Table 2.7. 
                                                 
51 For all probit estimates asteriks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) 
level. Estimated standard errors appear in parentheses. 
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 Explanatory Variables 
 Constant Male UG Payoff 
C1 -.037 
(.113) 
-.284** 
(.115) 
.423*** 
(.118) 
-.482*** 
(.118) 
   
 Table 2.7: Probit estimation of treatment effects for C1. 
   
This probit estimation shows that the probability of the maximin allocation being 
chosen falls significantly if the decider is male, it rises significantly in the presence of 
an ultimatum game and falls, again significantly, if there are real money payments.52  
 
2.3.3 Discussion of Treatment Effects 
 
We found that the analyzed changes in the experimental framing caused consistent and 
significant changes in the importance of efficiency and maximin preferences, but they 
did not lead to consistent changes concerning the importance of FS preferences of 
inequity aversion. 
How can these results be interpreted? As soon as real money is at stake, 
efficiency concerns become more important. It seems that people sacrifice their 
concerns for the poorest in order to maximize the total payoff to society (which 
corresponds to the group of three participants in our experiments).53  
One interesting aspect concerns the decision maker herself. There exists an 
established literature on what is called the warm glow effect of doing good things. This 
literature claims that doing something good to others has a positive effect on one’s own 
utility (see Andreoni, 1995, for experimental evidence on the warm glow effect). 
                                                 
52 The results of the probit estimates for the other maximin allocations, C2 (allocation C in game 2) and 
C3 (allocation C in game 3) that can be found in Appendix A.2.7. 
53 Of course maximizing the total payoff to society should not be considerd unfair, although it coincides 
with a more unequal distribution of payoffs in some games. Maximizing the total payoff could also be 
interpreted as some kind of fairness towards society as a whole. And from the perspective of society as a 
whole it is indeed costly, in the presence of real monetary payoffs, to choose more equal allocations. 
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Without real money a warm glow that is caused by caring for the poorest comes for 
free. As long as it is costless to be fair in the sense of maximin preferences, people 
indeed prefer to be fair and therefore choose the maximin allocation. But as soon as it 
gets costly (at least from the perspective of society) the warm glow seems not to be big 
enough to outweigh the costs to society. It seems that the effect has to come rather 
cheap in order to really affect behavior.  
Another effect that is well connected to the warm glow effect could play a role 
here. This is the so called positive-self-image effect.54 Its asserters claim that people 
strongly want to have a nice image of themselves, e.g. to appear caring for the poor in 
front of themselves. As long as it is costless (from the viewpoint of society) to appear 
fair in front of oneself, people definitely want to appear nice. 
An additional explanation for the increasing importance of efficiency could be 
that as soon as there are real monetary payments, the subjects consider themselves as 
one big group playing against the experimentator. If the subjects try to extract as much 
money as possible from the experimentator, they could do so by choosing the efficient 
allocations in the distribution games. 
The ultimatum game at the first stage forces subjects to think strategically. Other 
players become potential opponents or partners. When deciding on their proposal, 
players have to take into account the responder´s reaction. If proposed offers are too 
low, they run the risk of getting their offer rejected and therefore of getting a payoff of 
zero. Using the strategy method enforces this strategic thinking, as people really have to 
think through both roles, that of the proposer and that of the responder. Players who 
want to be treated fairly by their partners might also be willing to treat them in a fair 
way while concerns for efficiency become less important. Although the outcome in the 
ultimatum game does not at all influence payoffs in the distribution games, and 
although the distribution games are not at all strategic, the presence of the ultimatum 
game changes results in the distribution games. After having played the ultimatum 
                                                 
54 See e.g. Farwell and Weiner (1996) and Singh et al. (1998) for more on the positive self-image effect. 
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game, the concern for the poorest clearly increases. In the distribution games the 
maximin allocations are then chosen more often, although the poorest have no influence 
on the real payoffs, as the distribution games are dictatorship games, i.e. nobody has the 
right to reject person two´s choice. The efficient allocations are chosen less often. Note 
that this effect is stronger if there is real money at stake. With real money, in order not 
to lose the opportunity to earn something from the ultimatum game, it is important to 
offer not too little to the responder. This effect carries over to the distribution games. 
Obviously once the strategic context is created people do not stop to think in this 
strategic way even in perfectly non-strategic set-ups. 
There are two things we can conclude from these results. The first is that 
framing effects and subjects´ experiences strongly influence their behavior. The second 
is that, at least in the limited frame of our experiments, efficiency and maximin motives 
play a big role in the process of decision taking. Inequity aversion, however, cannot be 
shown to have a significant influence on subjects´ choices.  
An additional insight we got from these results concerns the different behavior 
of male and female participants. It is well known from previous research and also well 
confirmed in our data that female participants choose more according to maximin 
motives and inequity aversion than male participants, who choose efficient allocations 
more frequently and who also decide more efficiently in ultimatum games.55 From this 
one might conjecture that our postulated effects of real payoffs and strategic context 
might (at least to some part) be due to different fractions of male and female 
participants in the respective treatments. It is rather easy to see that this is not the case. 
Consider the effect of real payments in treatments T3 versus T4 in game 1. With real 
payments (T4) the efficient allocation gets chosen more often (40.6% in T4 versus 
36.6% in T3) although the fraction of female participants in T4 (53%) was much higher 
than in T3 (39%). For the effect of a strategic context consider T1 (no UG) versus T3. 
Consider game 1 again. In T3 the maximin allocation is chosen more often (55.4% in 
                                                 
55 See Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Eckel and Grossman (1998, 2001) for experimental evidence 
on gender effects concerning fairness. 
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T3 versus 45.7% in T1) although the fraction of females is only 39% in T3 but 55% in 
T1.56  
 
 
2.4 Consistency within the Distribution Games 
 
In addition to the analysis of the treatment effects described in Section 2.3 there are 
several other interesting insights to get out of the experimental data. Let us first have a 
closer look at the correlation of choices within the three different distribution games. 
How are the choices of the efficient, the maximin and the FS allocations in the 
distribution games correlated for the different treatments? While in Section 2.3 we 
looked at changes in the decisions in each of the games across the treatments we now 
look at the changes in decisions across games. Is the preference for efficiency and 
maximin or the inequity aversion that people reveal influenced by their position relative 
to the other group members? Does it make a difference whether we play the taxation 
game (where the decision maker gets an intermediate payoff), the poor game (where the 
decision maker is the poorest member) or the rich game (where the decider gets the 
highest payoff)? The preference for an even distribution might be higher when the 
decider is the poorest member. This is reasonable if people suffer more from 
disadvantageous inequality than from inequality to their advantage. On the other hand 
one could think of people caring more about inequality if they are the richest members 
in a society because they feel some kind of duty for charity. 
In order to get an idea of the correlation between decisions in the different 
games we look at the Pearson correlation coefficients between the respective 
allocations. We calculated these coefficients separately for every treatment. For an 
overview see Table 2.8 below that indicates the correlation coefficients for treatment 
                                                 
56 In order to get the results more clear cut and to control for the gender effect completely we analyzed all 
effects for male and female participants separately. The results are shown in Appendix A.2.8. 
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1.57 It turns out that the efficient allocations in the distribution game are positively 
correlated. Also the maximin allocations are highly positively correlated. The FS 
allocations are correlated inconsistently, depending on whether they coincide with the 
efficient or the maximin allocation in the respective games. Note that a correlation 
coefficient of zero indicates that a chosen allocation in a certain game has no influence 
on the choice of a certain allocation in another game. In contrast a correlation 
coefficient of plus or minus one indicates that the decisions are perfectly (positive or 
negative) correlated. We concentrate on allocations A and C in the distribution games 
and do not indicate correlation coefficients for the ''intermediate'' B allocations. 
 
T1 A1 C1 A2 C2 A3 C3 
A1 1      
C1  1     
A2 0.659*** -0.564*** 1    
C2 -0.469*** 0.562***  1   
A3 0.645*** -0.450*** 0.663*** -0.409*** 1  
C3 -0.425*** 0.483*** -0.418*** 0.406***  1 
   
 Table 2.8: Pearson correlation coefficients in treatment 1.58 
 
Take a closer look at Table 2.8. First consider the efficient allocations A1 (A in game 
1), A2 and A3. All of them are positively correlated and the coefficients are highly 
significant. The correlation coefficient between A1 and A2 is 0.659, between A1 and 
A3 it is 0.645 and between A2 and A3 it is 0.663. This means that, on average, if the 
efficient allocation was chosen in distribution game 1, it is very likely that also in games 
2 and 3 the efficient allocation was chosen. The same positive and significant 
correlation can be observed for the maximin allocations C1, C2 and C3: the correlation 
coefficient between C1 and C2 is 0.562, between C1 and C3 it is 0.483 and between C2 
and C3 it is 0.406. Correlations between efficient and maximin allocations are negative 
                                                 
57 The respective tables for treatments two, three and four, as well as a table with the correlation 
coefficients across all treatments can be found in Appendix A.2.9. 
58 Significance of the respective correlation coefficients is marked by stars where (two sided) significance 
at the 1% level is indicated by three stars and (two sided) significance at the 5% level by two stars. 
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and significant.59 Consequently the correlation between Fehr-Schmidt allocations differs 
in sign, as FS coincides with maximin in game 1 and 2 but coincides with efficiency in 
game 3. So the correlation coefficient between the FS allocations C1 and C2 is positive, 
but between C2 and A3 as well as between C1 and A3 it is negative. The conclusion we 
can draw from these results is that it does not seem to play much of a role in what 
relative position the decision maker is, i.e. what type of distribution game was played. 
Regardless of being the poorest or the richest member of society, choosing a certain 
type of allocation in one game is highly positively correlated with choosing that type of 
allocation in the other games. This does not hold for the FS allocations. 
These results give interesting insights regarding the relationship between the 
allocations on an average level. But it may be even more interesting to look at the cases 
of perfect correlation. In what follows we analyze how many subjects persistently chose 
the efficient (or the maximin or the FS) allocations in all three distribution games. Let 
us call participants who chose the efficient allocations in all games pure ''E-types'', those 
who chose maximin allocations in all games pure ''MM-types'' and those who chose 
according to Fehr-Schmidt´s inequity aversion pure ''FS-types'', respectively. Table 2.9 
gives an overview of the absolute and relative numbers. These numbers give a hint at 
the relative importance of the different types of preferences. 
 all T1 T2 T3 T4 
pure E-types      
absolute number 159 37 47 28 47 
% 31.2 28.7 43.1 27.7 27.6 
pure MM-types      
absolute number 125 39 12 35 39 
% 24.6 30.2 11.0 34.7 22.9 
pure FS-types      
absolute number 23 7 4 9 3 
% 4.5 5.4 3.7 8.9 1.8 
  
Table 2.9: Pure types. 
 
                                                 
59 Note that in game 2 all allocations are maximin allocations. But here the efficient allocation, i.e. 
allocation A2 is not positively correlated with the maximin allocations in game 1 and 3, i.e. A1 and A3.  
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Remember that there were altogether 509 participants in our experiments. 159 subjects 
chose the efficient allocations throughout all games. This is substantial fraction of 
31.2 % pure E-types. The highest fraction of pure efficiency types can be found in T2. 
As we concluded from Section 2.3.1, real money payments and a non-strategic context 
(T2) are most favourable for choosing efficient allocations.60 125 participants chose 
maximin allocations in all distribution games, i.e. there is a fraction of 24.6% pure MM-
types.61 The highest fraction of MM-types (34.7%) appears in T3, the treatment without 
real monetary payments but with a strategic context.62 Remember that these are the 
features that strengthen maximin motives. Only 23 out of 509 subjects consistently 
behaved according to inequity averse preferences, i.e. there is only a 4.5% fraction of 
pure FS-types.  
60.3% of all participants (307 out of 509) chose consistently according to 
efficiency, maximin or inequity aversion motives. This leaves a fraction of 39.7% (202 
out of 509) participants who did not behave according to one of these three motives in 
all three games, i.e. their decisions can not be explained consistently by one of these 
motives. We therefore call this group of people ''unexplained types''. Within this group 
of unexplained choices there are no dominant patterns to be observed. 18 participants (a 
fraction of 3.5% of all 509 participants) chose the intermediate allocation B in all three 
games. Another 25 subjects (a fraction of 4.9% of all participants) chose the 
combination C1, C2, B3. They chose the maximin allocations in games 1 and 2 but in 
game 3 (the rich game) they chose the intermediate allocation B.  
More than half of the decisions made in the experiments (55.8%) can be 
explained by efficiency and maximin motives, only 4.5% can be explained by inequity 
                                                 
60 Note that in T2 the fraction of male participants was 55% and that of females 45%. In T2 the fraction of 
pure efficiency types was highest, although there are treatments with a higher fraction of males and 
correspondingly a lower fraction of females. 
61 Note that pure maximin types could choose any allocation in game 2, as game 2 is neutral for maximin 
allocations. If we consider only those participants as pure MM-types who chose the non efficient 
allocations in game 2, i.e. C2 or C3 we still get a number of 115 subjects, i.e. a fraction of 22.6% of pure 
MM-types. If we only count those participants who chose C in all games, we get a number of 97, i.e. still 
a fraction of 19.1%. 
62 Although the fraction of males was as high as 61% with a corresponding fraction of only 39% female 
participants. 
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aversion. This indicates a rather weak performance of inequity aversion in these simple 
distribution games. A huge number of results in interactive strategic experiments can be 
well explained by inequity aversion (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, 2003, for a detailed 
overview of experimental evidence). A feature of most of these strategic experiments is 
that it is difficult to distinguish between motives of pure inequity aversion, i.e. 
distributional fairness and motives of reciprocity, i.e. intention based fairness. In our 
distribution games intentions do not play any role as there is no strategic interaction. In 
this intention free setting, FS performs rather poorly. The results concerning the 
absolute performance of FS preferences are well in line with previous research 
(Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). We saw from the analysis of the treatment effects in 
Section 2.3 that the performance of inequity aversion preferences is bad not only in an 
absolute but also in a marginal sense: with changes in the environment (treatment 
effects) the (marginal) change concerning the importance of efficiency and maximin 
preferences is consistent, but it is not consistent concerning FS preferences. This 
indicates that people´s distributional preferences are driven by other forces than inequity 
aversion, while inequity aversion seems to be a very good proxy for intention-based 
behavior, which matters in strategic games. 
The fact that efficiency and maximin motives play a dominant role in 
distribution games clearly hints to a strong explanatory power of the theory of social-
welfare preferences by Charness and Rabin (2002). CR suggest that behavior in a multi-
person context is driven by a combination of reciprocity and quasi-maximin 
preferences, i.e. a combination of efficiency and maximin motives (in addition to self-
interest). In an intention free environment this reduces to pure ''quasi-maximin'' 
preferences (again in addition to self-interest).63  
                                                 
63 Charness and Rabin define the following social-welfare preferences utility function in a multi-person 
intention free setting: [ ]1 2 1 2 1 2( , ... ) (1 ) ( , ... ) (1 )( ... )i n i n nV minπ π π χ π χ δ π π π δ π π π≡ − + ⋅ + − + + +  where 
iπ  denotes the payoff of player i and [ ]0,1χ ∈  and [ ]0,1δ ∈  are constants. Utility increases in the 
subject´s own payoff, as well as in a weighted combination of how much the poorest person gets 
(maximin motive) and how much the society as a whole gets (efficiency motive). 
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In our experiments the decisions of the unexplained deciders could well be in 
line with CR, as social-welfare preferences do not call for always choosing the efficient 
or maximin allocations. One is tempted to suspect that there are three groups of people: 
one with a strong bias towards efficiency, one with a strong bias towards maximin and a 
third one with intermediate weights on efficiency and maximin, whose members decide 
in a seemingly inconsistent way. This intuition turns out to be plainly wrong, however. 
Remember the second distribution game, the so called poor game, that is neutral 
for maximin preferences. Here efficiency and maximin coincide, so CR make a clear 
forecast independent of the parameters that would in general influence the relative 
importance of maximin versus efficiency motives: all subjects who act according to 
social-welfare preferences should choose allocation A (that is efficient) here. Table 2.10 
gives an overview over the choices made in game 2 across all treatments. 
 
  Game 2 (Poor)   
Allocation A B C 
Person 1 14 11 8 
Person 2 4 4 4 
Person 3 5 6 7 
Total 23 21 19 
Efficient A   
F&S   C 
Maximin A B or C 
All treatments    
absolute numbers 227 87 195 
% 44.6 17.1 38.3 
    
Table 2.10: Choices in the poor game. 
 
A fraction of 44.6% of all participants (227 out of 509) indeed chose the efficient and 
maximin (and therefore social-welfare) allocation A. This indicates that there are at 
CHAPTER 2 DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS 
 
109
most 44.6% subjects who have social-welfare preferences.64 If a substantial fraction of 
the unexplained choices indeed consisted of quasi-maximizers, the fraction of choices 
for allocation A in game 2 should be much bigger than it actually is. Although 
efficiency and maximin play a dominant role in these distribution games the 
combination of both, i.e. ''quasi-maximin'' preferences, is not able to explain even half 
of the decisions. In this intention free context also CR does not perform too convincing.  
The following result summarizes our observations. 
 
Result 2.3 There is consistency concerning the choice of efficient and maximin 
preferences within the distribution games in every treatment, for a majority of subjects. 
FS preferences perform rather poorly in the purely distributional context. We observe a 
puzzle as more than 40% of the subjects did not consistently choose according to any of 
the leading theories. 
 
 
                                                 
64 Possibly this fraction is much lower, as also the pure E-types chose A here and even some pure MM-
types. Of course we can not rule out that some of those subjects who appear as pure E- or pure MM-types 
are actually CR-types, but probably that does not hold for all of them. 
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2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 
We report on a series of simple distribution experiments in the spirit of Engelmann and 
Strobel (2004), that allow to compare the relative importance of efficiency, maximin 
preferences and inequity aversion in a purely distributional context. We investigated the 
effect of different experimental ''framings'' and the effect of a strategic environment on 
the subjects´ revealed preferences. Our experimental results show that in a strategic 
environment maximin preferences become more important. On the other hand as soon 
as ''real money'' is at stake, efficiency plays a more important role. Inequity aversion, 
however, cannot be shown to have a significant influence on the subjects´ choices. In 
addition to the observed treatment effects we analyzed whether revealed preferences are 
consistent across the distribution games.  
From this we conclude that, although a huge number of experimental results in 
interactive strategic games may be correctly predicted and well explained by inequity 
aversion, FS preferences may play a less important role in purely distributional settings. 
An important question, that is not investigated in this chapter, concerns the 
substantial fraction of choices that were not in line with either of the three motives 
efficiency, maximin or inequity aversion. It remains a topic for future research to find 
out more about what drives these unexplained choices and to detect consistent patterns. 
A wide range of further control experiments is of need and interest here. It 
should be interesting to check whether an increase in the probability of being paid off 
increases the concerns for efficiency even more, or whether the mere existence of a 
small probability of being paid off is enough to strengthen the importance of efficiency 
concerns as we observed. One could also control for the influence of the sequence of 
games and therefore conduct the distribution games in isolated experimental sessions. 
Furthermore it is of interest to find out whether our results are robust in a hot version of 
the game, i.e. the ultimatum game played with real instead of hypothetical interaction. 
Lastly an interesting question is, whether the type of strategic game plays a role. Does it 
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make a difference whether we let subjects play the trust game instead of the ultimatum 
game before they come to play the distribution games?  
A further interesting extension of our experiments would be a set-up where the 
decider´s payoff varies with different allocations. In such a setting, choosing, for 
instance the maximin allocation could be personally costly to the decider. This allows to 
take selfishness as a component of motivation explicitly into account. It should be 
investigated whether this strengthens or weakens the observed effects. 
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2.6 Appendix 
 
A.2.1 Overview of Participants  
 
 all male female 
T1 129 58 
45% 
71 
55% 
T2 109 58 
55% 
48 
45% 
T3 101 62 
61% 
39 
39% 
T4 170 78 
47% 
88 
53% 
All 509 256 
51% 
246 
49% 
  Table A.2.1: Overview of participants. 
 
A.2.2 Chi-squared tests  
 
We test here whether there are significant differences in treatments with and without the 
information of total and average payoffs. The following data is taken from experiments 
that we conducted in summer 2002 at the University of Munich. We played only two 
distribution games here, namely the poor game and the taxation game. There were no 
real payoffs. Tables A.2.2.1 and A.2.2.2 show the experimental results. 
 
  Poor Game    
Allocation A B C   
         
absolute number      sum  
Economists (with) 8 4 20 32 
Economists (without) 5 5 20 30 
Economists (all) 13 9 40 62 
Others (with) 9 10 36 55 
Others (without) 7 8 40 55 
Others (all) 16 18 76 110 
Sociologists (with) 0 4 24 28 
Sociologists (without) 2 4 18 24 
Sociologists (all) 2 8 42 52 
Munich 2002 (all) 32 35 130 197 
Table A.2.2.1: Results of the poor game. 
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  Rich Game   
Allocation A B C   
         
absolute number      sum  
Economists (with) 6 4 22 32 
Economists (without) 7 3 19 29 
Economists (all) 13 7 41 61 
Others (with) 14 8 32 54 
Others (without) 12 5 38 55 
Others (all) 26 13 70 109 
Sociologists (with) 7 2 18 27 
Sociologists (without) 4 3 17 24 
Sociologists (all) 11 5 35 51 
Munich 2002 (all) 42 27 126 195 
  Table A.2.2.2: Results of the taxation game. 
 
The chi-squared tests for the poor game (with versus without additional information) 
gave the following results: 
Economists:  2χ  = 0.74, p > .691 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .754) 
Others:  2χ = 0.68, p > .711 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .734) 
Sociologists:  2χ  = 2.57, p > .277 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .282) 
 
These tests show that there is no significant difference between treatments with and 
without the information on the sum of payoffs and the average payoffs. 
 
The chi-squared test for the taxation game (with versus without additional information) 
gave the following results: 
Economists:  2χ  = 0.29, p > .864 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .926) 
Others:  2χ = 1.35, p > .509 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .486) 
Sociologists:  2χ  = 0.873, p > .646 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .680) 
Again, there is no significant difference between treatments with and without the 
information on the sum of payoffs and the average payoffs for each allocation. 
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A.2.3 Control experiments ''sequence of games'' 
 
T1org taxA taxB taxC poorA poorB poorC richA richB richC sum 
choices (abs.) 9 10 13 9 9 14 9 7 16 32 
choices (%) 28.1 31.3 40.6 28.1 28.1 43.8 28.1 21.9 50.0 100 
               
T1var1 poorA poorB poorC richA richB richC taxA taxB taxC  
choices (abs.) 8 7 29 12 10 22 9 10 25 44 
choices (%) 18.2 15.9 65.9 27.3 22.7 50.0 20.5 22.7 56.8 100 
               
T1var2 richA richB richC taxA taxB taxC poorA poorB poorC  
choices (abs.) 20 7 18 20 8 17 19 5 21 45 
choices (%) 44.4 15.6 40.0 44.4 17.8 37.8 42.2 11.1 46.7 100 
               
T1 taxA taxB taxC poorA poorB poorC richA richB richC sum 
choices (abs.) 47 23 59 52 24 53 53 24 52 129 
choices (%) 36.4 17.8 45.7 40.3 18.6 41.1 41.1 18.6 40.3 100 
Table A.2.3: Results of the control experiments ''sequence of games''. 
 
Table A.2.3 reports the results of the control treatments. T1 is the original experiment 
conducted in January 2003.The chi-squared tests listed below show that the sequence of 
distribution games does not change the behavior significantly. Seven out of nine chi-
squared tests do not show any significant differences in how often the respective 
allocations are chosen in the respective games. Probit estimates, testing whether and 
how the probability of a certain allocation being chosen depends on the treatment also 
confirm this result.  
Taxation games: 
T1org vs. T1var1:  2χ  = 1.94, p > .378 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .391) 
T1org vs. T1var2:  2χ  = 2.81, p > .245 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .246) 
T1var1 vs. T1var2:  2χ  = 5.91, p > .052 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .056) (significant 
difference) 
Poor games: 
T1org vs. T1var1:  2χ  = 3.74, p > .154 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .164) 
T1org vs. T1var2:  2χ  = 4.03, p > .133 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .144) 
T1var1 vs. T1var2:  2χ  = 6.08, p > .048 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .054) (significant 
difference) 
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Rich games: 
T1org vs. T1var1:  2χ  = 0.01, p > .995 (Fisher’s exact test: p >1 .000) 
T1org vs. T1var2:  2χ  = 2.16, p > .340 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .334) 
T1var1 vs. T1var2:  2χ  = 2.92, p > .232 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .244) 
 
 
A.2.4 Control experiments ''subject pool effects'' 
 
In what follows we compare the results of treatments T2 and T4 with economics and 
business students (pool 1) conducted in January 2003 to results of the same experiments 
with sociologists and other students who chose economics as a minor subject in their 
studies (pool 2). We conducted these control experiments T2var and T4var in April 
2003 during a basic economics course for sociologists and other minor subject students 
at the University of Munich. We had 83 participants in T2var (42 sociologists and 41 
other studies; 31 male and 52 female) and 77 participants in T4var (40 sociologists and 
37 other studies; 36 male and 41 female). 
 
Table A.2.4 reports the results of the original treatments T2 and T4 with subject pool 1 
and the results of the control treatments T2var and T4var with subject pool 2. 
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  Game 1 (Tax)   Game 2 (Poor)   Game 3 (Rich)   
Allocation A B C A B C A B C 
Person 1 21 17 13 14 11 8 11 8 5 
Person 2 9 9 9 4 4 4 12 12 12 
Person 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 2 3 4 
Total 33 30 27 23 21 19 25 23 21 
Average 1,3 12 10.5 9 9.5 8.5 7.5 6.5 5.5 4.5 
Efficient A    A    A   
FS    C    C A   
Maximin    C A B or C     C 
T2              
choices (abs.) 72 12 25 63 16 30 70 14 25 
choices (%) 66.1 11.0 22.9 57.8 14.7 27.5 64.2 12.8 22.9 
T4              
choices (abs.) 69 28 73 73 36 61 72 40 58 
choices (%) 40.6 16.5 42.9 42.9 21.2 35.9 42.4 23.5 34.1 
T2var              
choices (abs.) 22 13 48 21 17 45 33 19 31 
choices (%) 26.5 15.7 57.8 25.3 20.5 54.2 39.8 22.9 37.3 
T4var          
choices (abs.) 16 17 44 18 11 48 17 16 44 
choices (%) 20.8 22.1 57.1 23.4 14.3 62.3 22.1 20.8 57.1 
  Table A.2.4: T2 and T4 with pool 1 and pool 2. 
 
 
Effects of a strategic context (ultimatum game)  
 
As can be seen, the treatment effect of the strategic context goes in the same direction 
for both groups of subjects. In the strategic context, maximin preferences become more 
important in the control treatments, while efficiency motives become less important. 
Concerning FS preferences of inequity aversion the effect is inconsistent. Note that with 
students of non-economic the effect is less strong. This is probably due to the subject 
pool effect. Non-economic students chose less efficient in treatment 2 (T2var) as well. 
Therefore the effect of a strategic environment (comparing T2var to T4var) is less 
strong in absolute numbers.  
CHAPTER 2 DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS 
 
117
 
First compare the original T2 to T4. The following chi-squared tests have been made: 
Tax:  2χ  = 17.47, p > .000 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .000) 
Poor:  2χ = 5.93, p > .051 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .054) 
Rich:  2χ  = 12.95, p > .002 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .002) 
Hence, all differences are highly significant (i.e. we observe a strong treatment effect). 
 
Next compare the control treatments T2var to T4var:  
Tax:  2χ  = 1.43, p > .489 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .502) 
Poor:  2χ = 1.39, p > .499 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .510) 
Rich:  2χ  = 7.42, p > .025 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .025) 
Thus, only for the rich game we have a significant treatment effect. 
 
 
Subject pool effect (T2 versus T2var and T4 versus T4var) 
 
As is visible in Table A.2.4.we observe a strong subject pool effect. Economics and 
business students are highly biased towards efficiency whereas sociologists and others 
seem to choose very much according to maximin motives. The significance of this 
difference is confirmed in a number of chi-squared tests, as can be seen below. 
 
First compare T2 to T2var: 
Tax:  2χ  = 30.93, p > .000 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .000) 
Poor:  2χ = 20.89, p > .000 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .000) 
Rich:  2χ  = 11.38, p > .003 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .003) 
All differences are highly significant (i.e. we observe a strong subject pool influence). 
Next compare T4 to T4var: 
Tax:  2χ  = 9.21, p > .010 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .008) 
Poor:  2χ = 15.23, p > .000 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .001) 
Rich:  2χ  = 13.03, p > .001 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .002) 
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Again all differences are highly significant (i.e. again we observe a strong subject pool 
influence). 
 
 
A.2.5 Probit estimates for T1 and T3 only65 
 
 Explanatory Variables 
 Constant Male UG 
A1 -.530*** 
(.140) 
.393** 
(.173) 
-.059 
(.174) 
C1 
 
-.028 
(.134) 
-.177 
(.169) 
.274 
(.170) 
Table A.2.5: Probit estimates for T1 and T3. 
 
A.2.6 Probit estimates  
 
 Explanatory Variables 
 Constant Male UG Payoff 
A2 -.302*** 
(.114) 
.243** 
(.113) 
-.209* 
(.115) 
.271** 
(.115) 
A3 
 
-.222** 
(.113) 
.273** 
(.113) 
-.296*** 
(.115) 
.305*** 
(.115) 
 Table A.2.6: Probit estimates for efficient allocations A2 and A3. 
 
Please note that here the dummy variable UG is not of high significance, but remember 
that A2 is not only the efficient but also a maximin allocation in game 2. 
 
 
A.2.7 Probit estimates 
 
 Explanatory Variables 
 Constant Male UG Payoff 
C2 -.194* 
(.113) 
-.047 
(.115) 
.223* 
(.117) 
-.369*** 
(.117) 
C3 
 
-.365*** 
(.115) 
.090 
(.116) 
.172 
(.119) 
-.351*** 
(.118) 
 Table A.2.7: Probit estimates for maximin allocations C2 and C3. 
 
                                                 
65 For all probit estimates please note that asteriks denote statistical significance at the 10% (*). 5% (**), 
or 1% (***) level. Estimated standard errors appear in parentheses. 
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Again the variable UG is not of high significance, but C2 is not the only maximin 
allocation in game 2, as game 2 is neutral for maximin allocation A2 also coincides with 
maximin motives. Note that the dummy variable UG is not significant here. 
 
 
A.2.8 Separate analysis of male and female participants  
 
In order to get the results more clear cut and to control for the gender effect completely, 
we analyzed all effects discussed in Section 2.3.1 for male and female participants 
separately. The results and chi-squared tests listed below confirm that all effects also 
hold in the separate analysis. 
 
Table A.2.8.1 shows the results for the subset of male subjects. 
 
  Game 1 (Tax)   Game 2 (Poor)   Game 3 (Rich)   
Allocation A B C A B C A B C 
Person 1 21 17 13 14 11 8 11 8 5 
Person 2 9 9 9 4 4 4 12 12 12 
Person 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 2 3 4 
Total 33 30 27 23 21 19 25 23 21 
Average 1,3 12 10.5 9 9.5 8.5 7.5 6.5 5.5 4.5 
Efficient A    A   A    
FS   C   C A    
Maximin   C A B or C     C 
T1               
choices (abs.) 26 6 26 26 8 24 28 6 24 
choices (%) 44.8 10.3 44.8 44.8 13.8 41.4 48.3 10.3 41.4 
T2          
choices (abs.) 41 6 11 39 6 13 43 4 11 
choices (%) 70.7 10.3 19.0 67.2 10.3 22.4 74.1 6.9 19.0 
T3          
choices (abs.) 26 5 31 26 8 28 25 9 28 
choices (%) 41.9 8.1 50.0 41.9 12.9 45.2 40.3 14.5 45.2 
T4          
choices (abs.) 35 16 27 34 12 32 37 12 29 
choices (%) 44.9 20.5 34.6 43.6 15.4 41.0 47.4 15.4 37.2 
   Table A.2.8.1: Male participants. 
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In what follows, we report the corresponding chi-squared tests for the effect of real 
payments. 
T1 versus T2:  
Tax:  2χ  = 9.44, p > .009 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .010) 
Poor:  2χ = 6.16, p > .046 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .043) 
Rich:  2χ  = 8.40, p > .015 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .014) 
T3 versus T4:  
Tax:  2χ  = 5.61, p > .060 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .063) 
Poor:  2χ = 0.31, p > .857 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .919) 
Rich:  2χ  = 0.953, p > .621 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .626) 
 
Next, consider the chi-squared tests for the effect of the ultimatum game. 
T1 versus T3:  
Tax:  2χ  = 0.40, p > .820 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .828) 
Poor:  2χ = 0.175, p > .916 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .918) 
Rich:  2χ  = 0.945, p > .623 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .668) 
T2 versus T4:  
Tax:  2χ  = 9.01, p > .011 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .012) 
Poor:  2χ = 7.59, p > .023 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .022) 
Rich:  2χ  = 9.82, p > .007 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .008) 
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Table A.2.8.2 shows the results for the subset of female subjects. 
 
  Game 1 (Tax)   Game 2 (Poor)   Game 3 (Rich)   
Allocation A B C A B C A B C 
Person 1 21 17 13 14 11 8 11 8 5 
Person 2 9 9 9 4 4 4 12 12 12 
Person 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 2 3 4 
Total 33 30 27 23 21 19 25 23 21 
Average 1,3 12 10.5 9 9.5 8.5 7.5 6.5 5.5 4.5 
Efficient A    A   A    
FS   C   C A    
Maximin   C A B or C     C 
T1               
choices (abs.) 21 17 33 26 16 29 25 18 28 
choices (%) 29.6 23.9 46.5 36.6 22.5 40.8 35.2 25.3 39.4 
T2          
choices (abs.) 30 5 13 21 10 17 26 10 12 
choices (%) 62.5 10.4 27.1 43.8 20.8 35.4 54.2 20.8 25.0 
T3          
choices (abs.) 11 3 25 13 3 23 18 8 13 
choices (%) 28.2 7.7 64.1 33.3 7.7 59.0 46.2 20.5 33.3 
T4          
choices (abs.) 32 12 44 38 23 27 34 28 26 
choices (%) 36.4 13.6 50.0 43.2 26.1 30.7 38.6 31.8 29.5 
             Table A.2.8.2: Female participants. 
 
In what follows, we report the corresponding chi-squared tests for the effect of real 
payments. 
T1 versus T2:  
Tax:  2χ  = 12.87, p > .002 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .002) 
Poor:  2χ = 0.63, p > .732 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .720) 
Rich:  2χ  = 4.43, p > .109 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .113) 
T3 versus T4:  
Tax:  2χ  = 2.33, p > .312 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .348) 
Poor:  2χ = 10.64, p > .005 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .005) 
Rich:  2χ  = 1.72, p > .424 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .412) 
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Next, consider the chi-squared tests for the effect of the ultimatum game. 
T1 versus T3:  
Tax:  2χ  = 5.16, p > .076 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .068) 
Poor:  2χ = 5.04, p > .081 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .082) 
Rich:  2χ  = 1.27, p > .529 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .530) 
 
T2 versus T4:  
Tax:  2χ  = 8.80, p > .012 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .011) 
Poor:  2χ = 0.58, p > .749 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .741) 
Rich:  2χ  = 3.27, p > .195 (Fisher’s exact test: p > .223) 
 
 
A.2.9 Correlation coefficients66  
 
T2 A1 C1 A2 C2 A3 C3 
A1 1      
C1  1     
A2 0.486*** -0.418*** 1    
C2 -0.382*** 0.397***  1   
A3 0.435*** -0.321*** 0.408*** -0.354*** 1  
C3 -0.392*** 0.325*** -0.285*** 0.299***  1 
Table A.2.9.1: Pearson correlation coefficients in treatment 2. 
 
T3 prop    minacc A1 C1 A2 C2 A3 C3 
prop 1        
minacc 0.494*** 1       
A1 -0.267*** -0.174 1      
C1 0.146 0.128  1     
A2 -0.234** -0.153 0.748*** -0.680*** 1    
C2 0.142 0.060 -0.562*** 0.626***  1   
A3 -0.217** -0.063 0.509*** -0.477*** 0.592*** -0.509*** 1  
C3 0.035 -0.081 -0.377*** 0.498*** -0.449*** 0.496***  1 
Table A.2.9.2: Pearson correlation coefficients in treatment 3. 
                                                 
66 For all Peason correlation coefficients calculated here, significance of the respective correlation 
coefficients is marked by stars, where (two sided) significance at the 1% level is indicated by three stars 
and (two sided) significance at the 5% level by two stars. 
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T4 prop    minacc A1 C1 A2 C2 A3 C3 
prop 1        
minacc 0.258*** 1       
A1 -0.126 -0.227*** 1      
C1 0.136 0.145  1     
A2 -0.121 -0.175** 0.590*** -0.464*** 1    
C2 0.058 0.143 -0.369*** 0.441***  1   
A3 -0.135 -0.260*** 0.625*** -0.503*** 0.531*** -0.368*** 1  
C3 0.045 0.135 -0.393*** 0.353*** -0.323*** 0.367***  1 
Table A.2.9.3: Pearson correlation coefficients in treatment 4. 
 
all prop    minacc A1 C1 A2 C2 A3 C3 UG pay
prop 1          
minacc 0.363*** 1         
A1 -0.173*** -0.205*** 1        
C1 0.110 0.135**  1       
A2 -0.156*** -0.165*** 0.626*** -0.537*** 1      
C2 0.063 0.105 -0.449*** 0.519***  1     
A3 -0.166*** -0.181*** 0.585*** -0.468*** 0.561*** -0.415*** 1    
C3 0.026 0.045 -0.414*** 0.430*** -0.378*** 0.404***  1   
UG   -0.109** 0.124*** -0.070 0.066 -0.092** 0.044 1  
payoff 0.204*** 0.017 0.140*** -0.150*** 0.092** -0.129*** 0.091** -0.122** 0.170*** 1 
Table A.2.9.4: Pearson correlation coefficients across all treatments. 
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A.2.10 Instructions 
 
 
We chose to include the instructions for treatment T4 in this Appendix as T4 includes 
the ultimatum game as well as monetary payments.  
 
Experiment 
Ident. No.: _______________ 
 
I kindly would like to ask you to participate in the four hypothetical decision problems 
on the attached decision sheets.   
Decision problem 1 is a two person game, in which you have to decide how to allocate a 
certain amount of money between you and another person. In this problem you, as well 
as the other person, have to make a decision.  
Decision problems 2, 3 and 4 are all structured identically. For each problem, please 
imagine that you are part of a three-person group. In each case you have to decide 
between different allocations of monetary payoffs among the 3 persons. You are always 
assigned the role of person 2. The other two persons do not have the possibility to make 
any decisions. In each decision problem the different payoff allocations are labeled 
allocation A, allocation B and allocation C.  
 
You do not know the identity of the other two persons in the group and the other group 
members will not be informed about your identity.  
 
After collecting all the decision sheets, we will randomly select for each of the four 
decision problems two (decision problem 1) and three persons for decision problems 2, 
3 and 4. In all decision problems the order of the selection determines the role of the 
selected persons (i.e. person 1 to 3 for decision problems 2, 3 and 4). These persons are 
paid the monetary payoffs, which were determined by the decision of person 2. In the 
case you are randomly selected you could be in the role of either person 1, 2 or 3. The 
identity of the selected persons and the monetary payoffs are kept secret to the 
other participants. Please keep the sheet with your identification number. Without this 
sheet we cannot give you the money.  
 
Please make your decisions privately without contacting your neighbor or 
discussing your decision with other people. We are interested in your independent 
decision. When you have made all decisions please fold the decision sheet and put it 
in the box. This ensures the anonymity of your decisions.  
Before we start with the experiment we would like to ask you for the following 
personal information:  
 
Major, Year:  ______________________________ 
sex:      male   female 
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Decision Problem 1: 
 
Consider the following two person decision problem: 
You are person 1 and you can now decide how to allocate € 10 between you and an 
anonymous person 2. You could propose any arbitrary amount of money x between € 0 
and € 10 for the share of person 2. If person 2 accepts your proposal, you are paid € (10-
x) and person 2 gets € x. 
 
If person 2 rejects your proposal, you both get nothing, i.e. you are paid € 0. 
The decision problem is anonymous, i.e. you do not have the possibility to 
communicate neither before nor after the experiment with person 2.  
 
Which amount of money do you propose for the share that person 2 receives? 
Proposed share for person 2      €  _______________________________. 
Now imagine that you are in the role of person 2. 
What is the smallest share, proposed to you by person 1, that you would accept? 
 
The share must be at least €  ______________  so that I would accept it as person 2.  
If the share is less than the named one, I would reject it.  
 
Note that if you are randomly selected as either person 1 or 2, you only get a positive 
amount of money, if your proposal is compatible with the acceptance/rejection decision 
of the randomly selected person 1 or person 2 respectively. 
 
Decision problem 2:  
You are person 2. You can now determine unilaterally the payoff allocation between the 
three persons in your group. You are the only person in the group that makes a decision. 
Please choose the payoff allocation that you prefer by marking the respective column.  
 
 Payoff Allocation 
 A B C 
Person 1 €21 €17 €13 
Person 2 (YOU) €9 €9 €9 
Person 3  €3 €4 €5 
Your decision    
Average payoff of 
persons 1 and 3  
€12 €10.5 €9 
Total payoff of all 
three persons together 
€33 €30 €27 
 
CHAPTER 2 DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS 
 
126
Decision problem 3:  
 
You are person 2. You can now determine unilaterally the payoff allocation between the 
three persons in your group. You are the only person in the group that makes a decision. 
Please choose the payoff allocation that you prefer by marking the respective column.  
 
 Payoff Allocation 
 A B C 
Person 1 €14 €11 €8 
Person 2 (YOU) €4 €4 €4 
Person 3  €5 €6 €7 
Your decision    
Average payoff of 
persons 1 and 3 
€9.5 €8.5 €7.5 
Total payoff of all 
three persons together 
€23 €21 €19 
 
 
Decision problem 4:  
 
You are person 2. You can now determine unilaterally the payoff allocation between the 
three persons in your group. You are the only person in the group that makes a decision. 
Please choose the payoff allocation that you prefer by marking the respective column.  
 
 Payoff Allocation 
 A B C 
Person 1 €11 €8 €5 
Person 2 (YOU) €12 €12 €12 
Person 3  €2 €3 €4 
Your decision    
Average payoff of 
persons 1 and 3  
€6.5 €5.5 €4.5 
Total payoff of all 
three persons together 
€25 €23 €21 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ADVERTISING AND THE MEDIA67 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The complementary view of advertising (pioneered by Becker and Murphy, 1993) holds 
that advertising should be seen as a good or bad that is complementary to the advertised 
good. This approach has been instrumental in analyzing the welfare effects of 
advertising (see Bagwell, 2004, for a discussion). Suppose that advertising is a bad for 
consumers.68 Then firms have to pay consumers to consume their advertising. If the 
resulting increase in the firms' profits (via increased sales through advertising) 
outweighs the utility loss incurred by the consumers (due for instance to the annoyance 
caused by the exposure to the advertisement), then there is scope for a mutually 
beneficial transaction.69  
                                                 
67 This chapter is joint work with Hans Zenger. 
68 This is the view that we will hold throughout this chapter. 
69 Note that for an analysis of the welfare effects that are involved here, one would also have to take 
externalities into account that the two parties exert on others. For example, if advertising simply shifts 
consumption of a certain good from one company to another, as is often put forward by the literature on 
sunk costs and market structure (for instance Sutton, 1991), then advertising may be socially inefficient 
even if the two parties can make a mutually beneficial trade. 
CHAPTER 3 ADVERTISING AND THE MEDIA 
 
128
However, given that advertising can be viewed as a standard good or bad 
consumed by economic agents, the question arises why there are hardly any direct 
markets on which advertising is traded. In this chapter we argue that this is mainly due 
to adverse selection. Clearly, firms are willing to pay different amounts of money for 
different consumers, depending on unobservable characteristics like income, interest in 
the advertised product, or past consumption. Hence, every consumer would have an 
incentive to claim that she has profitable characteristics. This effect is absent in most 
models of advertising, as it is usually assumed that consumers are homogeneous. 
As an illustration of our point, consider the few marketplaces on which 
advertising is traded between firms and consumers which do exist. Both in the US and 
in Europe several websites offer consumers money for reading e-mail advertisements, 
viewing banners in their browser and the like. Those websites are financed by the firms 
that book the advertising. Some of them are paying out since several years and have 
managed to acquire quite impressive client bases. The German start-up Bonimail.de for 
instance claims to have almost 100,000 members. Still, all those websites are visibly 
plagued by adverse selection. Most of them pay extremely low rates (often below one 
euro cent for viewing an on-line advertisement for at least 30 seconds and then 
following a confirmation procedure). Also, the advertising that they feature is obviously 
targeted at low income consumers. Major advertisers are bargain-websites, loan-sharks, 
financial institutions offering credit cards without solvency check and dubious internet 
business opportunities. The market outcome is thus as proposed in Akerlof's (1970) 
classic lemons market: the average payout rate is too low for high income consumers, 
who drop out of the market, reducing the quality of the pool; this implies that the payout 
rate is deteriorated even more and the process repeats until only the lowest income type 
remains.70  
                                                 
70 Apparently, the above webpages also have to handle a problem of moral hazard, as it is difficult to 
guarantee that consumers pay sufficient attention to the advertisements. However, software technologies 
tackle this problem quite efficiently. For instance, websites that pay for viewing banners only award 
credits if the user clicks a confirmation button in regular intervals, in order to prevent that the ads are run 
while the user is absent from the computer. 
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In this chapter we analyze how media firms can mitigate the adverse selection 
problem from which direct markets suffer. There are some obvious ways in which they 
do this. For instance, tennis rackets are advertised in tennis magazines. Also, high 
income types can be targeted by placing ads in golf magazines. There is, however, a 
limit to this kind of targeting. In particular, most companies want to reach broader 
audiences of high income types than the very small subset of those happening to read 
golf magazines. In addition, most products are not as target-group specific as tennis-
rackets. Hence, most advertising has to rely on mass media in order to get its message 
across. 
Mass media like television or magazines sell a bundle of products consisting of a 
primary product (the content) and a secondary product (the advertising). Agents have to 
pay a price for consuming the content and receive a reimbursement for consuming the 
advertising (in the form of a lower cover price or subscription fee). In trading the 
advertising, the media firm acts as an intermediary on behalf of the advertising 
companies. Since it offers both products as a bundle, it can tackle the adverse selection 
problem: by distorting the market for its primary product (for example by altering its 
price or quality) it can mitigate the distortion in the secondary market. Thus, the two-
sided market nature of media firms allows achieving more efficiency in the market for 
advertising. 
As an illustrative example of what we have in mind consider two competitive 
TV markets in countries R(ich) and P(oor) that broadcast the latest Hollywood movies. 
Suppose the film industry demands a fixed price per viewer from the TV stations that 
want to show their movies. Assume that people who live in R are rich, whereas people 
who live in P are poor. Consider the case where advertising rates are sufficiently high so 
that all stations are financed by advertising rather than a subscription fee. Clearly, as 
consumers in country R are more attractive to advertisers, the price for an advertisement 
is higher in country R than in country P. Therefore, in the competitive equilibria (where 
media firms earn zero profits) there is less advertising in country R than in country P. 
Now consider a trade liberalization which makes it possible that TV stations broadcast 
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in both countries. Apparently, the full information competitive outcome that was just 
described is not stable in this new situation as all viewers in country P would switch to 
channels of country R, where there is less advertising. Since the TV stations in country 
R were just breaking even with the high advertising rates they received for their rich 
viewers, they would now make losses with the new mixed audience. A possible solution 
for this problem is that the channels in R demand a positive subscription fee and reduce 
their advertising. This is a helpful separating mechanism because poor viewers may 
suffer harder from a subscription fee than rich viewers, hence incentive compatibility 
can be achieved. Note that this mechanism seriously hampers price competition of 
media products: as lowering the price attracts low income viewers, competition for high 
income types will mainly be driven by the quality of the media and the amount of 
advertising. 
We analyze both monopolistic and competitive media markets, assuming that 
there are high and low income consumers. The main findings of this chapter are as 
follows. Unless consumers' tastes for the quality of media content are very 
heterogeneous, first best pricing schemes for media products are not incentive 
compatible. In order to separate types, media firms use two instruments. By increasing 
the price of the high type bundle above the first best level, firms can deter low types 
from consuming it. The second means to separate types is increasing the quality of the 
high type bundle beyond first best levels. This deters low types indirectly as it involves 
an increase in advertising or price in order to finance the higher production costs. But as 
low types are likely to have a lower willingness to pay for a quality improvement than 
high types, the incentive constraint of low types is relaxed. 
It turns out that an increase in the difference of the two types' quality preference 
has two effects: (i) It is cheaper to use the quality distortion as a screening instrument; 
hence there is more of it and less price distortion. (ii) As the preferred bundles of the 
two types differ more, screening becomes easier, so both types of distortion will be used 
less. The second effect implies that if the preferences of the two types are very different, 
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the first best is attainable. These effects will be shown to persist both in competitive and 
monopolistic media markets. 
Our results are well in line with empirical evidence on media markets. In 
particular, Thompson's (1989) and Kaiser's (2002) analyses of newspaper and magazine 
markets show that media firms, when considering a cover price cut, face a trade-off 
between increased sales and deteriorating advertising rates. This is exactly the trade-off 
that is generated by adverse selection in our model. A more detailed discussion of 
empirical results can be found in Section 3.6. 
Recently, media markets have been analyzed extensively in the two-sided 
market literature.71 Models in this spirit are Anderson and Coate (2004), Chaudhri 
(1998), Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001b), Gal-Or and Dukes (2004), Häckner 
and Nyberg (2000) and Nilssen and Sørgard (2001). These papers offer interesting 
insights into the nature of competition in media markets, but do not address the question 
of adverse selection we are concerned with here.  
The monopoly case in this chapter is closely related to the literature on 
monopolistic price discrimination with endogenous quality choice (most notably Mussa 
and Rosen, 1978, and Srinagesh and Bradburd, 1989). As should become clear below, 
however, the basic intuitions that were derived in this literature usually fail to hold in 
the case of media markets. 
Our model is a model of multidimensional screening in the sense that media 
firms have several screening instruments at their disposal. On the other hand, it is one-
dimensional in the sense that consumer types are differentiated along a single dimension 
alone. This feature is responsible for the fact that it does not inherit the technical 
difficulties that characterize general models of multidimensional screening, where often 
no clear ordering of types is possible (see Rochet and Stole, 2003, for an overview). 
                                                 
71 See Armstrong (2004) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) for some of the general insights from this 
literature. They also contain some analysis of media markets. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present 
the formal model. Section 3.3 characterizes the equilibrium in a monopolistic media 
market, whereas Section 3.4 considers a competitive media market. Section 3.5 presents 
some comparative statics analysis. Finally, in Section 3.6 we offer some extensions of 
our basic model, discuss our results and relate them to empirical work. 
 
 
3.2 The Model 
 
Consider a market for an homogeneous media product. This could be any kind of 
product that can be financed both via advertising and via price (for example a TV 
station, a newspaper or a webpage).72 In principle, it could even be a professional sports 
event or a software program. There are two types of consumers: high types (denoted by 
subscript H ) with high income, high involvement or the like and low types (denoted by 
subscript L ). There is a continuum of consumers of measure 1. A proportion γ  is of 
type H , while a proportion 1 γ−  is of type L . Consumers have unit demand and buy 
from the media firm providing them with the highest utility (if above zero). The utility 
of a consumer of type i  from consumption of a given media product is 
 i i i iV U p v qα β= − − +  (1) 
where 0α ≥  denotes the amount of advertising, 0p ≥  denotes the cover price or 
subscription fee and q∈ ¡  denotes the quality of the content of the media product. 
''Quality'' refers to some unambiguously measurable quality characteristic of the media 
output, say the number of color pages in a newspaper or the amount of money that a TV 
station spends on broadcasting rights. Naturally, price enters negatively and quality 
                                                 
72 Throughout this chapter we assume that media companies have access to a technology that enables 
them to raise a price from consumers. If such a technology was costly, these transaction costs would bias 
the results in this chapter towards advertising finance of the media product (as is encountered for instance 
in the radio market). 
CHAPTER 3 ADVERTISING AND THE MEDIA 
 
133
enters positively in the utility function. Advertising enters negatively, that is, there are 
nuisance costs of advertising. This is a weak assumption in the case of television (which 
predominantly features persuasive advertising) but may be less innocuous in the case of 
newspapers (which often have a large fraction of informative advertising).73 
iU  is a constant measuring the utility of consuming a free, base-quality media 
product containing no advertising. 0iβ >  measures type i 's aversion to monetary 
expenditures.74 Let L Hβ β> , implying that poor consumers suffer more from a higher 
price than rich consumers. 0iv ≥  is an indicator of type i 's willingness to pay for 
quality. Let H Lv v≥ . With this assumption we do not want to suggest that low types 
have a lower appreciation for quality, but rather that their lack of wealth induces a lower 
marginal willingness to pay for it. We normalize 0Lv =  which has no impact on the 
quality of our results but greatly simplifies calculations. 
We will differentiate between the two polar cases of a monopolistic media firm 
and a competitive media market with many firms. Media firms can offer media products 
which are characterized by the vector ( ), ,C p qα= . Although media firms may have 
market power regarding consumers, they are assumed to be price-takers regarding the 
advertising side of the market. That is, there is perfect competition on the market for 
advertising. This means that, although a trucking magazine does not compete with a 
women's magazine for readers, the two do compete for advertising. This concords with 
the motivation that was given in the introduction: advertising firms can not fully reach 
their target groups by advertising in special interest media alone, but have to spread out 
their campaigns over different types of (mass) media. Accordingly, let iδ  denote the 
                                                 
73 It is generally accepted that TV advertising annoys most viewers. Sometimes it is argued that 
newspaper advertising is not harmful to readers. Contrary to this view, Sonnac (2000) presents evidence 
that most European readers are ad-averse. American newspaper readers, on the other hand, seem to like 
advertising (Rosse, 1980). It is clear that beyond some percentage of newspaper space that is devoted to 
advertising, ads become annoying even to ad-lovers. As it is optimal for media firms to increase 
advertising beyond this threshold, the last units of advertising will cause disutility in any case. 
74As equation (1) has been normalized with respect to α , iβ  can also be interpreted as the marginal rate 
of substitution between watching advertising and paying a fee to finance a media good.  
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market price for one unit of advertising that is consumed by a consumer of type i .75 It is 
natural to have H Lδ δ> . This is supported by Fisher, McGowan and Evans (1980) who 
find that US broadcasting stations with high income viewers receive much more 
favorable advertising rates than otherwise equal stations with relatively poor audience. 
Thompson (1989) presents similar evidence for newspaper markets. 
Consumers can remunerate media firms for obtaining the media content they 
desire by paying a subscription fee and/or by accepting advertising. Which form of 
obligation they prefer of course depends on their preferences.76 From (1) we have that 
consumers of type i  strictly prefer advertising-financed media to subscription-based 
media if 1i iδ β > . If =1i iδ β , they are indifferent between the two. And if <1i iδ β , they 
strictly prefer paying in money rather than consuming advertisements. As this chapter is 
concerned with the provision of advertising, we fully concentrate on the case where 
1i iδ β >  for { },i H L∈  and hence assume advertising to be the efficient form of 
financing for media content. We forgo the analysis of the other possible cases. Note, 
however, that the adverse selection problem may be less severe in alternative settings, 
as it is then possible that some consumers prefer subscription-based media while others 
prefer advertising-based media, which facilitates screening.77 
Media firms have a cost function that consists of marginal cost 0c >  and fixed 
cost 0F ≥ , which has to be incurred by every firm that wants to engage in the media 
market. This is in accordance with empirical evidence that media firms exhibit 
increasing returns to scale (Rosse, 1967, 1970). We assume that the provision of quality 
                                                 
75 iδ  is the price that brings demand and supply for type i  advertising across media markets into 
equilibrium. 
76 Note that media firms' preferences concerning the form of payment are perfectly in line with 
consumers' in a first best world: letting consumers choose the form of payment maximizes the sum that 
can be extracted from them - directly via a subscription fee or indirectly via advertising revenue. 
77 In the real world, at least some advertising must be efficient in the sense employed above. Otherwise, 
we would not observe advertising, as then media firms could increase their profit by having less 
advertising and increasing the media price such that consumers' utility levels stay constant. As will 
become clear below, this argument does not hold for subscription fees. Asymmetric information might 
guarantee their existance even in a world where every consumer would prefer all types of media to be 
fully advertising-financed. 
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increases the marginal cost of the media product in a convex way. To be concrete, we 
choose quality costs to be 212 iqϕ , where 0ϕ >  is a parameter that measures how costly 
the provision of quality is. One could argue that quality costs are fixed rather than 
variable. We claim that this is not the case for most components of quality. For instance, 
arguably the most costly component of magazine quality are printing costs, which are 
determined by the number of pages, the extent of color-printing, the type of paper and 
the like. Kaiser (2002) estimates marginal costs of German women's magazines at 
roughly twice the cover price. Likewise, broadcasting quality-costs are variable rather 
than fixed: usually the prices that television stations have to pay for content from 
outside providers, who sell the rights to broadcast movies, sports events or the like, are 
sharply increasing with the number of consumers. Naturally, Belgian television pays 
much lower fees to obtain the broadcasting rights for the Olympic Games than a French 
station does. 
Note that because of the above technological specifications, our model crucially 
differs from the view that (broadcasting) media are public goods. For instance, many 
undergraduate textbooks in public economics list television as an example for a pure 
public good, satisfying non-rivalry and non-excludability. In contrast to this we argue 
that media provision is excludable (as media firms can charge a price) and rivalrous (as 
additional viewers increase costs). 
Putting the above together, a media product ( ), ,C p qα=  that caters to a 
consumer of type i  makes a marginal profit of 
 212i p c qπ αδ ϕ= + − −  (2) 
per consumer. 
An interesting problem of course only arises if consumers' willingness to pay is 
high enough to make production of the media product efficient. The condition 
i iU F cβ ≥ +  for { },i H L∈ , which says that the willingness to pay for a media good 
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exceeds its production costs, guarantees that production is always constrained Pareto 
optimal.78 We assume this condition to hold throughout this chapter. 
 
 
3.3 Monopoly Media 
 
3.3.1 First Best 
 
We will now analyze the equilibrium in the media market for a monopolistic media 
firm. As a benchmark, we first consider the market equilibrium under full information, 
assuming that the media firm can perfectly discriminate between types. In order to make 
sure that consumers buy the media product, the monopolist has to bear in mind the 
participation constraints 
 
 0H H H H H HU p v qα β− − + ≥  (3) 
for high types and 
 0L L L LU pα β− − ≥  (4) 
for low types, which follow directly from (1). Also, the monopolist has to ensure that 
the non-negativity constraints 
 { }0 for ,i i H Lα ≥ ∈  (5) 
and 
 { }0 for ,ip i H L≥ ∈  (6) 
are met. The monopolist's program thus becomes to solve 
                                                 
78 Remember that consumers are of measure 1. 
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(P1) ( ) ( )( )2 21 12 2{( , , ),
 ( , , )}
max  1
H H H
L L L
H H H H L L L Lp q
p q
p c q p c q F
α
α
γ α δ ϕ γ α δ ϕ+ − − + − + − − −  
subject to (3) to (6). 
The solution to program (P1) is straightforward to find and has 0FBHp = ´, 
( ) 2FBH H H HU vα δ ϕ= +  and ( )FBH H Hq vδ ϕ=  for the high type and 0FBLp = , FBL LUα =  
and 0FBLq =  for the low type. This is quite intuitive. As advertising is the efficient way 
of paying for the media product, prices are zero for both types and the media product is 
fully financed by advertising. This way, the monopolist is able to extract most rent. Low 
types receive zero quality as they do not care about it. High types, on the other hand, 
receive a positive amount of quality, which is increasing in their valuation Hv  and in 
advertising receipts Hδ , while it is decreasing in the cost of the provision of quality ϕ . 
The monopolist provides both types with the efficient amount of quality as this 
maximizes the amount of rent he can extract from them. Which type has to accept more 
advertising depends on the two types' maximum willingness to accept advertising 
( LU and HU ) and on the quality preferences of the H -types. Consumers are held to 
zero utility. 
 
3.3.2 Second Best 
 
Next we turn to the case of asymmetric information with respect to consumers' types. In 
this case consumers are free to buy any media product that is available on the market. 
The monopolist has two possibilities. Either he can price discriminate and thereby sell 
to the whole market. Or he can offer a single bundle only and thence extract the whole 
rent from one type alone, while rationing the other one. Which of these strategies is 
optimal typically depends on the relative frequency of types. As is usual in the literature 
on price discrimination, we first consider the case of price discrimination without 
worrying about the possibility of rationing for the moment. 
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In this case the monopolist again maximizes her profit given participation 
constraints of the two types. But now she also has to consider the following incentive 
constraints, which guarantee that both types actually prefer the bundle that is designed 
for them. The high type's incentive constraint can be easily constructed from (1) as 
 ( ) ( ) 0.L H H L H H L Hp p v q qα α β− + − − − ≥  (7) 
Similarly, the low type's incentive constraint is 
 ( ) 0.H L L H Lp pα α β− + − ≥  (8) 
Note that the L -type's incentive constraint is independent of the quality of the media 
goods because 0Lv = . The monopolist solves 
(P2) ( ) ( )( )2 21 12 2{( , , ),
 ( , , )}
max  1
H H H
L L L
H H H H L L L Lp q
p q
p c q p c q F
α
α
γ α δ ϕ γ α δ ϕ+ − − + − + − − −  
subject to (3) to (8). 
It turns out that the solution to this program is different for two distinct cases: (a) High 
types have a higher willingness to pay for a media good of base quality than low types 
(in terms of money); but low types will accept a higher maximum amount of advertising 
than high types. (b) One type has a higher willingness to pay in both dimensions.79 We 
have argued that (compared to low types) high types find price increases relatively less 
worrying than an equivalent advertising increase. Situation (a) corresponds to the case 
where this statement does not only hold in marginal but also in absolute terms. Hence, 
this seems to be the natural case to consider. Accordingly, this situation will be the one 
that we are going to analyze here. Formally, we have L HU U≥  (low types have a higher 
willingness to accept advertising) and H H L LU Uβ β≥  (high types have a higher 
willingness to pay). We have included an analysis of case (b) in Appendix 3.7.2. 
                                                 
79 It is not possible that low types have a higher willingness to pay, but a lower willingness to accept 
advertising. This would imply L L H HU Uβ β≥  and H LU U≥ . The second inequality is equivalent to 
H L L LU Uβ β≥ . This, together with the first inequality, gives H L H HU Uβ β≥ , which in turn is 
equivalent to H Lβ β≥ , a contradiction to our assumptions. 
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 Before analyzing the solution it is useful to note that the first best bundles that 
were determined in the previous subsection may not be incentive compatible in the 
second best. The reason is that - as long as high types have to endure less advertising 
than low types - there is always an incentive for low types to consume the high type 
product, which costs the same but has less advertising (and more quality). 
 The solution to program (P2) crucially depends on the relative frequency of 
types. Let us first consider the case where there are relatively many low types so that 
γ γ≤ . Propositions 3.1 formally states the solution in this case.80  
 
Proposition 3.1 In the solution to program (P2) for the case γ γ≤ , the low type always 
receives his first best bundle. The high type’s bundle is as follows. 
(i) If [ ) 0,H Hv v∈ , then ( )
21SB H L H L
H H
H L H L
U Up vδ β
β β ϕ β β
− −
= +
− − 2
, 
( )
( )
21L H LSB H L L H
H H
H L H L
U U v
β δ ββ βα
β β ϕ β β
−−
= −
− − 2
 and 
( )
1 .SB H LH H
H L
q vδ β
ϕ β β
−
=
−
 
(ii) If [ ) ,H H Hv v v∈ , then 0SBHp = , SBH LUα =  and SB L HH
H
U Uq
v
−
= . 
(iii) If [ ),H Hv v∈ ∞ , then the high type receives his first best bundle. 
 
It is interesting to note that the low types receive their first best bundle, while the high 
types' bundle is distorted. This is not surprising as the low types have to be deterred 
from consuming the high type product. It is convenient to present the solution 
graphically as we do here in Figure 3.1, which depicts the first and second best bundle 
                                                 
80 All proofs are in Appendix 3.7.1, which also contains the precise definitions for the threshold levels γ , 
Hv , Hv ′ , Hv  and Hv′  which satisfy ( )0,1γ ∈ , 0 H Hv v< < < ∞ , 0 H Hv v′< < < ∞  and 0 H Hv v′< < < ∞ . 
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for high types depending on the valuation Hv . As can be seen, optimal price, advertising 
and quality largely depend on the size of the H -type's preference for quality Hv . 
 
Second Best
First Best
 
Figure 3.1: The Monopoly Case (γ γ≤ ) 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that both a quality and a price distortion are used to achieve 
incentive compatibility. As a price increase hurts low types relatively more, the upward 
distortion in Hp  can be used to scare away L -types from the H -bundle. The reason 
that an overprovision of quality is a useful screening instrument is that more quality for 
the H -bundle has to be financed. High types would like to have less quality, but at least 
they somewhat value its increase. Low types, on the other hand, have no benefit from 
increased quality whatsoever. And since quality has to be paid for by Hα  and Hp , the 
quality distortion relaxes the low type's incentive constraint. The level of advertising, on 
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the other hand, is not a screening instrument, but adapts to price and quality distortions 
in a way that holds the participation constraints of consumers binding. 
If the difference in quality preferences of the two types is low ( H Hv v< ), both 
price and quality distortions are used by the monopolist. An increase in Hv  then has two 
effects. The first effect is that the increasingly different preferences for quality make it 
more and more profitable to use Hq  as a screening instrument. Hence, the high type's 
quality moves further away from its first best level. At the same time the price distortion 
is used less and less, until Hp  reaches zero at H Hv v= . Hence, the first effect of a 
widening gap between quality-preferences is an exchange of screening instruments. 
 The second notable effect is that screening becomes easier overall, as the 
products the two types would like to consume are getting more differentiated. This 
effect drives the use of both screening instruments down. This process is completed if 
H Hv v≥ , where the first best is attained. It is straightforward to show that second best 
profits monotonically increase towards first best levels, which they reach at H Hv v= . 
Thus, the more differentiated the products are that high and low types would ideally like 
to consume, the easier it is for media firms to efficiently sort types.81 
The amount of advertising for high types, Hα , is below first best for low levels 
of Hv . The monopolist has to do this in order to compensate high type consumers for 
the price distortion. As Hv  increases, two forces drive Hα  up: the reduction in price 
screening renders it possible to increase Hα  and in addition to that, the rapid increase in 
Hq  must be financed by more advertising. As a result, Hα  increases above its first best 
level beyond some point. Finally, SBHα  and 
FB
Hα  approach each other again, as all 
distortions go down. 
                                                 
81 This result is akin to a result from insurance economics. Bond and Crocker (1991) show that 
differential consumption of hazardous goods may allow insurance companies to reach the first best in 
insurance markets with adverse selection. 
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 Note that the quality distortion that potentially occurs in monopoly media 
markets is quite different to the quality distortion observed in regular goods markets 
with price discrimination (as analyzed by Mussa and Rosen, 1978, among others). 
While in Mussa and Rosen (1978) quality is distorted downwards, here we have an 
upwards distortion. This difference occurs because in media markets (other than in 
goods markets) the low types have to be deterred from consuming the high type bundle. 
This is so even though the high types are usually the more profitable clientele for the 
monopolist. The crucial point is that high types generate far higher advertising receipts 
than low types. 
 Next we turn to the case where there are many high types (γ γ> ). Proposition 
3.2 states the monopolistic equilibrium in this case. 
 
Proposition 3.2 In the solution to program (P2) for the case γ γ> , the low type always 
receives his first best bundle, except that ( )( )( ) 21SBL H H L HU vα δ ϕ γ γ δ ϕ = + + −   if 
[ ) ,H H Hv v v′∈ . The high type’s bundle is as follows. 
(i) If [ ) 0,H Hv v′∈ , then 0SBHp = , 2
1SB H L
H H HU v
δ δγα
ϕ γ ϕ
 −
= + + 
 
 and 
1SB H L
H Hq v
δ δγ
ϕ γ ϕ
 −
= + 
 
. 
(ii) If [ ) ,H H Hv v v′∈ , then 0SBHp = , SBH LUα =  and SB L HH
H
U Uq
v
−
= . 
(iii) If [ ),H Hv v∈ ∞ , then the high type receives his first best bundle. 
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Note that the optimal solution now not only depends on the size of Hv  but also on the 
size of γ . Figure 3.2 represents this solution graphically. It is drawn for some given 
γ γ> .  
 
Second Best
First Best
 
Figure 3.2: The Monopoly Case (γ γ> ) 
 
Figure 3.2 reflects a sudden change in the monopolist's screening policy if γ  
gets larger than γ . While the screening of the high type quality remains unchanged, the 
monopolist now refrains from using the price instrument. This allows her to increase the 
advertising of H -types. To guarantee incentive compatibility it now becomes necessary 
to decrease Lα  below first best levels. This policy is quite intuitive: The more high 
types there are, the more costly it becomes for the monopolist to distort the high type 
bundle in order to achieve incentive compatibility. Beyond γ , there are so few low 
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types that it is profitable to distort the low type bundle instead, by lowering its 
advertising level below first best. As the low type bundle otherwise remains unchanged, 
this policy generates an information rent for L -types. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows that the two effects of an increase in Hv  that we observed for 
γ γ≤  are at work here, too. First of all, the quality instrument becomes more effective, 
so the advertising distortion is exchanged for the quality distortion until Lα  reaches its 
first best level. Second of all, screening becomes easier, which decreases the use of both 
instruments. Again, for H Hv v≥  the two types demand so different goods that self-
selection is without costs. 
 Let us now analyze, how the solution changes if γ  increases beyond γ . It turns 
out that in this case, the remaining quality distortion of high types gets still smaller and 
is gradually exchanged for a further distortion of the low types' advertising. 
 So we have the following two observations from the monopoly case. (i) As the 
number of high types increases, the high type distortion gradually gets exchanged for a 
distortion of low types. (ii) As the differential of the types' quality preferences increases, 
the distortion in Hq  will be used more often than the distortion in Hp  (respectively Lα ), 
in addition, screening becomes easier and the overall distortion is reduced.82 
 As was mentioned above, the solution to program (P2) only determines the 
optimal behavior of the monopolist if it is not preferable to ration one type of customer 
while extracting the whole rent from the other. 
 
Proposition 3.3 Independent of the size of γ , there will be no rationing of consumers. 
That is, the monopolist always makes her pricing decision according to Propositions 
3.1 and 3.2. 
                                                 
82 Further comparative statics results can be found in section 3.5. 
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This is an important observation. Quite contrary to standard models of monopolistic 
price discrimination as Mussa and Rosen (1978), rationing in media markets is never 
profitable for a monopolist - irrespective of the relative frequencies of types. This means 
that the efficiency loss from monopolization may be smaller in media markets than in 
standard goods markets.83 The difference occurs because the monopolist can use 
different forms of payment from different types, which gives him greater leeway in 
profitably separating types. 
 For this result to hold it is crucial that low types have a higher willingness to 
accept advertising for a media product of quality 0q = . If high types had a higher 
willingness to accept advertising, we would be back in a situation where rationing of 
low types may be profitable if there are sufficiently many high types.84  
 
 
3.4 Competitive Media 
 
In the case of free entry into the media market, an effectively competitive outcome 
involving the market presence of more than one media company requires that 0F = . 
This stems from the fact that the media products we consider here are perfectly 
homogeneous (except for the quality and the amount of advertising). This implies 
Bertrand competition of all companies that have entered the market. Hence, with 
increasing returns to scale a situation of natural monopoly would arise. In order to be 
able to analyze a competitive media market, we thus set 0F = . It should become clear 
                                                 
83 Of course, monopolization in media markets may bring about other inefficiencies than purely economic 
ones. For instance, it may lead to political biases and disinformation. This alone may be enough in order 
to worry about media monopolies. On the other hand, competition may also lead to biased news by 
making it necessary to exaggerate stories in order to attract readers or viewers. See Mullainathan and 
Shleifer (2003) for a model that analyzes both types of media bias. 
84 See the analysis of this case in Appendix 3.7.2. 
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that the problems that adverse selection may pose in media markets are quite general 
and not driven by a specific formulation of market structure. 
 
3.4.1 First Best 
 
Again, we first consider the market equilibrium under full information as a benchmark. 
We can look at the H - and the L -market separately. It is straightforward to see that the 
following conditions are necessary and sufficient for a Nash equilibrium of the game 
that the media firms play: (i) media firms earn non-negative profits and (ii) there does 
not exist a contract ( ), ,C p qα=  which is not offered in equilibrium but would make 
positive profits for a media firm offering it. In order to guarantee condition (i) we must 
have 
 { }212 for ,i i i ip c q i H Lα δ ϕ+ ≥ + ∈  (9) 
from equation (2). Condition (ii) then implies that an equilibrium can be found by 
maximizing the agent's utility subject to these zero profit constraints. Hence, we have to 
solve for { },i H L∈  
(P3) 
{( , , )}
max  
i i i
i i i i i ip q
U p v q
α
α β− − +  
subject to (5), (6) and (9). 
As in the monopoly case we forgo a proof for the solution of the first best. This solution 
has 0FBHp = , ( ) 22FBH H H Hc vα δ δ ϕ= +  and ( )FBH H Hq vδ ϕ=  for the high type and 
0FBLp = , 
FB
L Lcα δ=  and 0
FB
Lq =  for the low type. Again, this is quite intuitive. As 
advertising is the efficient way of paying for the media product, prices are zero for both 
types and the media product is fully financed by advertising. Low types receive zero 
quality as they do not care about it. High types, on the other hand, receive a positive 
amount of quality, which is increasing in their valuation Hv  and in advertising receipts 
Hδ , while it is decreasing in the cost of the provision of quality ϕ . Which type has to 
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accept more advertising depends on the quality preferences of H -types. If their desire 
for quality is sufficiently small, high types have to endure less advertising. This is 
because they are more attractive to advertising firms. If their desire for quality is 
sufficiently large, however, they still have to accept more advertising than low types, in 
order to finance the additional costs of quality. The firms in the market offer two 
different types of bundles, one for high and one for low types, and make zero profits. 
The entire surplus goes to consumers. 
 
3.4.2 Second Best 
 
Next turn to the more realistic case of asymmetric information. Lemma 1 guarantees 
that we can direct our attention to separating equilibria. 
 
Lemma 3.1 There does not exist a pooling equilibrium in the competitive media market. 
 
The intuition for Lemma 3.1 is that every pooling contract can be destabilized by 
another contract that baits only high types, thereby ruining the advertising rate for the 
pooling contract.  
Apart from the constraints from the first best case, we must now also guarantee 
incentive compatibility, as in the monopoly case. Again, we maximize the agents' utility 
to satisfy condition (ii) for a Nash equilibrium. 
(P4) ( ) ( )( )
{( , , ),
 ( , , )}
max  1
H H H
L L L
H H H H H H L L L Lp q
p q
U p v q U p
α
α
γ α β γ α β− − + + − − −  
subject to (5) to (9) 
 
Proposition 3.4 formally states the solution to program (P4). 
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Proposition 3.4 In the solution to program (P4), the low type always receives his first 
best bundle. The high type’s bundle is as follows. 
(i) If [ ) 0,H Hv v∈ , then ( ) ( )
1
1 2
SB L H H L
H H
L H L H L
p c vδ δ δ β
δ δ β ϕ β β
− −
= +
− −
2
2 , 
( )
( )
( )
2
2
11
1 2
L H LSB L L
H H
L H L H L
c v
β δ βδ βα
δ δ β ϕ β β
−−
= −
− −
 and 
( )
1SB H L
H H
H L
q vδ β
ϕ β β
−
=
−
. 
(ii) If [ ) ,H H Hv v v′∈ , then 0SBHp = , 
( )2 H LSB
H
L
q c
δ δ
ϕδ
−
=  and .SBH
L
cα
δ
=  
(iii) If [ ),H Hv v′∈ ∞ , then the high type receives his first best bundle. 
 
Again we proceed with the graphical representation of the solution, which can be found 
in Figure 3.3. A comparison of Figures 3.1 and 3.3 immediately shows that the way 
competitive firms deal with adverse selection almost perfectly corresponds to the way a 
monopolist deals with it if there are many low types. The only big difference is that in 
the competitive case firms make zero profits and hence there is less advertising overall. 
It is interesting that the solution is independent of γ . This is so because competitive 
firms can not use cross-subsidizing schemes. Since in equilibrium there must be zero 
profits for both high and low types, firms can not trade off which type they like to 
screen more intensively. 
Again, we see that if Hv  is small, both quality- and price-screening occur. As the 
valuations get different, there are the by now well known effects of an exchange of 
instruments and of a general reduction in screening. As before, beyond some threshold 
Hv′  the first best is achieved. 
 It is well known that in competitive markets with adverse selection, separating 
pure strategy equilibria exist if and only if there is no pooling contract that has the 
following two properties: (a) it makes non-negative profits if offered and (b) both types  
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Second Best
First Best
 
Figure 3.3: The Competitive Case 
 
prefer it to the separating contracts that were proposed as equilibrium candidates (given 
here by the solution to program (P4)). Non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria is 
worrying because it is unclear how a mixed strategy by firms could be interpreted. The 
following proposition addresses the question of equilibrium existence in the context of 
media markets. 
 
Proposition 3.5 If [ )H0,vHv ′∈ , then a pure strategy equilibrium in the media market 
exists if and only if ( )ˆ Hvγ γ≤  for some ( ) ( )ˆ 0,1 .Hvγ ∈  ( )ˆ 0H Hv vγ∂ ∂ >  and ˆ 1γ →  as 
.H Hv v′→  If H Hv v′≥ , a pure strategy equilibrium exists for all [ ]0,1 .γ ∈  
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Therefore, also in media markets, there is a problem of non-existence of pure strategy 
equilibria. However, the problem gets less severe as Hv  increases and finally vanishes 
beyond some point. Note that in the case of non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium 
it is known that a mixed-strategy equilibrium does exist (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). 
Also, various equilibrium refinements have been proposed by the literature in order to 
guarantee the existence of pure strategy equilibria. We do not want to delve into this 
matter, however, and refer to Hellwig (1987) for a discussion. 
 
 
3.5 Comparative Statics 
 
We will now analyze how media market distortions that are due to adverse selection are 
affected by a change in the exogenous parameters of the model.85 Note that SBHp  is a 
direct measure of the price distortion as 0FBHp = . In order to measure the quality 
distortion, let : 1SB FBH H Hq q q∆ = −  denote the percentagewise distortion of quality. 
Unless otherwise stated, all results hold both for the monopoly and for the competitive 
case. 
 Let us first analyze a change in the marginal rate of substitution between 
monetary payments and advertising, Hβ  and Lβ . It is easy to show that 0
SB
H Hp β∂ ∂ ≤  
and >0H Hq β∂∆ ∂ . This corresponds to an exchange in screening instruments. The 
reason for this is that an increase in Hβ  means that the payment preferences of the two 
types get closer. Hence, screening via the price becomes more expensive. Therefore, it 
                                                 
85 Accordingly, all derivatives we present here are taken at a value of Hv  such that we are strictly in 
second best. 
CHAPTER 3 ADVERTISING AND THE MEDIA 
 
151
is optimal to use the quality instrument more intensively, while the use of the price 
distortion should be reduced.86  
 Secondly, consider an increase in ϕ , that is the provision of quality becomes 
more expensive. We find 0SBHp ϕ∂ ∂ ≥  and =0Hq ϕ∂∆ ∂ . These changes embody two 
effects. First of all, the increase in ϕ  makes screening via quality more costly. This 
force reduces quality screening and increases price screening. Second of all, a higher ϕ  
means that Hq  is decreasing in first best, too. Since we know from above that the 
adverse selection problem gets worse when the quality preferences of the two types get 
more similar, there now has to be more screening overall. This pushes up both kinds of 
distortion. The net effect has the quality distortion unchanged and the price distortion 
increased. 
 Now consider a change in c . Here, the result of the comparative statics analysis 
depends on the market structure. We first analyze the competitive case. There, we 
immediately find that 0Hq c∂∆ ∂ ≥  and 0
SB
Hp c∂ ∂ ≥ . Hence, an increase in marginal 
costs implies (weakly) more use of both distortions. This is reasonable: a higher cost of 
the product brings about more advertising and thus it becomes more attractive for L -
types to consume the H -type bundle. As a response, screening must be intensified. 
 In the monopoly case, the level of c  does not influence the screening policy. 
This is a consequence of the fact that in monopoly, the amount of advertising (and 
hence the severity of the adverse selection problem) is determined by the consumers' 
valuations and not by the producers' marginal cost. 
Finally, consider a change of the advertising prices Hδ  and Lδ . It is well known 
that advertising prices change pro-cyclically and very amplified along the business 
cycle. This makes it a particularly interesting case to consider. It turns out that 
comparative statics with respect to the advertising rates again yield different results 
                                                 
86 Analogously, an increase in Lβ implies that more emphasis is put on the price distortion, while the 
quality distortion is reduced. 
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depending on the type of market structure. Let us first consider the competitive case. 
Simple calculations show that <0SBH ip δ∂ ∂  for { },i H L∈  and <0H Hq δ∂∆ ∂  (and 
=0H Lq δ∂∆ ∂ ). Bad times let the adverse selection problem become more severe, which 
calls for more intensive distortions. This is intuitive: an economic downturn implies 
lower advertising rates. This increases not only the absolute number of advertisements 
Hα and Lα  that a competitive media firm has to display in order to break even, but also 
the difference between Hα  and Lα . Alas, this makes the low type's incentive constraint 
harder to fulfill, which necessitates a bigger distortion. 
 In the monopoly case things are different. There, the media firm always tries to 
have as much advertising as possible in order to extract rent. This is independent of 
advertising rates. Nonetheless, a change in Hδ  alters the distortions in the monopoly 
case. It is straightforward to show that 0SBH Hp δ∂ ∂ ≤ , =0
SB
H Lp δ∂ ∂ , 0H Hq δ∂∆ ∂ ≥  and 
=0H Lq δ∂∆ ∂ . That is, the distortions are unaffected by the low type advertising rate. 
But if Hδ  goes up, the price distortion decreases and the quality distortion increases. If 
Hδ  increases, the high type wants more quality as quality has become less expensive. 
This makes screening via quality relatively less expensive. Hence an increase in Hδ  
results in an exchange of screening instruments as we have seen before. All in all, in the 
case of a media monopoly, economic changes have no influence on the severity of the 
adverse selection problem. But they do have an effect on the way this problem is tackled 
by the media firm.87  The following corollary summarizes the effect of an economic 
crisis. 
 
Corollary 3.1 An economic downturn that decreases advertising rates aggravates the 
adverse selection problem in competitive media markets, but leaves it unchanged for a 
monopolist. 
                                                 
87 This indirect effect is of course also present in the competitive market. However, it is wholly 
overshadowed by the direct effect that was discussed above. 
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3.6 Discussion 
 
One assumption that we have made in the case of a competitive media market is that 
consumers' basic valuations LU  and HU  are sufficiently high compared to production 
costs, so that trade of the media products is efficient. Alternatively, consider the 
situation where only the H -type's valuation is high enough to enable trade of the media 
product. It is tempting to suspect that in such a case the adverse selection problem 
vanishes and we return to first best. This, however, turns out to be wrong. Even though 
low types do not find the first best low type bundle attractive, they still may have to be 
deterred from buying the high type bundle. This may be necessary because the high type 
bundle is very attractive due to its (relatively) low amount of advertising. It is 
straightforward to show in our basic model that whenever LU  decreases below some 
threshold level, production for low types becomes inefficient. As LU  decreases from 
this point on, the necessary distortion of the high types becomes weaker and weaker, 
because buying the high type bundle becomes less and less attractive to L -types. But 
until LU  has decreased below some second threshold level, we are strictly in second 
best. 
 The above case may be the relevant one for newspaper markets. Here the 
distinguishing characteristic of readers is probably the average reading time more than 
income. It is well known that usually only 15% or less of newspaper subscribers 
actually read their paper on a given day. If the price is low enough, most people want to 
subscribe to a newspaper, even if they do not read it very often. Naturally, advertisers 
pay lower rates for ''readers'' who do not actually see their advertisements. It is well 
conceivable that it would be efficient (in a first best world) to finance newspapers 
wholly by advertising. But given that free papers would attract subscriptions of readers 
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who merely use the paper for checking the lottery numbers and the cinema program, 
newspapers are forced to distort their pricing policy.88  
 Another interesting extension of our model is to the question of the political bias 
of mass media. It has been argued that the reliance of mass media on advertising 
revenue causes a distortion of political content away from extreme views towards softer 
positions (see Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac, 2001a, and the references therein). 
According to this view, advertising reduces the heterogeneity of the media market's 
political spectrum and leads to a ''pensée unique''. Our model shows that adverse 
selection may work as a countervailing force against this problem. Assume that the 
political spectrum can be represented by a one-dimensional continuous variable (say, by 
a left-right index). Now, if there is some correlation between income and political 
opinion89 then the political orientation of a media product may be used as a screening 
instrument. The consequence of this is straightforward: if the political preference of the 
two types is sufficiently different, the orientation of the media product suffices to 
separate the two types without distortion. If the political preference of the two types is 
not too different, however, the political orientation of high type media products will be 
distorted further away from the low type's preference. Hence, to the extent that there is 
political heterogeneity among readers, the media's political heterogeneity will be 
amplified as a response to adverse selection. A similar argument holds of course for 
content diversity. Therefore, our model also suggests a countervailing force against the 
problem of restricted diversity of broadcasting content (as argued by Steiner, 1952, 
Spence and Owen, 1977, Beebe, 1977, Anderson and Coate, 2004, and Gal-Or and 
Dukes, 2004). 
                                                 
88 Newspapers usually raise 50 to 90% of their revenue from advertising but almost all regular papers 
have a positive cover price. There do exist free newspapers in some major cities. Usually these are 
distributed in subways and are very thin, which ensures that most readers will actually have a look at the 
paper. Their appearance is well in line with our theory: they can readily be recognized as a low type 
bundle with low quality appearance and a large amount of advertising. 
89 Such correlation is claimed by political economy models of redistributive politics. See for instance 
Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) or Meltzer and Richard (1981). 
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 In the analysis so far, we have restricted ourselves to positive aspects and have 
refrained from engaging in welfare analysis. As we have pointed out in the introduction, 
interpreting a downward-distortion in the advertising market as welfare-reducing is not 
obvious, as advertising may exert negative externalities on competitors. In order to 
evaluate this question it plays a crucial role whether advertising is informative or 
persuasive. If advertising is informative, a downward distortion is clearly welfare-
reducing. While there is a negative externality on other firms also, this externality is 
purely pecuniary and thus irrelevant for welfare comparisons. If advertising is 
persuasive, however, it may just shift consumption from one firm to another, hence the 
benefit of the advertising firm may just correspond to a reduction in profit for another 
firm, while the consumer dislikes viewing the ad and gets a comparable utility from 
consuming the advertised product. In this case, advertising is clearly inefficient in the 
sense of social welfare and any reduction in its level is desirable, while any upward 
distortion would be welfare reducing. In short, the welfare effects of adverse selection 
in advertising markets crucially depend on the type of advertising. See Bagwell (2004) 
for a general discussion of the welfare effects of advertising. 
 Our theory accords well with empirical regularities. Fisher, McGowan and 
Evans (1980) report the strong impact that viewer characteristics have on advertising 
prices in the broadcasting industry. Thompson (1989) finds similar results for 
newspapers. In addition to that he finds that price setting involves a trade-off between 
circulation and advertising revenue. If media companies decide to reduce the cover 
price of their medium, this increases sales but substantially deteriorates advertising 
rates, as many of the new readers are less attractive for advertisers. Similarly, Kaiser's 
(2002) empirical results for women's magazines show that increasing the circulation by 
one percent increases advertising revenues by far less than one percent. This implies 
that price cuts dramatically worsen advertising rates per reader. This effect is 
particularly strong for magazines which are aimed at high income women. 
 These facts can be easily explained within our model: high-type media firms do 
not compete themselves down in prices as much as possible, since lowering the price 
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too much would attract low types, which would deteriorate advertising rates 
substantially. Instead, in our model high-type media compete via quality and the amount 
of advertising. Casual observation confirms that the proposed positive correlation 
between subscription fees and advertising rates is met in reality. 
 It is interesting to note that the classic papers in media economics already hint at 
problems of adverse selection in the media industry. Reddaway (1963, p. 214) observes 
the dangers of using cover price cuts as a competitive instrument: 
''Even if the price-cut succeeded, however, there is a real risk that the new 
readers would be concentrated in low-income groups, and so lower A's status as an 
advertising medium.'' 
In a similar vein, Corden (1953, p. 186) explains that advertising revenue 
increases less than proportionally with increases in circulation (caused, say, by a cover 
price cut): 
 ''Firstly, as circulation increases the average income of readers usually falls; 
hence the quality of the advertising space to advertisers is decreased, and to some 
extent the increase in quality resulting from the rise in circulation itself is offset.'' 
 But while both authors already see the problem, they lack the analytical tools of 
modern contract theory for a proper analysis of the matter. Consequently, these issues 
are just asides in the non-technical parts of their papers. 
 It is much more difficult to find convincing evidence for an overprovision of 
quality in media markets. The main problem stems from the fact that there is no 
microeconomic foundation of what constitutes the first best. In insurance economics or 
in banking, where we know from first principles that full-insurance and zero collateral 
are efficient, we can immediately link the observation of partial insurance and 
collateralized loans to market failures like adverse selection or moral hazard. In the 
media industry, on the other hand, there is no clear-cut level of first-best quality that is 
easily recognizable. 
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 We do want to mention, however, the remarks of Reddaway (1963, p. 217) on 
the economics of newspapers: 
''[…] [There is] a question which has always puzzled me - namely, is it really 
necessary for a national paper of wide appeal to spend such vast sums on ''editorial''? 
[…] Could not an editor of ideas produce the text for a normal popular national without 
spending more than (say) three times as much as the Birmingham Post?'' 
 Our model would claim that, indeed, a popular national would be able to; but 
that it does not want to. In fact one could argue that increasing the paper's quality 
enables the national paper to scare away low type readers who are not willing to pay for 
the artificially increased quality. Quite possibly, many of the high type readers would 
actually prefer reducing editorial expenditures as well, since the marginal value they 
contribute to reading enjoyment is arguably low (as exemplified by the above quote).  
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3.7 Appendix 
 
3.7.1 Proofs 
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Definition 5 ( )
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δ β δ β β
−
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. 
To simplify the reference, let us split conditions (5) and (6) into their single parts. We 
refer to the constraint 0Hα ≥  by (5h), while we refer to 0Lα ≥  by (5l). Likewise we 
refer to 0Hp ≥  by (6h) and to 0Lp ≥  by (6l). 
 First conjecture that (3), (4), (6l) and (8) are binding, whereas (5h), (5l), (6h) and 
(7) are slack. Let iµ  be the multiplier for constraint ( i ). This gives us the Lagrangean 
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Using γ γ≤ , H Hv v≤  and the assumptions from Section 3.2 we find that all multipliers 
are larger than zero and get the equilibrium values proposed in the proposition for the 
case where [ ]0,H Hv v∈ . Substituting the solutions back in the constraints and 
rearranging shows that none of the constraints is violated.90  
Next conjecture that (3), (6h), (6l) and (8) are binding, whereas (4), (5h), (5l) 
and (7) are slack. The Lagrangean then becomes 
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 + − − + 
 + − − 
+
+
+ − + −  
 
Using γ γ≤ , H H Hv v v≤ <  and the assumptions from Section 3.2 we again find the 
multipliers to be larger than zero and get the equilibrium values proposed in the 
proposition for the case [ ],H H Hv v v∈ . As before, substitution of these values into the 
constraints and rearranging confirms that all constraints are fulfilled by the solution. 
                                                 
90 More detailed calculations of this and later maximization problems are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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 Finally, using γ γ≤ , H Hv v≥  and the assumptions from Section 3.2, simple 
substitution of the first best values into the constraints and rearranging confirms that the 
first best can be achieved for H Hv v≥ .      Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. 
First conjecture that (3), (6h), (6l) and (8) are binding, whereas (4), (5h), (5l), and (7) 
are slack. This gives us the Lagrangean 
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Using γ γ> , H Hv v′<  and the assumptions from Section 3.2 we find that all multipliers 
are larger than zero and get the equilibrium values proposed in the proposition for the 
case where [ ]0,H Hv v′∈ . Substituting the solutions back in the constraints and 
rearranging shows that none of the constraints is violated. 
 Next conjecture that (3), (4), (6h), (6l) and (8) are binding, whereas (5h), (5l) 
and (7) are slack. The Lagrangean then becomes 
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Using γ γ> , H H Hv v v′ ≤ < and the assumptions from Section 3.2 we again find the 
multipliers to be larger than zero and get the equilibrium values proposed in the 
proposition for the case [ ],H H Hv v v′∈ . As before, substitution of these values into the 
constraints and rearranging confirms that all constraints are fulfilled by the solution. 
 Finally, using γ γ> , H Hv v≥  and the assumptions from Section 3.2, simple 
substitution of the first best values into the constraints and rearranging confirms that the 
first best can be achieved for H Hv v≥ .       Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.3. 
First note that in the case H Hv v≥  we are in first best. Hence, rationing can only be 
profitable if H Hv v< . Let us assume this to be the case. Denote by 
FB
iC  (
SB
iC ) the first 
best (second best) contract offered to type i  according to program (P2); and denote a 
no-trade situation by N . As for low types FB SBL LC C= , rationing high types can never 
improve the monopolist's profit. The most profitable strategy that possibly rations low 
types is offering FBHC  only. 
 As the low type's incentive constraint is binding if H Hv v< , we must have 
FB FB
H L LC Cf . Furthermore, 
FB SB
L L LC C:  as 
FB SB
L LC C= . Finally, since the low type's 
participation constraint is fulfilled, we must have SBL LC Nf . Hence, by transitivity of 
L 's preferences, FBH LC Nf . This means that the most profitable candidate for rationing 
actually does not involve any rationing if offered alone. Therefore, there exists no 
rationing contract that generates a higher profit for the monopolist than the solution to 
program (P2).          Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Lemma 3.1. 
Suppose there exists a pooling equilibrium in which only the bundle ( ), ,P P P PC p qα=  
is offered by the media firms. As both types consume the bundle, the advertising rate 
that PC  generates is ( )1P H Lδ γδ γ δ= + − . Since firms engage in Bertrand competition, 
we must have that PC  entails zero profits for media firms. 
We will first prove the lemma for the case 0Pα > . Consider entry of a firm that 
offers bundle ( )1 1 2, ,A P P P PC p qε α ε δ ε= + − −  with 1ε  and 2ε  small.91 We will show 
that there exist 1 0ε >  and 2 0ε >  such that all high types strictly prefer AC , all low 
types strictly prefer PC  and the entering firm makes a strictly positive profit. Evidently, 
this is a contradiction to PC  being a pooling equilibrium contract. 
From (1) and after simple rearranging we find that A H PC Cf  is equivalent to 
2 1 1L Pε ε β δ< − . Similarly, P L AC Cf  is equivalent to 2 1 1H Pε ε β δ> − . There must 
exist small 1ε  and 2ε  such that both inequalities are fulfilled as L Hβ β> . Let ε  be a 
value of 2 1ε ε  such that both conditions hold. 
As firms make zero profits with PC  alone, AC  makes positive profits whenever 
AC  generates higher profits than PC . From (2) and after some rearranging we find that 
this is the case whenever ( )1 2P P H H Pα ε δ ε δ δ δ> + − . Substituting 2 1ε ε ε= ⋅  into this 
inequality yields ( ) 11P P H H Pα δ εδ δ δ ε> + −   . Clearly, this inequality holds for small 
enough 1ε , which completes the proof for 0Pα > . 
In the case 0Pα =  an analogous proof can be used, where this time quality and 
price are varied in the destabilizing contract (instead of advertising and price). Q.E.D. 
 
                                                 
91 This guarantees that the non-negativity constraint for advertising is not violated. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.4. 
First conjecture that (6l), (8) and (9) are binding, whereas (5h), (5l), (6h) and (7) are 
slack. This gives us the Lagrangean 
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Using H Hv v<  and the assumptions from Section 3.2 we find that all multipliers are 
larger than zero and get the equilibrium values proposed in the proposition for the case 
where [ )0,H Hv v∈ . Substituting the solutions back in the constraints and rearranging 
shows that none of the constraints is violated. 
 Next conjecture that (6h), (6l), (8) and (9) are binding, whereas (5h), (5l) and (7) 
are slack. The Lagrangean then becomes 
( ) ( )( )
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Using H H Hv v v′≤ <  and the assumptions from Section 3.2 we again find the multipliers 
to be larger than zero and get the equilibrium values proposed in the proposition for the 
case [ ),H H Hv v v′∈ . As before, substitution of these values into the constraints and 
rearranging confirms that all constraints are fulfilled by the solution. 
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 Finally, using H Hv v′≥  and the assumptions from Section 3.2, simple substitution 
of the first best values into the constraints and rearranging confirms that the first best 
can be achieved for H Hv v′≥ .        Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.5 
A pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if there does not exist a pooling contract 
( ), ,P P P PC p qα=  that the high types prefer to their separating contract 
( ), ,SB SB SB SBH H H HC p qα=  and that generates non-negative profits for a media company 
offering it. Denote by *PC  the pooling contract that is the most preferable for high types 
among the contracts that generate non-negative profits for firms if the advertising rate is 
( )1P H Lδ γδ γ δ= + − . This contract can be found just as the first best contract for high 
types, but replacing Hδ  with Pδ . First assume that 1H Lβ δ > . This guarantees that 
advertising is the efficient way of financing the pooling media product. Then the best 
pooling contract corresponds to the solution to program (P3), with Hδ  replaced by Pδ . 
We will proceed in several steps. 
 
Step 1: ( ) ( )ˆ 0 0,1γ ∈  
 For 1γ = , we must have * SBP H HC Cf  as 
* FB
P HC C=  in that case. And we know 
FB SB
H H HC Cf  as 
SB
HC  is distorted away from first best at 0Hv = . For 0γ =  we must have 
*SB
H H PC Cf  as 
* SB
P LC C=  in that case. And we know that 
SB SB
H H LC Cf  from the fact that 
(7) is slack in program (P4). Clearly, the utility that *PC  generates for high types is 
continuously increasing in γ , as an increase in γ  increases Pδ  in a continuous way. 
Hence, there exists a unique ( ) ( )ˆ 0 0,1γ ∈  at which * SBP H HC C: . 
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Step 2: ( )ˆ 1Hvγ =  for all H Hv v′≥  
 This follows immediately from Proposition 3.4, as the first best must constitute a 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium for every H Hv v′≥ . 
 
Step 3: ( ) ( )* 0SBH H H H P HV C v V C v∂ ∂ >∂ ∂ ≥  and ( )* 0H PV C γ∂ ∂ >  for all H Hv v′<  
Substituting the equilibrium values in (1) for high types and taking derivatives we find 
( )( )* ,
0H P H P H
H
V C v
v
v
γ δ
ϕ
∂
= ≥
∂
 for all H Hv v′< , 
( )( ) ( )
[ )
( ) [ )
1  for 0,
,
0 for all 
2
 for ,
H L
H H HSB
H LH H H
H H
H H L
H H H
L
v v v
V C v
v v
v
c v v v
δ β
ϕ β βγ
δ δ
ϕδ
− ∈ −∂  ′= ≥ <∂ − ′∈

 
and 
( )( )* 2, >0H P H H L H L H
P P
V C v
c v
γ δ δ δ δ
γ δ δ
∂ − −
= +
∂
 for all H Hv v′< . 
Simple comparisons show that ( ) ( )*SBH H H H P HV C v V C v∂ ∂ ≤∂ ∂  would imply that either 
H Hv v′≥  or ( )0 1 0H P L H Pβ δ β δ δ> − ≥ − > , both of which is a contradiction.  
 
Step 4: ( )ˆ 0H Hd v d vγ >  for all H Hv v′≤  
 ( )ˆ Hvγ is implicitly defined by the equation 
( )( ) ( )( )*, , 0SBH H H H P HV C v V C vγ γ− = , whose left-hand-side is a function ( ), HF vγ . 
From the implicit function theorem we have ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ H H Hd v d v F v Fγ γ= − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . 
Therefore,  
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
*
*
*
*
, ,ˆ
, ,
, ,
0,
,
SB
H H H H H P H HH
SB
H H H H H P H
SB
H H H H H P H H
H P H
V C v v V C v vd v
dv V C v V C v
V C v v V C v v
V C v
γ γγ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ
∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂
= >
∂ ∂
 
where we use ( )( ), 0SBH H HV C vγ γ∂ ∂ =  from Proposition 3.4 and 
( )( ) ( )( )*, , 0SBH H H H H P H HV C v v V C v vγ γ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ >  and ( )( )* , 0H P HV C vγ γ∂ ∂ >  from 
Step 3.  
 
Step 5: ˆ 1γ →  as H Hv v′→  
 As H Hv v′→  we have 
SB FB
H HC C→  from Proposition 3.4. Also we know 
*FB
H H PC Cf  for 1γ < . Hence for every 1γ <  there exists an 0ε >  such that 
( ) ( )*, ,SBH H H P HC v C vγ ε γ ε′ ′− −f , which proves the statement. 
 
Taken together, Steps 1, 2, 4 and 5 prove the proposition for the case 1H Lβ δ > . 
If this condition is not met, the high types will prefer financing of the pooling media 
product by price rather than advertising whenever 1H Pβ δ ≤ . In this case, it may thus be 
that the equilibrium values in *PC  change if γ  gets too low. Simple adaptation of the 
above steps for the new equilibrium values then completes the proof.  Q.E.D. 
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3.7.2 Analysis of Alternative Monopoly Cases 
 
In this Appendix we analyze the monopoly media case in the situation where one type 
has both a higher willingness to pay and a higher willingness to accept advertising. Let 
us first consider the subcase where H LU U≥  and H H L LU Uβ β≥ , that is where the 
high types have a higher willingness to pay in both dimensions. In this case, the high 
types are unambiguously the more attractive customers for the monopolist. This renders 
the optimal behavior of the monopolist similar to price discriminating behavior in 
standard goods markets (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). We forgo presenting the formal 
solution to this case; instead we will present the results graphically.92 Figure A.3.4 
shows the results. 
 
Second Best
First Best
 
Figure A.3.4: The Alternative Monopoly Case 
                                                 
92 A complete algebraic solution for this case is available from the authors upon request. 
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The first notable feature of this case is that high types have to be impeded from 
choosing the low type contract. This implies that they receive their first best quality 
throughout (no distortion at the top). In addition, they have to endure less advertising 
than in first best (that is, they receive an information rent). Low types quality is 
distorted downwards throughout, in order to deter high types. Note that this quality 
distortion is not due to the adverse selection of advertising, but due to price 
discrimination, quite contrary to the case that is analyzed in the main text. As can be 
seen from Figure A.3.4, in the present case it is never possible to obtain the first best. 
However, for Hv →∞  the optimal price discriminating contract converges to the first 
best contract. Note that it may be profitable for the monopolist to ration low types. 
Rationing will occur whenever γ is high, HU  is high and Hv  is low. 
 Next turn to the case where low types have a higher willingness to pay in both 
dimensions, that is L HU U≥  and L L H HU Uβ β≥ . This is the case that has been 
analyzed by Srinagesh and Bradburd (1989) for standard goods. This time, however, the 
results in the media market do not match the results in goods markets at all. Quite to the 
contrary, the analysis in this case corresponds to the analysis in the main text in all but 
one subcases. The only difference occurs when γ γ≤  and [ )0,H Hv v∈ . Even in this 
subcase, a difference to the main text only occurs within an interval [ )0, Hv′′ , where 
H Hv v′′ < . In this subinterval there will be pooling of types. Whether the pooling involves 
positive price and zero advertising or the other way around depends on the parameters. 
Since this difference is so minor we forgo a more detailed analysis. 
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